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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
During the 1970s, the combination of rapidly appreciating land 
values with the trend toward fewer but larger farms dramatically 
increased the potential equity drain due to estate taxation. When the 
continuation of the farm business is an objective of the parents, there 
is an increasing interest to begin the intergenerational transfer process 
during the parents' lifetimes instead of at their deaths. The focus of 
this dissertation is upon the role of equity and nonequity financing 
within the corporate structure as a means of facilitating the intergener­
ational transfer of the family farm prior to death. 
The desire of the parents to continue the life cycle of the farm 
beyond one generation is not enough. There must be a son, daughter or 
other family member who wants to manage the farm operation. The on-farm 
heir must have the skills and been given the opportunity and responsibil­
ity to make management decisions prior to the parents' deaths. The size 
of the farm is also important since it must be large enough to provide a 
reasonable standard of living for the succeeding family member and his or 
her family. Finally, continuity beyond one generation depends on the 
type of transfer plan and the number of on-farm and off-farm heirs 
involved. As a result of these considerations, it is often difficult to 
provide for the continuation of many farms beyond one generation. But 
for those family farms where continuity is desired and feasible, there is 
an Increasing trend to initiate the transfer process as early as 
possible. 
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One approach to this problem is to transfer asset ownership by gift 
or sale from parents to the heir. But the transfer of the asset entails 
the loss of control of that asset to the parents. A preferred approach 
is to gift or sell a minority interest in the farm to the heir while 
maintaining sufficient control of the farm assets to generate adequate 
retirement income. In addition, the parents may wish to reduce their 
management responsibilities and increase the responsibilities of the heir 
so that the heir can gain experience in managing the business. Finally, 
in inflationary periods, the parents may wish to "freeze" the value of 
their Interest in the farm to mitigate the potential liquidity drain from 
estate taxation. 
The corporate form of business organization is the most conducive 
accomplishing these objectives. Although the same outcomes can be 
achieved with the sole proprietorship and partnership, the corporation 
provides the greatest flexibility in structuring and carrying out the 
Intergenerational transfer process. Within a corporate organizational 
form, an equity Interest in the farm can be transferred to the heir in 
the form of shares of common stock. An investor Interest is accomplished 
with intrafamily loans or bonds. The Interest payments, along with divi­
dends, salaries and directors' fees, can be used to provide the parents 
and the heir with adequate Incomes. But in a world of uncertainty, 
common stock, loans, bonds and Income sharing plans may not always 
produce their Intended effects for both the parents and the heir. 
The appropriate framework within which to evaluate equity and non­
equity financing of the business and its transfer Is whole farm planning 
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under uncertainty. Whole farm planning In agriculture requires the joint 
awareness and Integration of the production, investment and finance 
mlcrotheorles. The production mlcrotheory addresses the questions of 
which commodities to produce In what quantities using which technologies. 
The investment mlcrotheory addresses the issue of which assets to acquire 
to provide the inputs needed in the production process. The finance 
mlcrotheory answers the question of how the needed assets should be 
acquired. 
Furthermore, any analysis of whole farm decision making which 
assumes the decision maker knows with certainty the outcome of his 
decision at the time he makes it Introduces a degree of artificiality 
into the analysis. To be sure, many worthwhile Inferences about economic 
behavior have been developed under the assumption of certainty. However, 
the present trend is toward modeling economic behavior in an uncertain 
environment. Not only does this provide the model with more realism, the 
results are more applicable to real world situations. 
There are a number of reasons why uncertainty is likely to become 
more important in agriculture In the future. Agriculture has been 
characterized by rapid technological change over the last two decades. 
Typically, this new technology is capital intensive, which requires more 
expensive and more specialized (and therefore less liquid) assets in the 
production process. This phenomenon Increases the fixed operating costs 
of the farm and thereby increases the firm's exposure to operating risk. 
Â heavier reliance on purchased inputs makes agricultural enterprises 
more susceptible to price changes in other sectors of the economy. High 
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Interest rates, combined with the Increased volatility in the national 
money markets, have increased the fixed financing costs and the financial 
risk of farming (78, 124). In addition, agriculture is also evidencing a 
trend toward lower and more variable profit margins (70, 90, and 124). 
This trend leads to lower but more variable after-tax cash flows. 
Inflation as a cause of uncertainty has become of particular concern 
during the last decade. Inflationary expectations have been bid into 
land prices (35, 60 and 74) and interest rates. Inflation, at least in 
the short run, reduces farm income and liquidity while increasing capital 
gains and leads to greater income instability (78). 
In addition to these causes of uncertainty, a number of other causes 
always have influenced and will continue to influence decision making in 
agriculture. These sources include weather and climate variability, the 
biological processes Inherent in agriculture, inaccurate and incomplete 
information, uncertain product demand, uncertain government programs, and 
government intervention. As a result, the farm firm must operate within 
an ever more uncertain environment, and it is within this uncertain 
environment that intergenerational transfers must be accomplished. 
Purpose of this Study 
The purpose of this study is to address the issue of facilitating 
the intergenerational transfer of the family farm where a relevant goal 
is continuing the business beyond one generation. For a father and 
mother who wish to bring their son or daughter into the farming 
operation, there exist a multitude of equity and nonequity financing 
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methods which will facilitate the transfer process during the lives of 
the parents. These financing methods will ultimately vest control of the 
farm in the heir. The options available are limited by only the imagina­
tion and creativeness of the parties involved. But it is not clear, in 
an uncertain world, as to the costs and benefits of various financing 
arrangements to the parents or to the heir. 
In particular, the inter vivos effects of selected financing 
arrangements are analyzed with the Iowa State University Business and 
Financial Planning Model for representative farms operating in an 
inflationary and uncertain environment. Each representative farm is 
assumed to be incorporated with only one on-farm heir. The financing 
arrangement is selected and implemented at the beginning of the planning 
process. It can not be changed to another financing arrangement during 
the planning horizon. The financing arrangements selected for study are 
the following: 
1. Common Stock 
In this situation the parents transfer an equity interest 
in the farm firm with shares of common stock. Initial ownership 
patterns of 100 percent held by the parents, 80 percent held by 
the parents and 60 percent held are analyzed for each of four 
representative farm sizes. Therefore, the son (or daughter) is 
assumed to initially own 0, 20, or 40 percent of the common 
stock. 
2. Loans 
Constant principal loans at the market rate of Interest and 
three percent below the market rate are analyzed as an 
alternative to the ownership of common stock by the parents and 
by the child. 
3. Bonds 
An interest only loan with principal paid in one balloon 
payment at maturity is also analyzed. The rate of interest are 
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set at market and at three percent below market. These are 
analyzed for both the parents and the child. 
Closely related to the financing arrangements are Income sharing 
plans. The following income-sharing plans are analyzed: 
1. Dividends 
Dividends on common stock are a vehicle for distributing 
the firm's past and present earnings to the family members in 
relation to their ownership. 
2. Salaries and directors' fees 
Salaries and directors' fees can be used to distribute 
earnings in relation to contributed labor and management 
skills. 
3. Interest payments 
Interest payments on intrafamily loans and bonds can be 
used to distribute the firm's earnings in relation to investor 
interests in the firm. 
Outline of the Study 
The following outline is used in this study. The tasks listed below 
are in the sequence in which they appear in the following chapters : 
1. Although there is a consensus that risk should be incorporated 
into the decision making process, there is no consensus on the best 
method of Incorporation. Chapter II reviews several methods often used 
to handle risk and develops the maximization of expected utility as the 
best method. 
2. Because the exact specification of the utility function Is not 
known (and, for the sake of generality, it need not be known), stochastic 
dominance is developed in Chapter III as the means for choosing the 
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financing arrangement which maximizes expected utility irtien only certain 
characteristics are known about the shape of the utility function. 
3* The theory of the firm under risk as an integrated «Aole of the 
production, investment and finance microtheories is developed in Chapter 
IV. The components which make up total business risk based on these 
three microtheories are presented. 
This disucssion of the theory of the firm also Includes a review of 
the role of equity and nonequity financing. 
4. The empirical model, necessary data requirements and representa­
tive farms are presented in Chapter V. 
5. In Chapter VI, selected equity and nonequity financing arrange­
ments are analyzed for the representative farms with the Iowa State 
University Business and Financial Planning Model. 
6. Chapter VII presents the results and conclusions of this study 
and suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER II, INCORPORATING RISK IN THE 
DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
Much of economic theory was developed under the assumption that the 
decision maker knew the outcome of his decision at the time the decision 
was made. Although this led to many worthwhile inferences about economic 
behavior, a certain degree of artificiality is present in these 
analyses. 
Over the last twenty years, there has been a growing emphasis on 
Incorporating risk In decision making situations to more realistically 
model economic behavior. Although the consensus is that risk should be 
Included in economic modeling, there is not general agreement on the best 
procedure for doing so. 
Risk Versus Uncertainty 
Until recently, researchers consistently distinguished between risk 
and uncertainty. This distinction was first proposed by Frank Knight.^ 
1. Risk refers to a situation in which several events or outcomes 
are possible. The probability of each event occurring is known 
and can be expressed as an objective value. 
2. Uncertainty refers to a similar situation except that the 
numerical probabilities of the different outcomes cannot be 
specified. 
1 This definition is restated by Friedman (44, p. 282). 
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Statistically, a risky prospect is one for which the parameters of 
Che probability distribution are known, while uncertainty implies that 
the parameters are unknown. 
Although this distinction was adhered to in the past, it no longer 
is. Rothschild and Stlglltz (107, p. 225) use the terms interchangeably. 
Friedman (44, p. 282) contends that the distinction between risk and 
uncertainty is no longer valid because the decision maker forms his own 
subjective probabilities when Information is not available. The fact 
that these personal, subjective probabilities may not agree with those of 
other individuals is not important. What is important is that the 
individual acts as if the probabilities are known. Following Friedman, 
no distinction between the terms will be made in this study and the terms 
will be used Interchangeably. 
The Decision Making Process 
By definition, a decision Involves a choice among alternative 
courses of action offering different consequences (134, p. 4). The 
decision maker selects one course of action from all of the strategies 
available to him. In Its simplest form, the decision process can be 
portrayed as in Figure 1. Each in Figure 1 represents a course of 
action or strategy of which there are n available to the decision maker. 
Each Sj represents an outcome state or state of nature which may 
prevail with probability of occurrence Pj. In total, there are m 
possible outcome states. The consequences (usually measured in monetary 
Courses 
of Action 
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terms) of selecting strategy When outcome state Sj prevails Is 
indicated by C^j. If only one column in Figure 1 is associated with 
a nonzero probability (I.e., only one Sj can occur), then the decision 
maker is said to know with certainty the outcome of each strategy before 
the choice is made. In this case, the decision maker chooses the 
strategy that produces the most desirable consequence. However, if it is 
possible for more than one outcome to prevail (more than one outcome 
state has a nonzero probability of occurrence), then the decision maker 
is uncertain as to the ultimate consequence of any course of action. Now 
the decision maker must employ some criterion to determine the most 
desirable course of action. 
Alternate Criteria of Choice 
There is no consensus as to what the best criteria of choice should 
be, although several criteria have received extensive treatment in 
economic research. The expected value, safety first, utility 
maximization, expected utility maximization, mean-variance and stochastic 
dominance criteria will briefly be reviewed in the remainder of this 
chapter. Although no attempt is made to make this list all inclusive, 
these do represent the most popular and widely used criteria. 
Expected value criteria 
From economic theory, a profit-maximizing firm will equate Its 
marginal revenue from production with its marginal cost of production. 
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In a world of certainty with well defined production and cost functions, 
this Is nothing more than an exercise In algebra. But for a perfectly 
competitive firm operating In an uncertain environment, the price and 
quantity of output will not be known at the time the decision is made on 
how much to produce. The decision maker, if adhering to the expected 
value criteria, would use the expected price and expected quantity in his 
decision process and give no recognition to the probability distribution 
of expected price or expected quantity. 
If the ultimate price and quantity which prevail are the same as the 
expectation, then thé decision maker has equated marginal revenue with 
marginal cost. However, if the ultimate price and quantity which prevail 
are something other than those expected, the decision maker has made a 
less than optimal decision. The reason the expected value criteria 
produces suboptimal results Is that it gives no recognition to the 
possibility of more than one outcome occurring. 
The shortcomings of the expected value criteria have been known for 
quite some time. In 1732, Daniel Bernoulli (11, pp.. 23-26) used a ficti­
tious game, the St. Petersburg Paradox, to Illustrate that the expected 
value criteria could not be representative of rational human behavior. 
In Bernoulli's game, a fair coin is tossed until a head appears. If a 
head appears on the nth toss, the player receives 2^ dollars. As an 
alternative to playing the game, the player Is offered a finite sum of 
money, such as one hundred dollars. The player must decide whether to 
accept the finite sum or toss the coin until a head appears and then 
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receive 2^ dollars. Under the expected value criteria, the expected 
value of the St. Petersburg Paradox is infinite, as shown in Equation 
2-1. 
EV - -i- 2® - (2-1) 
But when people were offered a choice between playing the game and a 
finite sum, they opted for the finite sum. Bernoulli concluded that 
expected value is not applicable in explaining the behavior of people who 
act rationally. Bernoulli (11, p. 24) argues that expected value is a 
function of price which Is the same for all persons, but the value of an 
item to a person is the utility that it yields. Furthermore, Bernoulli 
hypothesized that utility is a function of existing wealth and that 
Increases in wealth result in Increases in utility, but at a decreasing 
rate. It was not until 1947 that Bernoulli's hypotheses were put on a 
rigorous foundation. 
Safety^first criteria 
There are a number of variants which fall within the collective name 
of safety-first criteria. Basically, all safety-first variants place the 
top priority upon survival (3, p. 88). They require that the actual 
payoff exceed some minimum critical level with some specified prob­
ability. The decision maker's basic strategy is to avoid outcomes which 
would result in personal disaster. If the individual, after assuring the 
strategy chosen will not lead to disaster, tries to maximize some gain, 
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then the ordering of strategies becomes lexicographic. In this approach, 
a prospect with a smaller chance of failure Is always preferred to a 
prospect with a larger chance of failure even If the latter has a much 
higher expected value of gain. 
Chance constrained programming (116, pp. 134-140) and focus of loss 
(17) are examples of safety-first variants. The analysis of particular 
situations, such as beginning farmers with a very small equity base, may 
suggest that suirvlval Is the paramount goal to satisfy; In these 
situations, safety-first"may be the appropriate method. However, a more 
general approach Is needed because the safety-first criteria focuses 
attention on the left-most tall of the distribution and Ignores the 
right-tall (83, pp. 41-42). Only In the special case of two prospects 
with Identical chances of failure will the safety-first rule and the 
expected value rule coincide (3, p. 88). 
Utility maximization 
The concept of utility is nothing more than the association of an 
uncertain outcome with a real number in such a fashion that the larger 
the utility value of the uncertain outcome, the more desirable is that 
outcome. Referring back to Figure 1 (and assuming that more than one 
Pj has a positive probability of occurring), it is convenient to view 
the consequences of each strategy as a lottery or a gamble. If the 
probabilities satisfy the conditions of 
m 
0 ^  Pj ^  1 for j • 1 to m, and S Pj « 1, (2-2) 
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then the full set of lotteries can be mapped into utility space where the 
utility values are denominated in real numbers. 
Certain conditions must hold before utility values can represent the 
relative desirability of different lotteries (132, p. 9). From Figure 1, 
let Ai refer to the ith lottery and U(Âi) refer to the utility value 
of lottery i. Then the first condition which must be satisfied is the 
complete ordering of the lotteries. For all pairs of lotteries from the 
total set of lotteries, must be preferred to ^  (i^j), or Âj 
must be preferred to Ai, or Ai and Aj must be of equal desir­
ability. Only one of these three possibilities can be true for any pair 
of lotteries. The second condition which must hold true is that the 
ordering of lotteries must be transitive. That is, if is preferred 
to A2 and A2 is preferred to A3, then it must also be true that 
ki is preferred to A3. 
If the conditions of a complete and transitive ordering of lotteries 
hold, then utility values denominated in real numbers can represent the 
relative desirability of the lotteries. It follows that the best action 
to pursue is the one which results in the largest (or maximum) utility. 
Although this is a very general criterion of choice, the question 
still unanswered is how to join the possible consequences of any lottery 
into a single value. The sections which follow on expected utility 
maximization, mean-variance, and stochastic dominance are all subsets of 
utility maximization and describe how the consequences can be aggregated 
into a single utility measure. 
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Expected utility maximization criterion 
The maximization of expected utility was first proposed by Bernoulli 
in 1732, proved by Bamsey in 1931 (104), and independently proved again 
by Von Neumann and Itorgenstern in 1947 (131) 
It was Von Neumann and Morgenstern's published work which introduced 
the expected utility concept to decision theory. The maximum expected 
utility criterion Is a rule which combines the utility values of a 
lottery's uncertain consequences with its associated probabilities into a 
single utility value for that lottery. As shown in Figure 2, each 
consequence from Figure 1 is measured in terms of its utility n(C^j), 
which is the utility of the consequence of the 1th lottery if the jth 
outcome state prevails. is the probability of occurrence 
associated with consequence 
The expected utility of any lottery is 
EU(L^) - p^j" U(C^^) + p^2* ^(C^g) + . . . + (2-3) 
This section draws upon the material from Horowitz (59, pp. 
340-350) and Luce and Halffa (82, pp. 23-28). A list of sources 
providing more formal proofs is given by Borch (16, p. 33). 
^The probabilities now have two subscripts indicating that the 
probability of any consequence occurring depends not only upon which 
state of nature prevails, but also upon the course of action chosen. 
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Outcome States 
Lotteries 
«2 «m 
U(C„) n(Cj2) . 
U(C22) . 
:Cn2) • 
Probabilities 
^1 ^21 ^nl 
"l2 ^22 ^2 
^im ^2m • ^nm 
Figure 2 A lottery table measured In utilities 
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where the expected utility is the sum of the 1th row of the utility 
matrix times the jth column of the probability matrix of Figure 2. The 
lottery which results in the maximum expected utility is the lottery 
which is most desirable. 
The maximization of expected utility is applicable to any decision 
making situation under risk provided the decision maker is willing to 
adhere to certain utility axioms. These axioms are often referred to as 
the Von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms of rational behaivor. 
The first and second axioms of rational behavior are the complete 
and transitive ordering of all lotteries which were described in the 
previous section on utility maximization. In addition to these two 
axioms, the following axioms must also hold. 
The third axiom is continuity. Given three lotteries designated as 
Lg, and where is preferred to Lg, and Lg is 
preferred to Lg, there then exists some probability p (where 0 < p < 1) 
such that the decision maker is indifferent to choosing between Lg 
a combination of and Lg. Mathematically, the axiom of continuity 
holds if the following is true for all subsets of lotteries: 
L2 " p • Lj + (1 - p) • Lg. (2-4) 
The fourth axiom deals with the reduction of compound lotteries into 
simple lotteries. This means that a compound lottery can be restated as 
a simple lottery which is at least as preferred as the compound lottery. 
The right hand side of Equation 2-4 can be viewed as a compound lottery 
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since L| and Lg are themselves composed of a series of consequences, 
C^j's, and associated probabilities, p^^'s. The left-hand side 
of Equation 2-4 is the simple lottery which is at least as preferred as 
the compound lottery. If Equation 2-4 holds for all combinations of 
lotteries» the third and fourth axioms of rational behaivor are 
satisfied. 
The fifth axiom is independence. If the decision maker is indif­
ferent to the choice between two lotteries denoted by and Lg and 
is also indifferent to the choice between two other lotteries denoted by 
Ig and L^, then a lottery, can be constructed from lotteries 
and Lg and another lottery, Lg, can be constructed from 
lotteries ^4 as 
Lj « p • Lj + (1 - p) • Lj and (2-5) 
Lg - P • L2 + (1 - p) • L^. (2-6) 
If the probability p appearing in Equations 2-5 and 2-6 is the same, then 
the decision maker will be indifferent to the choice between lotteries 
li^ and Ijg. 
The last axiom of rational behavior addresses the preference of 
lotteries constructed with unequal probabilities. If the decision maker 
prefers lottery to lottery and constructs two lotteries, 
and L^, by combining with Lg, such as 
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Lj • p • Lj + (1 - p) • Lj and (2-7) 
- r • Lj + (1 - r) * Lg* (2-8) 
lottery Lg will be preferred only to if p is greater than r. If p 
is less than (or equal to) r, than must be preferred (or indifferent 
to) to Lg. 
If these six axioms of rational behavior are true for a decision 
maker, it is always possible to map the decision maker's preferences into 
utilities (82, p. 29). 
If the utility mapping is denominated in monetary terms, then it is 
possible to restate the preference ordering of all lotteries in terms of 
the most preferred and least preferred lotteries. The last axiom 
concerning unequal probabilities can then be used to evaluate the 
riskiness of any lottery. This technique is often used In empirical work 
to construct a decision maker's preferences.^ 
Alternatively, it is frequently assumed that the mapping of prefer­
ences Into utility numbers can be expressed as a mathematical function. 
If this function is continuous and dlfferentlable, then Equation 2-9 
below can be solved via calculus to find the mairimum expected utility for 
a decision problem Involving risk. The expected utility of some risky 
prospect T is 
^Refer to Binswanger (12, pp. 395-407) and Dillon and Scandizzo 
(28, pp. 425-435) for empirical applications of this approach. 
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b 
EU(Y) - / n(y)f(y)dy, a < y <b, (2-9) 
a 
where 
U(y) Is the mathematical form of the utility function 
(expressed here in its most general form), and 
f(y) is the associated probability density function.^ 
Although it has been shown to be theoretically possible to construct 
utility functions for an individual or a group of individuals (3, pp. 
69-100), the problem still remains as to how a utility function or an 
individual's attitude toward risk (to be discussed shortly) can be 
measured empirically* In 1957, Luce and Raiffa (82, pp. 34-35) were 
somewhat pessimistic about the possibility of actually producing such a 
function. Luce and Suppes (83) reviewed early experimental work on 
measurements of attitudes toward risk. Officer and Halter (98) used 
approaches based on utility theory and the elicitation of certainty 
equivalents using hypothetical choice techniques. In 1980, Binswanger 
(12, pp. 395-407) used an experimental technique with actual payouts with 
a certain degree of success.^ 
At present, the elicitation of utility functions is a difficult, 
time consuming, and expensive exercise prone to errors and biases. 
^If the mapping is discrete, then Equation 2-3 provides the 
appropriate result. 
Hans Binswanger's conclusions would indicate virtually all 
individuals are moderately risk averse and that wealth tends to reduce 
risk aversion slightly, although the effect was not statistically 
significant. 
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However, much progress has been made since the mid-1950s and undoubtedly 
will continue to be made in the future. The weight of the empirical 
evidence supports the contention that the elicitation of utility 
functions is indeed possible. Therefore, the maximization of expected 
utility as the choice criterion is viable and empirically implementable. 
In empirical applications. Equation 2-9 requires an exact specifica-<-
tion of the functional form of utility. Even if an exact specification 
can be determined, the results are applicable only to the particular 
decision maker (and others, if any, who might have the identical specifi­
cation of utility). Although these results would be very useful to the 
individual, they would probably be of little use to anyone else. 
Generally, it is more useful in economic research to generate results 
which will be applicable to a group of decision makers instead of a 
single individual. This can be accomplished by placing restrictions upon 
the shape of the utility function. The results of the study are then 
applicable to all decision makers whose utility functions satisfy the 
stipulated restrictions. The more exacting the restrictions, the smaller 
the group of decision makers to which the results are applicable. There 
is, therefore, a trade-off between the generality to whom the results 
pertain and the definitiveness of the results. 
Mean-variance analysis and stochastic dominance are two subsets of 
expected utility maximization which can be used as criteria of choice 
without the need to specify the exact functional form of the utility 
function. But before these are discussed, it is necessary to discuss a 
decision maker's possible attitudes toward risk. 
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Attitudes Towards Risk 
To facilitate decision making under uncertainty. It Is necessary to 
assume that utility can be completely described In monetary terms (such 
as Income, wealth or money payoffs). Furthermore, It Is necessary to 
assume that utility Is nonnegatlve and monotonlcally Increasing. This 
Implies, as shown In Figure 3, that utility Increases with Increasing 
wealth, no matter what the decision maker's attitude toward risk. The 
three attitudes or behaviors towards risk are defined as risk aversion, 
risk neutrality, and risk seeking. 
Risk averse behavior means an Individual prefers a known situation 
to a risky situation even when the two situations have the same expected 
outcome. Utility functions of risk averse Individuals are concave In 
wealth (I.e., they evidence decreasing marginal utility), as shown In 
Figures 3 and 4.^ That Is, the first derivative Is positive and the 
second derivative Is negative. 
^Formally, for a gamble with two possible outcomes, x and y, with 
probabilities P(X-x)"« and P(X-y)"l-«, (K « ^  1, risk aversion 
requires that ~ "" . 
«• U(x) +(!-«) U(y) ^  D[« • X + (1 - «) • y]. 
Any utility function satisfying this condition for all combinations 
of X and y on some bounded interval I is said to be concave on I. ' If, in 
addition, the inequality is strict lAienever x f y, the function is said 
to be strictly concave. 
Strict concavity Is equivalent to a positive first derivative of 
utility which is strictly decreasing with increasing wealth, or a 
negative second derivative. For a proof of this equivalence, refer to 
Hardy, Llttlewood and Polya (50); Mangasarlan (85) or Zangwlll (136). 
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Figure 4. Risk averse behavior 
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Figure 4 is an example of risk averse behavior lAiere Increasing 
utility is measured along the vertical axis and the monetary terms are 
measured along the horizontal axis. In Figure 4, outcomes and Yg 
have utility values U(Yj) and UCYj) respectively. The linear line 
segment AC describes a risky lottery composed of a combination of Yj^  
and Y2* Point B, the midpoint of represents a risky prospect with 
a fifty percent probability of outcome Y^ occurring and a fifty percent 
chance of Y2 occurring. The expected value of this risky prospect is 
l/2(Yj + Yg) and the expected utility is U(Yq). A risk averse 
individual would be indifferent to the certain outcome Yq and a risky 
prospect of 1/2 of Y^ and 1/2 of Yg since both result in the same 
level of utility. Yq Is said to be the certainty equivalent of the 
risky prospect 1/2(Y^  + Yj). 
Conversely, the difference between l/2(Yj + Yg) and Yg is the 
risk premium the individual demands to take on the risk. There are two 
equivalent ways of viewing the risk premium. One view Is that the risk 
premium is the additional compensation, demanded by the decision maker to 
take on the risk. The other view Is that the risk premium is the amount 
of Income or wealth the Individual would be willing to for go to avoid 
the risk. The risk premiums demanded by risk averse Individuals are 
always positive. 
A decision maker who is risk neutral is indifferent to risk and 
ranks prospects based upon their expected values. The utility function 
for such an individual is linear with a positive first derivative and a 
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second derivative equal to zero. The risk premium of a risk neutral 
decision maker Is always zero, 
A risk seeking Individual prefers a risky prospect to a certain 
prospect If the two prospects have the same expected value. The utility 
function of a risk seeker Is convex In wealth, as shown In Figure 3. The 
risk seeker's second derivative Is positive and his risk premium Is 
always negative. That Is, the risk seeker Is always willing to forgo 
some monetary return so as to enjoy the opportunity to take a risk. 
Most studies of the firm under uncertainty assume that the decision 
maker Is risk averse.^ For such firms, an additional characteristic of 
decreasing absolute risk aversion Is also often assumed. Pratt (101, p. 
125) defined decreasing absolute risk aversion as 
V« - -f# 
where 
n*(Y) Is the first derivative of utility with respect to 
wealth, and 
U"(Y) Is the second derivative. 
Decreasing absolute risk aversion says the decision maker Is more 
willing to accept a given level of risk, the higher is the decision 
maker's Income. For a risk averter, absolute risk aversion is positive, 
^Friedman and Savage (45, pp. 293-297) argue convincingly that 
utility functions must evidence both risk averse and risk seeking 
sections in order to portray the totality of human behavior. However, 
most studies typically restrict their analysis to the concave section of 
the utility curve. 
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and decreasing absolute risk aversion Implies that the third derivative 
of utility is positive (4, p. 122).^ 
The maximization of expected utility as the choice criterion in con­
junction with a positive first derivative and negative second derivative 
of utility are sufficient to develop a fairly extensive theory of the 
firm in a world of uncertainty. As Samuelson suggests (109, p. 537), 
most of the Important aspects of risk theory can be derived from these 
general assumptions. Sandmo (110, pp. 65-73) provides an excellent 
discussion of techniques as well as some comparative static results for a 
competitive firm operating in a risky environment. Horowitz (59, pp. 
363-415) also presents a fairly detailed discussion of a number of models 
in which risk has been included. 
However, the use of expected utility as the appropriate choice cri­
terion is not universally accepted. Allias (Borch, 16, pp. 62-63 and 
Markowitz, 87, pp. 220-221) developed an example fAiich showed that indi­
viduals do not act rationally. People were inconsistent in their choices 
and therefore the axioms upon which expected utility is predicated are 
violated and expected utility is not a valid choice criterion, k heated 
second measure of the degree of risk aversion is Pratt's 
relative risk aversion which is: 
- - wrrl} ' ? -
This measure expresses the willingness of an Individual to accept 
risk when the size of the risk and income are increased proportionately. 
Arrow (5, p. Ill) argues that relative risk aversion should increase as 
Income Increases; however, this idea is not universally accepted (88, p. 
410) and will not be pursued further here. 
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debate ensued during the 1950s over the validity of expected utility max­
imization. Although the issue is moot, most economists today accept 
rational behavior as a reasonable assumption on the grounds that there is 
no better tenet of human behavior available. 
As discussed earlier, it is generally more useful In economic 
research to define some characteristics and restrictions which a group of 
utility functions must satisfy than to know the exact specification of 
one particular utility function. In this manner, the results can be 
applied to all individuals whose utility functions satisfy the stated 
conditions even though the exact specifications of the utility functions 
will undoubtedly not be the same. Furthermore, the more general the 
restrictions, the broader will be the applicability of the results. 
Within this context several empirical approaches have been used to model 
firm behavior under uncertainty. Two of the most powerful methods will 
briefly be reviewed. 
Mean-Variance Analysis 
The major tenet of mean-variance analysis is that a utility function 
can be completely described in terms of its mean and variance. That is, 
expected utility is composed of the first statistical moment about the 
origin and the second moment about the mean. All higher order statis­
tical moments about the mean do not matter, because they do not exist 
(quadratic utility function), can be safely ignored through a Taylor 
series expansion, or can be restated in terms of the variance. Johnson 
(66) contains an excellent discussion of the applicability of 
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mean-variance analysis. See also Farrar (33, pp. 20-22) and Kaplan (68, 
p. 426). 
The premise upon which mean-variance analysis is based Is that the 
mean of the distribution represents the expected return and that the 
variance (or standard deviation, or some other statistical moment 
measuring variation) Is a proxy for the riskiness of the prospect. 
Harkowltz (86) first promoted the use of mean-variance preference 
ordering In the analysis of risk. In this theory, the Individual Is 
assumed to make decisions by evaluating the trade-offs between return and 
variance of the risky prospects. Denoting the distributions of two 
alternative risky prospects as F and 6, a risk averse decision maker will 
prefer distribution F over distribution 6 If 
E(Xp) > E(Xg) and (2-11) 
V(Xp) < V(Xg) (2-12) 
where 
E is the mean return and 
V is the variance 
and at least one of the inequalities is strict. In this sense, F is said 
to dominate 6 in expected return-variance preference ordering and 6 can 
be eliminated from further consideration as a noncontender with no loss 
of optlmallty. This is to say that G is inefficient and will never be 
chosen by a risk averse decision maker. 
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If only one of the Inequalities in (2-11) and (2-12) is true, then 
neither dominates the other and both F and G would remain in the 
efficient set. In this situation, the choice depends on the individual's 
personal preferences concerning the trade-off between return and risk. 
More must be known about the specification of the individual's utility 
function before a choice can be made. 
Although the early work on expected return-variance analysis was 
done in terms of expected values of gain, the theory has been reformu­
lated by Arrow (4), Samuelson (108), and others to be consistent with the 
axioms of expected utility maximization. 
Beginning with the early work done by Freund (43), Markowitz (86, 
87) and Tobin (121) through Sharpe (113), the primary method of solution 
is quadratic programming. But the use of quadratic programming as a 
realistic procedure to solve expected utility problems is subject to 
criticism on two points. First, the use assumes that the underlying 
distribution is symmetrical, but in many applications in agriculture, 
this assumptions is unrealistic (123, p, 355; 15, p, 288 and 51, pp. 
490-491).^ Second, the quadratic utility functions evidence increasing 
absolute risk aversion but this contradicts what many economists believe 
people's behavior to be (5, pp. 96-97 and 34, p. 6). 
^Numerous authors maintain (for example, 34, pp. 6-8 and 122, p. 
13) the distribution must be normal which is more restrictive than mere 
symmetry. But as Johnson (66) has shown, mere symmetry is sufficient. 
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Regardless of the criticisms directed at mean-variance analysis, 
many useful Inferences about economic behavior have been generated from 
Its use. 
Stochastic Dominance 
Partly due to the two criticisms mentioned above, many researchers 
have pursued stochastic dominance as an alternative to quadratic 
programming (132, pp. 34-35; 92 and 93). A detailed development of 
stochastic dominance will be delayed until the next chapter, but the 
basic concept will be Introduced here. 
In a fashion quite similar in purpose to quadratic programming, the 
full set of possible lotteries is reduced to an efficient set by elimi­
nating Inefficient prospects from further consideration. Quadratic 
programming generates an efficient set by maximizing the mean for a given 
variance or minimizing the variance for a given mean. Stochastic domi­
nance generates an efficient set by placing sign restrictions on the 
successive derivatives for the class of utility functions under consider­
ation. For example, first degree stochastic dominance stipulates that 
the first derivative of utility must be positive; second degree 
stochastic dominance stipulates the second derivative must be negative; 
and the nth degree stochastic dominance places a sign convention upon the 
nth derivative of utility. Ultimately, a sufficiently high degree of 
dominance can be reached ;rtiere there is only one efficient prospect 
remaining in the efficient set (or more than one, if all are of equal 
desirability). 
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Expected Utility Measured in Terminal Wealth 
Mean-variance analysis and stochastic dominance are both methods of 
measuring expected utility. The question still remains as to what 
utility should measure. It is generally accepted by economists that the 
most desirable measure is consumption. That is, the most appropriate 
objective function is the maximization of the expected utility of 
lifetime consumption (Hirshlelfer, 57 and Hey, 56, pp. 70-82.) In 
general, the argument is that the decision maker should choose C^, C^, 
. . . C^, such that TJ(Cj, is maximized subject to 
2 ^ to T+1), where is defined recursively by -
(1+r) + - Cj.)(t»l to W-1). is the net wealth in year t; C % 
is consumption, Y^. is income; and r is the rate of interest between 
periods. There are assumed to be T periods in the Individual's expected 
life; therefore, C_., can be viewed as the individual's at death 
T+1 
bequests. Those unfamiliar with the solution of this model are referred 
to Henderson and Quandt (54, pp. 297-309) under conditions of certainty; 
Sandmo (111) considers separately both income uncertainty and uncertainty 
about interest rates; Dreze and Modigliani (30) consider income 
uncertainty and rate of return uncertainty; and Levhari and Srlnivasan 
(77) address the solution of infinite horizon models. 
Assuming that the utility function is additively separable, then the 
maximization of D(Cj, Cg, . . . C^^^) can be rewritten as: 
T+1 t 
U(C , C , . . . C ) - Z P u(C ) (2-13) 
1 2 T+1 t=l t 
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\Aieze 
0'(t«l to T+l) is the vector of weights attached to 
consumption. 
There is empirical evidence which suggests that a relationship 
exists between income and consumption in any period (21, p. 172 and 18). 
For expository purposes, this relationship is 
- dY^; 0 < d < 1. (2-14) 
The utility maximization problem (2-13) can be rewritten using 
(2-14) as 
T+1 t 
U - Z g u(dYg) (2-15) 
t-1 
Since consumption plus savings must equal income, and using (2-14), 
savings is 
- (l-d)Y^; 0 < d <1, (2-16) 
and therefore Yj. • (•j;^)Sj.. Substituting this expression for 
Income into (2-15), 
T+1 t 
U - (2-17) 
t-1 A a «-
Since the vector of weights on consumption 3^ and d are constant, 
both can be subtracted from the utility function without altering utility 
rankings (54, p. 22). By defining a new vector of weights = 8^ (y^), 
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(2-17) can be rewritten as 
•W-l 
U - E (2-18) 
t-1 
Therefore, utility can be maximized by finding the optimum set of 
consumption weights or, equlvalently, the optimum set of savings rates. 
For any period, savings are used to Invest In new capital goods or 
^ - X htht* (2-19) 
1-1 
where 
^It price of capital good 1 (1-1 to k), and 
lit Is the Investment in good 1 in time t. 
Total Investment in any one capital good throughout the horizon is 
T+1 
:it + "=1.' (2-2°) 
where is the initial endowment of capital good 1» A weighted 
average price for each capital good can be calculated by dividing the 
value of all purchases by the total investment and adjusting for time 
preferences or 
W-1 
'l • < \ Pit - lit + ho>'h- (2-21) 
t=l 
where P. is the weighted price. Then maximizing Z F.I. is the same 
1-1 
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k Tfl 
as maximizing E Z P, « I. + K. which by (2-19) Is the same as 
1-1 t-1 ° 
maximizing (2-18). The problem now has been restated as one of maxi­
mizing ending asset values at some particular price. Boussard (18, pp. 
469-471) argues that use of the "turnpike thereom" allows considerable 
flexibility in assigning terminal prices to assets. With a sufficiently 
long horizon, the expansion path of the firm is determined more by 
technical coefficients than prices (within a reasonable range) and 
therefore firms with differing initial endowments and facing differing 
price vectors will still have highly similar solutions. Hence, it is 
justifiable to maximize net terminal wealth (ending asset values less 
outstanding debt), in place of the original utility of consumption 
problem of (2-13). 
Equivalently, Lutz and Lutz (84, p. 17) suggest an entrepreneur will 
want to maximize the rate of return on owned capital, or maximize ending 
wealth, or net worth. Furthermore, as Fama (32) has shown, the 
properties of nonsatlation and risk aversion in the utility specification 
for multlperiod consumption are identical to a utility specification in 
net terminal wealth. Therefore, the appropriate objective function with 
which to incorporate risk into the decision making process is the 
maximization of expected utility of net terminal wealth. 
The next chapter presents the theory of stochastic dominance. 
Stochastic dominance theorems are used to choose the risky prospect which 
produces the maximum expected utility from a set of possible risky 
prospects. 
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CHAPTER III. STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE 
For the decision maker who must choose between two risky prospects 
and knows some general but limited information about his utility 
function, the existence or nonexistence of a stochastic dominance rela­
tionship between the prospects is purely a mathematical question.^ 
A risky prospect is any random variable whose values occur by 
chance. It is not important whether the probabilities are "objective" or 
"subjective" in nature. However, it is assumed the probabilities obey 
the axioms of mathematical probability theory* Probability theory will 
not be developed here; readers Interested in Its foundations and concepts 
should see such works as Feller (36 and 37), Lowe (81), Brieman (22), 
Flshbum (41) and Larson (73). 
Stochastic Dominance Theorems 
The theorems of stochastic dominance have the common theme of 
providing a basis for choosing between two risky prospects. All individ­
uals whose utility functions conform to the theorems will regard one 
prospect as being at least as desirable as (or more desirable than) the 
other. This process of comparing two prospects is accomplished through 
degrees. First degree stochastic dominance is the least restrictive and 
provides the most general results. Second degree stochastic dominance is 
^This chapter draws heavily upon the works of Fishburn and Vickson 
(42, pp. 39-113), Anderson and Dillon (3, pp. 281-317) and Meyer (92, pp. 
326-336 and 93). 
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more restrictive than first degree and Its power to differentiate between 
two risky prospects is greater. However, a second degree stochastic dom­
inance efficient set is applicable to a smaller set of decision makers 
than is first degree. Similarly, successively higher degrees of sto­
chastic dominance can be employed. 
Defining the term as "strictly preferred in the sense of 1th 
degree stochastic dominance," the stochastic dominance theorems can be 
defined In general as 
F >1 G if and only if EU(X)p > EO(X)g (3-1) 
for all u e U^, 
where 
F is the cumulative distribution function of some 
continuous risky prospect A,^ 
G is the cumulative distribution function of some other 
continuous prospect B, 
EU(X)p is the expected utility of prospect A, 
EU(X)q is the expected utility of prospect B, and 
Consistent with conventional notation, upper case letters (X, Y) 
will be used to denote random variables and the corresponding lower case 
(x, y) to denote a particular value of the random variable. Similarly, 
upper case letters (F, G) will be used to denote cumulative density 
functions and the lower case (f, g) to denote the respective probability 
density function. For a continuous variable, the cumulative density 
function and the probability density function are related by the 
relationship F(x) » /* f(y)dy and f(x) > 0 for all x. 
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u G is the subset of all utility functions satisfying the 
restrictions imposed by degree i«^ 
The restrictions Imposed on the form of the utility functions deal with 
strict positivity or negativity restrictions on the derivatives of 
utility with respect to the uncertain variable. 
First degree stochastic dominance (FSD) 
Nonsatiation is the most general restriction commonly imposed on 
utility of wealth U(X). Nonsatiation is mathematically expressed as U(X) 
must be nondecreasing in X over some Interval I, or U(x) < U(y) if x < y, 
for all x, y e I. Equivalently, utility is said to be monotonically 
increasing with respect to wealth. For convenience, it is assumed that 
utility is continuous and once dlfferentlable. The subclass of all 
utility functions which satisfy the restriction of nonsatiation is 
defined as 
= u:u, ~ is continuous and bounded on I, (3-2) 
where 
is the first derivative of utility with respect to wealth. 
It is also assumed here that the utility functions are well-
defined and finite over the entire range of possible random outcomes. 
Furthermore, the random variables are bounded from below on a closed 
Interval (42, p. 51). 
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I denotes a closed Interval such as [0, «] or [a, b], and 
1° is the Interior of I or (0, «) or (a, b),^ 
Aside from nonsatiation, the class of utility functions defined 
in (3-2) says nothing about attitudes toward risk. Both risk averse and 
risk seeking behaviors are consistent with this class. The only restric­
tion imposed by first degree stochastic dominance is that more wealth is 
preferred to less. 
First degree stochastic dominance will result in the unanimous pref­
erence of one risky prospect over another for all decision makers whose 
utility functions belong to as defined in (3-2) if, for every value 
of X belonging to I, the cumulative density function of the preferred 
prospect is less than the cumulative density function of the other 
prospect. Equivalently, first degree stochastic dominance can be stated 
as 
F G if and only if D^(x) 2 0 for all x e I, and 
D^(x) > 0 for at least one value of x, (3-3) 
where 
F, G denote the cumulative distributions of two risky prospects 
defined on the interval I, and 
D^(x) - G(x) - F(x) for all x e I. 
In (3-3), if D^(x) • 0 for all values of x, then neither F 
dominates 6 nor G dominates F. In this case, the decision maker is 
^The first derivative may equal zero or be undefined at the 
endpoints of I without affecting the analysis. 
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equally Indifferent to F and 6» and both will remain in the efficient 
set. Conversely, if D^(x) < 0 for all values of x, then G dominates 
F. 
As a simple example of first degree stochastic dominance, assume the 
decision maker is faced with the two alternative courses of action, A and 
B, shown in Figure 5, where F is the cumulative density function of A and 
6 is the cumulative density function of B. Clearly distribution F is 
preferred to distribution 6 since it lies farther to the right and 
therefore has a higher expected outcome for every value of x. 
Conversely, D^(x) is greater than zero for every value of x, and 
according to (3-3), F is said to dominate 6 in the sense of first degree 
stochastic daainance. In the simple example portrayed in Figure 5, all 
decision makers satisfying will prefer F to G and will select strategy 
A as the preferred course of action* Strategy B is obviously an 
inefficient course of action and can be ignored in subsequent analysis. 
However, Figure 6 is an example where first degree stochastic domi­
nance can not choose between two risky prospects because the inequality 
of (3-3) does not hold for all values of x. The quantity D^(x) is 
negative for values between a and b, zero at b, and positive for values 
of X greater than b. In this case, neither distribution is dominant in 
the sense of first degree stochastic dominance. Both F and G will remain 
in the first degree efficient set. It remains for the decision maker to 
choose between the two distributions based upon his personal attitude 
toward risk. 
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Cumulative 
Density 
Function 
E (x) X (uncertain 
outcome) 
Figure 5. First degree stochastic dominance (FSD) where 
F dominates G 
Cumulative 
Density 
Function 
x(uncertaln outcome) 
Figure 6. FSD where F and G cross 
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Second degree stochastic dominance (SSD) 
For a decision maker to choose between two distributions such as 
those portrayed In Figure 6, an additional restriction must be Imposed 
upon the subclass of utility functions belonging to U^. This restric­
tion concerns the decision maker's attitude toward risk. As explained In 
the previous chapter, risk aversion Is a commonly accepted trait of 
Individuals who behave rationally. As discussed at that time, risk 
averse utility functions must be increasing and concave in wealth. 
Equivalently, the first derivative of utility with respect to wealth must 
be positive and the second derivative must be negative. The class of 
utility functions for all risk averse decision makers is 
d^U 
U. = u:u s U,, —-r is continuous and bounded on I, 
.2_ 
—T < 0 on 1° . (3-4) 
dX^ 
Condition (3-4) says that the class of risk averse utility functions, 
U2, is a subset of defined in (3-2) that also possesses negative 
second derivatives with respect to wealth. 
Define F^ (x) as the area under the graph of the cumulative 
density function of F(y) from y=0 to y«x or 
F^(x) » F(y)dy, x e I (3-5) 
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Similarly define the area under 6 as 
G^(x) - G(y) dy, x e I. (3-6) 
And define the difference between and as 
d2(x) - G^(x) - F^(x). (3-7) 
Then distribution F is said to dominate distribution G in the sense 
of second degree stochastic dominance or 
F >gG if and only if D^(x) 2 0 for all x e I and 
2 
D (x) > 0 for at least one value of x. (3-8) 
If D^(x) 0 for all values of x and the strict inequality holds 
for at least one value of x, then distribution G is said to dominate dis­
tribution F in the sense of second degree stochastic dominance. If 
D^(x) < 0 for some values of x and D^(x) 2 0 for other vlaues of x, 
then F and G are of equal desirability in the sense of second degree 
stochastic dominance. 
Intuitively, a positive difference in (3-8) Implies that F lies more 
to.the right than G in terms of differences in the areas between the 
cumulative density functions. In Figure 7, distribution G starts out 
smaller than F but catches up and crosses F as x becomes larger. 
However, first degree stochastic dominance can not choose between F and 
G, i.e.; neither F G nor G F is true. Since the difference in 
areas between F and G Is positive in Figure 7 (area A is clearly larger 
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Cumulative 
Density 
Function 
X(uncertain outcome) 
Figure 7. FSD where F and G cross but F dominates G 
under second degree stochastic dominance 
Area under 
the 
Cumulative 
Density 
Function 
Figure 8. Second degree stochastic dominance (SSD) where 
F dominates G 
^(uncertain outcome) 
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than area B), F lies farther to the right than G, and F dominates 6 In 
terms of second degree stochastic dominance. 
Alternatively, as In Figure 8, F^(x) and G^(x) are graphed 
Instead of F(x) and G(x). Clearly F^(x) lies to the right and below 
G^(x) for all values of x (I.e., D^(x) > 0 for all x) and F therefore 
dominates G In the sense of second degree stochastic dominance. In 
Figure 9, F^ and G^ cross; In this situation, second degree 
stochastic dominance can not choose the dominant prospect between F and 6 
and therefore both would remain in the second degree efficient set. 
Third degree stochastic dominance (TSD) 
Nonsatlatlon and risk aversion are widely accepted characteristics 
of rational behavior. Moving from second degree stochastic dominance to 
third degree stochastic dominance requires an assumption about rational 
behavior which Is not so widely accepted. The necessary assumption is 
that decreasing absolute risk aversion Is representative of rational 
economic behavior. Although some economists (4, 5 and 101) advocate the 
Inclusion of decreasing absolute risk aversion, as defined in Equation 
(2-10) In the decision making process, this Is not universally accepted. 
Assuming, for the moment, that decreasing absolute risk aversion Is an 
attitude toward risk evidenced by a certain set of risk averse decision 
makers, these decision makers could be defined as belonging to Ug. 
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The subclass of Ug of utility functions Is defined as 
" u:u U. -^-7 Is continuous and bounded on I, 
^ ^ dX^ 
3 
and 4-2. > 0 on 1° . (3-9) 
dX^ 
The subclass of utility functions contained In Ug consists of 
those In which utility Increases at a decreasing rate, the absolute value 
of which becomes smaller as wealth Increases. This condition Is 
satisfied If 
2 3 
^ > 0 (from U,), < 0 (from U.) and > 0. The effect of a 
* 1 (Ur ^ dX^ 
positive third derivative Is to slow the rate at which the utility 
function bends back toward the horizontal.^ 
Defining F^(x), G^(x) and D^(x) as 
F^(x) - F^(y)dy, 
G^(x) - G^(y)dy, and 
D^(x) - G^(x) - F^(x), 
then third degree stochastic dominance Is defined as 
positive third derivative Is a necessary condition for 
decreasing absolute risk aversion. It Is not, however, a sufficient 
condition since It Is possible to have > 0 and not have decreasing 
absolute risk aversion. An example of such a utility function Is the 
almost quadratic function U(x) = x - cx2 + ex3. The third derivative 
Is positive If e > 0. However, If 0 < e < 4c^/6, then absolute risk 
aversion Is positive and Increasing for all values of x. 
(3-10) 
(3-11) 
(3-12) 
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F >2 G if and only if, 
a) D^(x) 2 0 for all x e I and 
b) E(X)p > E(X)g 
q 
and either D (x) > 0 for at least one x or 
E(X)p > E(X)g. (3-13) 
If (3-13) is true, distribution F is said to dominate distribution G 
in the sense of third degree stochastic d(minance. For all individuals 
whose utility functions satisfy Ug, F Is unanimously preferred over G 
and distribution G can be eliminated from further consideration. Figures 
9 and 10 are examples of two distributions F and G where F dominates 6 in 
the sense of third degree stochastic dominance but neither F >£ G or G 
>2 F is true. 
Nth degree stochastic dominance 
First, second and third degree stochastic doninance theorems were 
developed by imposing sign restrictions on the corresponding derivatives 
of utility with respect to wealth. The results of each successively 
higher degree of dominance are applicable to a smaller and smaller 
subclass of decision makers. For degrees of stochastic dominance higher 
than three, the theorems of stochastic dominance have been generalized by 
Jean (64, p. 151). The nth subclass of decision makers whose utility 
functions satisfy stochastic dominance of degree n is classified as 
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X (uncertain outcome) 
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x (uncertain outcome) 
Figure 10. Third degree stochastic dominance where 
F dominates G 
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"n - [--Vl- 0 
Is continuous and bounded on 1, and 
either 
or b) — > 0 on 
dX* 
< 0 on 1° If n - 4, 6, 8 
I® If n - 5, 7, 9 
} 
}\ (3-14) 
Then distribution F Is preferred to distribution G In the sense of the 
nth degree stochastic dominance. 
With first degree stochastic dominance, nonsatlatlon of wealth Is 
assumed to be consistent with rational behavior. Second degree 
stochastic dominance requires that aversion to risk and nonsatlatlon are 
tenets of rational behavior. Moving to the third degree requires 
stepping on thinner ice in that the decision maker who behaves rationally 
is assumed to be nonsatiated, risk averse and decreaslngly risk averse in 
absolute terms as wealth increases. Progressing to the fourth and higher 
degrees of stochastic dominance is difficult to defend in terms of 
F >a G if and only if D^(b) 2 0 for k - 1, 2, . . 
and G° ^ (x) > F° ^ (x) for all x. 
. n-2 
. (3-15) 
where 
D^(b) - G^(b) - F^b) , 
G\b) - /J G^"\y)dy, 
F^(b) - /J F^"\y)dy, and 
b is the maximum value that x can take. 
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rational behavior because the fourth derivative (and higher derivatives) 
of utility with respect to wealth carry no economic meaning. Because of 
the absence of a linkage between a sign restriction on a high order 
derivative and its implication to rational behavior, stochastic dominance 
is seldom employed in economic analysis in degrees beyond the third. 
The theorems presented in (3-3), (3-8), and (3-13) have appeared in 
equivalent forms throughout much of the literature of mathematics and 
mathematical statistics. Interested readers are referred to Blackwell 
and Girschick (13), Quirk and Saposnik (103), Flshbum (41), Hadar and 
Russell (48), Hanock and Levy (49), Rothschild and Stiglitz (107) and 
Whitmore and Findlay (133) for examples of such theorems in the economics 
of decision making under risk. 
Special Properties of Stochastic Dominance 
First, second and third degree stochastic dcatinance preference 
orderings have a number of properties that are very Important in 
practical applications (42, p. 64). These include: 
1) Asymmetry: if F G, then it is false that G F; 
2) Transitivity: If F G and G H, then F H for some 
degree 1; 
and 
3) Implied dominance: F >, G implies F >, G implies 
F >3 G. 
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The first property of (3-16) states that either F Is preferred to 6 
or 6 is preferred to F or neither Is preferred In the sense of the 1th 
degree stochastic dominance. Only one of these can be true for any pair 
of unequal distributions. The transitive property Infers that if F is 
found to dominate G and G is found to dominate some other distribution H, 
then F and H need not be compared because it must be true that F domi­
nates H. If a risky prospect is determined to be inefficient when 
compared to a given distribution In the efficient set, then it must be 
true that the inefficient distribution is also inefficient for all other 
members in the efficient set. The third property of Implied dominance 
says that if one class of utility functions is a subset of another, then 
dominance in the larger class implies dominance in the smaller class. 
When two distributions are compared and one is determined to be preferred 
in the sense of first degree stochastic dominance, then it is not 
necessary to compare the two at second, third or higher degrees because 
first degree dominance implies dominance at all higher degrees. However, 
the converse of the third property is not true. Other special properties 
of interest are the following. 
Equal means 
If two distributions F and 6 have equal means, then F >2 G or G 
>1 F is impossible. This is obvious when considering linear utility 
functions. Furthermore, with equal means and F >2 G, then It must be 
true that the variance of F is smaller than the variance of G (132, p. 
78). Â similar relationship holds (without the strict inequality) for 
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third degree stochastic dominance. That Is, with equal means and F >g 
G, the variance of F Is smaller than the variance of G (124, p. 78). 
Discrete probability distributions 
The theorems of stochastic dominance presented In (3-3), (3-8), and 
(3-13) were structured In terms of continuous cumulative density 
functions F and G. These have corollaries for cases Involving discrete, 
finite; distributions (3, pp. 282-290 and 99, pp. 119-120). 
The discrete cumulative density functions of F and G are defined as 
F(X) - E f(x,) and 
all ^ 
x.<x 
1— 
G(X) - Z g(x,). (3-16) 
all ^ 
x.<x 
1— 
The quantities F(X) and G(X) fron (3-16) can now be compared using (3-3) 
to test for first degree stochastic dominance. 
The discrete forms of F^(X) appearing In (3-5) and G^(X) 
appearing In (3-6) are 
2 r 
F (x ) - Z f(x. ,) ÛX., and 
' 1-2  ^
2 : 
GTCXp) - Z g(x^_j) (3-17) 
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Where 
AXi • ~ and 
F^(xj) - G^Cxj) - 0, 
2 2 
The difference between G (x^) and F (x^) Is calculated as before 
and Theorem 3-8 Is used to determine second degree stochastic dominance. 
The discrete forms of F^(X) and G^(X) in (3-10) and (3-11) are 
F (^Xr) - (^) [F^(xp + f2(XJ^_J)1 AXJ and 
G^(x^) - (1) [G^(x^) + G^(Xj_j)l Ax^ (3-18) 
where 
Axj - Xj - x^_j, and 
F^Cci) - G^(xi) - 0. 
Similarly, D^(X) is calculated as before and Theorem (3-13) is 
used to compare F and G for third degree stochastic dominance. 
Alternative Approaches to Stochastic Dominance 
The theorems of stochastic dominance theory presented thus far 
describe the preferences of a group of individuals by imposing sign 
restrictions upon the derivatives of their utility functions. Meyer 
maintains that this does not result in a unique specification of the 
decision maker's preferences. Given a functional form of utility, the 
signs of its derivatives are unaltered by positive linear 
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transformations. Because of this Inconvenience, Meyer maintains It Is 
preferable to restate utility In terms of absolute risk aversion and to 
place restrictions on the size this value can assume. 
Meyer's approach suffers two weaknesses. The first is that some 
assumption must be made that decreasing, constant or Increasing absolute 
risk aversion is representative of rational economic behavior. The 
second weakness is that of determining to ^ om the results are applic­
able. That is, if one prospect is shown to be preferred to another for 
individuals whose absolute risk aversion is between .4 and .6, who are 
these individuals? For a thorough development of this approach, see 
Meyer (92 and 93). 
Another approach to the theory of stochastic dominance is convex 
stochastic dominance (55, p. 337). The decision theory developed thus 
far can address independent probability functions only on a palrwlse 
basis. The application of dominance theory to mixtures or convex linear 
combinations of probability distributions is known as convex stochastic 
dominance. In situations where the number of palrwlse combinations to be 
performed is prohibitively large in terms of computational expense, 
convex stochastic dominance can be an aid in reducing the size of the 
efficient set. Fortunately, it will not be needed here. See Anderson, 
et al., (3) and Hestenes (55) for a detailed development of convex 
stochastic dominance. 
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With the completion of the development of stochastic dominance 
theory as the appropriate method of maximizing expected utility of a 
rational decision maker. It Is now necessary to turn attention to the 
theory of the firm. 
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CHAPTER IV: THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
Chapter II developed the reasons why risk should be Incorporated 
Into the decision making process. Chapter III presented a methodology 
for selecting the most desirable strategy from a set of risky strategies 
when the exact specification of the utility function Is unknown. This 
chapter will develop the several parts of the theory of the firm. It 
traces the flow of funds through the firm. It Identifies the sources of 
risk to the agricultural firm and discusses the Interrelationships 
between the sources of risk. It reviews the fifty-year old question of 
whether financing matters. Last it discusses the conceptual considera­
tions for the types of financing commonly available to the family farm. 
Decision Making from a Whole Farm Perspective 
The theory of the firm in agriculture encompasses the Integration of 
the three microtheorles of production, investment, and finance.^ 
Production deals with the Issues of what commodities should be produced 
in what quantities using which technologies. Investment addresses the 
question of finding the most efficient combination of assets to provide 
the necessary inputs into the production process. Finance answers the 
question of what is the best way to acquire the needed assets. 
^Many authors define marketing as a separate microtheory (8, pp. 
5-7 and 75, p. 19). Without question, the theory of marketing is 
important and is given appropriate recognition in this study. It is, 
however, treated as a subset of production microtheory. 
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Each mlcrotheory contributes a component of risk to the total enter­
prise risk of the decision making firm.^ Variability In yields and 
prices causes production risk. Investment risk results from the 
ownership of assets whose economically useful lives exceed the production 
cycle. Financial risk is due to fixed financing costs which result 
from the use of nonequity money capital (128, pp. 779-783 and 130, pp. 
53-58). 
The majority of the literature written under the rubric of prooduc-
tlon management theory and financial management theory (with the notable 
exception of Vlckers) addresses only one or at most two of the micro-
theories. However, the three microtheorles are not Independent. As 
shown in Figure 11, the major nexus of management decision making flows 
from production through Investment to finance. That is, the decision 
maker first decides what to produce and what technologies to employ. The 
decision maker next determines what assets are needed to provide the 
necessary inputs to the production process. Finally, the decision maker 
decides how the assets should be acquired. This sequence of events is 
represented by the heavy arrows in Figure 11. 
^As discussed in Chapter 2, the terms risk and uncertainty are 
used Interchangeably. 
2 In this context. Investment risk is equivalent to operating 
leverage or operating risk which is typically measured as the amount of 
fixed operating costs which result from the presence of intermediate and 
fixed assets on the balance sheet (128, pp. 771-779 and 130, p. 53). 
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FINANCE INVESTMENT PRODUCTION 
11. The theory of the firm and the interaction of the micro 
theories of production, investment and finance 
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Although the major sequence of decisions flows from production 
through investment to finance, in reality resource availability, resource 
prices and operating risks all influence the production decision. This 
feedback of the investment upon production is shown in Figure 11 as the 
broken line from the investment decision to the production decision. 
Similarly, the terms and conditions of financing Influence which assets 
should be acquired. 
Most economists recognize the Interrelationship of production risk 
and Investment risk. While most economists agree there is financial 
risk, some economists maintain that the financing decision (and Its 
related risk) is independent of production and investment. An in-depth 
analysis of whether financing matters will be delayed until a later 
section. For the moment, assume financing does matter and, as portrayed 
in Figure 11, whole farm planning requires the joint attention to all 
three microtheories. 
Flow of Funds Within the Firm 
The owners of a family farm possess a certain amount of wealth in 
the form of durable and nondurable personal and business assets. In 
addition, the heirs may own or desire to own business and personal 
assets. Graphically, as In Figure 12, some proportion of the parents' 
wealth is held in productive business assets, and the balance is retained 
in the form of personal assets. The parents' investment in the farm is 
R#«ldw#l ownership end 
creditor Interest in corporation 
Residual ownership and 
creditor Interest In corporation 
On-farm heir's 
personal wealth 
Non-farm 
income 
Personal 
taxes 
Consumption and 
living expenses 
Consun^ktion and 
living expenses 
Salaries, 
director fees# 
dividends, and 
interest 
Salaries, 
director fees, 
dividends, end 
Interest 
On-ferm heir's 
personal wealth 
Conventional 
end non-family 
financing 
Parents* personal 
wealth 
Dividends and 
Interest owed to 
non-femily owners 
and investor# 
Farm coloration 
Figure 12. The flow of funds between family members 
and the farm corporation 
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Increased by sources of nonfarm income and funds generated from personal 
financing, and these funds may be used to Increase their contribution to 
the business. In return for these contributions, the parents receive 
either an equity interest in the form of common stock or contractual 
obligations on loans, rental agreements on leases or certificates on 
indebtedness of bonds.^ The parents can receive salaries, directors' 
fees, dividends, interest and principal payments as compensation for 
their contributions to the firm. Leakages from the parents' wealth are 
expenditures for personal income taxes and personal consumption, some 
proportion of which may be paid by the firm. 
The personal cash flows of the parents can be reinvested in new 
personal assets, used to payoff personal debts, or contributed to the 
family business. At the end of each accounting period, the parents' 
wealth is measured as the value of the personal assets owned, the present 
value of all financial obligations owed to the parents, and the value of 
their residual ownership in the family farm. 
Similarly, the heirs to the farm may possess some Initial endowment 
of wealth which is proportioned between contributions to the business 
and personal assets. The heirs can also contribute funds or physical 
assets to the firm in exchange for shares of common stock, bond and 
debenture certificates, or loan commitments. 
Ipor the reasons developed in Chapter 1, the legal form of 
organization is assumed to be the regularly taxed corporation. 
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Personal Income taxes and personal consumption expenditures drain 
the heirs* personal wealth. Sources of nonfarm Income and compensation 
for contributions In the forms of salaries and directors' fees. Interest, 
dividends and principal payments Increase the wealth of the heirs and can 
be funneled back to the firm as new contributions. In addition to 
Intrafamlly financing, the farm can also acquire funds from nonfamlly 
sources such as banks, neighbors and friends or other outsiders. 
The farm corporation represented in Figure 12 is shown in detail in 
Figure 13. 
Initially, parental and heir financing is used to create a stock 
of assets for the firm. These assets can be augmented by conventional 
nonfamlly financing and by nonbalance sheet methods, such as the acquisi­
tion of assets through operating leases and rental agreements. This 
creates a pool of farm production assets. The production process 
converts the farm production assets into commodities which may be sold 
for cash, accounts receivable, or stored in inventory for later sale. 
Accounts receivable will hopefully be converted into cash at some later 
date. Until that time receivables appear as an asset on the ending 
balance sheet and can be used as collateral for additional borrowing. 
Commodities held in inventory will appear as an asset on the ending 
balance sheet and can be used as. collateral to support additional 
financing. 
The cash generated from the sale of commodities, the liquidation of 
receivables, and the sale of Inventory is used to pay operating expenses, 
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Figure 13. The flow of funds within the firm 
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salaries, directors* fees, dividends. Interest and principal repayments 
on liabilities, corporate income taxes, consumption expenditures of the 
family members, and new assets. The balance sheet at the completion of 
the production cycle then becomes the beginning balance sheet of the 
subsequent period, and the cycle repeats Itself. At several points, 
uncertainty Influences the flow of funds within the firm. 
The Components of Risk Which Comprise Total Enterprise Risk 
The theory of the firm under uncertainty requires addressing risk in 
terms of total enterprise risk. Total enterprise risk is the multiplica­
tive combination of the three risk components identified In Figure 11. 
The first component of risk is attributable to everything external to and 
uncontrollable by the firm. Uncertain events contributing to this 
category of risk Include climate and weather variability, uncertain 
demand, inflation and uncertainty as to government intervention and 
policies. 
The second component of risk is operating risk. Operating risk is 
attributable to the presence of fixed operating costs in the production 
process. And the third component of risk is financing risk due to the 
presence of fixed financing costs. 
^The risk components of production and investment are often 
combined into a measure called business risk. Although the two 
approaches are equivalent, it facilitates the discussion to separate 
business risk into its components. 
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Production risk 
Risk which Is primarily uncontrollable and external to the farm Is 
classified as production risk. The effect of this component on total 
enterprise risk Is captured by stochastic prices of outputs and 
stochastic quantities of output. Mathematically total revenue Is defined 
as 
n 
TR - Z P,q,, (4-1) 
1-1 ^ ^ 
where 
TR Is total revenue, 
p^ Is the stochastic price of output 1, and 
q^ Is the stochastic quantity of output 1. 
Total revenue Is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 
E(TR) and a variance V(TR).^ Production risk Is measured as the 
variance of total revenue. 
Variable operating costs are also assumed to be random because Input 
prices and Input quantities are also stochastic in nature. Variable 
operating costs are defined as 
^In reality, total revenue may or may not be distributed normally. 
In the presentation of this chapter, the question of normality need not 
be addressed and normality will be assumed to facilitate the discussion. 
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m 
VOC - E r X , (4-2) 
j-1 J J 
where 
VOC Is variable operating costs, 
rj Is the stochastic price of Input j, and 
Xj Is the stochastic quantity of Input j. 
Earnings before Interest and taxes (EBIT) can be defined as the 
difference between total revenue and variable operating costs and fixed 
operating costs (FOC), or 
EBIT « TR - VOC - FOC. (4-3) 
As a simplifying assumption, assume that variable operating costs 
are a constant proportion of total revenue or 
VOC • b • TR. (4-4) 
Substituting (4-4) Into (4-3) and rearranging terms, (4-3) can be 
rewritten as 
EBIT - (1-b) • TR - FOC. (4-5) 
The expected value of earnings before Interest and taxes and Its 
variance are calculated as 
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E(EBIT) - (1-b) E(TR) - FOC, and 
V(EBIT) - (l-b)2 V(TR). 
(4-6) 
(4-7) 
Since the constant b and fixed operating costs must be greater than 
zero to Insure that a nonsensical solution does not result, the expected 
value of earnings before Interest and taxes will be less than the 
expected value of total revenue. The variance of earnings before 
Interest and taxes will be less than the variance of total revenue. But 
what Is really Important Is the measure of relative variability and not 
absolute variability. Defining the coefficient of variability as 
cv(TR) -n/v(TR) and cv(EBIT) -Vv(EBIT) .. . 
E(TR) E(EBIT) ' ^ 
Then what is really of Interest is the ratio of the coefficients of 
variation, or 
CV(EBIT) n/v(EBIT)/E(EBIT) v/v(EBIT) E(TR) 
CV(TR) " s/V(TR)/E(TR) " E(EBIT) .n/vTTRJ* 
(4-9) 
Substituting (4-6) and the square root of (4-7) into (4-9) results 
in 
CV(EBIT) 
CV(TR) 
(1-b) V(TR) 
(1-b) E(TR) - FOC 
(l-b) E(TR) 
(1-b) E(TR) - FOC* 
E(TR) 
VV(IR) 
(4-10) 
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which must be greater than 1 as long as fixed operating costs are greater 
than zero. Furthermore, the larger are the fixed operating costs, the 
larger will be the relative variability of earnings before interest and 
taxes. This can be seen by taking the partial derivative of (4-10) with 
respect to fixed operating costs, or 
_9_ . (1-b) E(Tlt) ^ 0 (4-11) 
3F0C [(1-b) E(TR) - FOC] 
which is positive as long as b < 1 and the firm is making a profit. An 
Increase In fixed operating costs increases the ratio of the relative 
dispersions. Therefore, the presence of fixed operating costs increases 
the risk exposure of the firm already present from price and quantity 
variability. For any given degree of variability due to price and 
quantity uncertainty, an increase in fixed operating costs will increase 
multipllcatively the business risk and the total enterprise risk of the 
firm. 
Fixed operating costs (and therefore operating risk) are primarily 
due to the presence of intermediate and long-term assets in the balance 
sheet. These are assets which are not consumed in one production cycle 
and generate depreciation and amortization charges against income. The 
composition of assets is primarily attributable to the production 
technologies employed by the firm and the expansion path the firm is 
following. Operating risk is a short run concept because in the long run 
(by definition) there can be no fixed costs. 
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The third component of risk to the firm is financial risk or 
financial leverage. Since total revenue Is assumed to be normally 
distributed, earnings before Interest and taxes from (4-6) and (4-7) must 
also be normally distributed. That Is 
EBIT ~ N(E(EBIT), V(EBIT)). (4-12) 
Net Income before taxes Is defined as 
k 
NIBT - EBIT -, S r. D.-, (4-13) 
k-1 ^ * 
where 
NIBT Is net Income before taxes, 
Is the Interest rate on debt of type k, and 
is the amount of debt of type k employed. 
The expected value and the variance of net income before taxes are 
defined as 
k 
E(NIBT) - E(EBIT) - Z r.D. , and (4-14) 
k-1 ^ ^  
V(NIBT) - V(EBIT). (4-15) 
The coefficients of variation of net Income before taxes (NIBT) and 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) are 
CV(EBIT) ->/v(EBIT). and (4-16) 
E(EBIT) 
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CV(NIBT) "VVÇNIBT) VV(NIBT) 
E(NIBT) " E(EBIT) -
(4-17) 
Dividing (4-16) by (4-17) and simplifying results in 
CV(NIBT) >yv(EBIT) E(EBIT) 
CV(EBIT) E(EBIT) - Zr^D^ >/V(EBIT) 
_ E(EBIT) 
E(EBIT) - Zr^D% (4-18) 
The expression in (4-18) must be greater than 1 with the presence of 
fixed interest charges so that the relative dispersion of earnings 
Increases with fixed financing costs. The partial derivative of (4-18) 
with respect to fixed financing costs is 
which says that as the amount of fixed financing costs Increase, so does 
the ratio of the relative dispersions. Therefore, an increase in fixed 
financing costs increases financial risk and the total enterprise risk. 
Financial risk is a function of the liability side of the balance 
sheet. If the liabilities are perpetual in nature (either perpetuities 
or liabilities of fixed term that are rolled over at maturity to generate 
new liabilities), then financial risk Is both a short run and a long run 
concept. 
a E (EBIT) 
> 0 (4-19) 
3(%) (E(EBIT) - Sr^D^)^ 
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The three sources of risk are multiplicative in nature and the farm 
should be concerned with the product of the three and not necessarily the 
particular level of any one. For a firm operating efficiently with a 
desired level of total enterprise risk, it is possible to substitute one 
source of risk for another and maintain the same level of total risk 
exposure. For example, the firm could employ such risk management 
strategies as diversification, hedging, spreading sales, forward price 
contracting, and Insurance to decrease the variability In output prices 
and yields. Alternatively, the firm could reduce its operating leverage 
by substituting Inputs which generate variable operating costs for inputs 
which lead to fixed operating costs. The substitution of labor inputs 
for capital and renting Instead of buying are examples which decrease 
operating risk. Financial risk can be decreased with the substitution of 
equity capital for nonequity sources of funds. To be certain, all risk 
management strategies also influence the level of expected return such 
that a trade-off typically exists between return and risk. 
The three components of enterprise risk suggest that the joint 
attention to production. Investment and financing is necessary in whole 
farm planning. A great deal of literature has been written on the 
Integration of investment and production decisions in agriculture (3, 32, 
33, 53, 54, 57, 84, 87, 108). Considerably less has been written on the 
integration of financing with production and investment. This Is partly 
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due to the unresolved question of whether financing matters. Therefore, 
it is now appropriate to discuss the theory of capital structure. 
Theory of Capital Structure 
The primary concern of the theory of capital structure is whether 
the way in which investments are financed influences the value of the 
firm (128, p. 261). For the sake of simplicity, assume there is only one 
type of debt available to the firm and only one type of equity. Further­
more, assume that the investment and production decisions have already 
been made and all that remains is to determine the most desirable combi­
nation of equity and debt.^ If the ratio of debt-to-equity (leverage) 
matters, then the firm can affect its total valuation by changing its 
financing mix. 
So that the analysis which follows can be more concisely presented, 
several facilitating assumptions will be made. Namely: 1) there are no 
income taxes (at least initially); 2) leverage is changed by issuing debt 
to repurchase stock or issuing stock to pay off debt; 3) changes in the 
capital structure are instantaneous with no transfer costs; 4) all 
Following the finance school, "most desirable" means the maximi­
zation of share price. For a large corporation with an active secondary 
market for its stock, this is equivalent to saying all stock owners 
possess an increasing utility function (or u' > 0) which is the same as 
first degree stochastic dominance. Since the shares of stock of farms 
are typically not publicly traded because of their small size and private 
holdings, we will substitute the maximization of net total assets (total 
assets minus total liabilities) valued at current fair market values as a 
proxy for the maximization of market price. This is a realistic proxy as 
long as shares of commong stock in the farm corporation accuraely 
represent the economic value of the underlying farm assets. 
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earnings are paid In dividends; 5) the probability distribution of future 
earnings is the same for all companies and are known by all Investors In 
the market; and 6) the operating earnings are not expected to grow—that 
is, the probability distribution of earnings is the same for every 
period. 
Following the analysis developed by Solomon (115), the following 
three rates are defined 
%% - ^  , (4-20) 
where 
k^ is the yield on the company's debt, assuming this debt is 
perpetual, 
F is the annual Interest charges on debt, 
B is the market value of debt outstanding. 
ke - "I (4-21) 
where 
kg is the required rate of return for investors, 
E is the earnings available to comnon stockholders, and 
S is the market value of stock outstanding. 
With 100 percent dividend payout, no taxes and no growth, the value 
(kg) represents the market rate of discount which equates the present 
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value of the stream of expected future dividends with the current market 
price of the stock (128, p. 263). 
Finally, define 
kg " f, (4-22) 
where 
kg is the overall capitalization rate of the firm, 
0 is net operating earnings, and 
V is total market value of the firm. 
The overall capitalization rate can be equivalently defined as the 
weighted average cost of capital where V = B + S, or 
^o " * % (3 + g)' (4-23) 
The concern with whether financing matters is then a question of 
what happens to k^, k^ and k^ when the degree of leverage (as denoted 
by the ratio B/S) changes. 
Durand (31, pp. 91-116) has proposed two approaches to the valuation 
of earnings—the net income approach and the net operating income 
approach. 
For an analysis of the use of the three weights in (4-20), (4-21) 
and (4-22) in calculating a weighted average cost of capital, see Nantell 
and Carlson (91). 
76 
Net Income approach to optimum capital structure 
To Illustrate the net Income approach of Durand, an example from Van 
Home (128, p. 264) Is used where the hypothetical firm has $3,000 of 
perpetual debt at 5 percent Interest, the expected value of annual net 
operating earnings Is $1,000 and the equity capitalization rate, k^. Is 
10 percent. The value of this firm to the stockholders Is $11,500—'as Is 
calculated In Table 1, column A. 
The Implied overall capitalization rate from (4-22) Is 
"o - ? -
Now assume this hypothetical firm Increases Its debt from $3,000 to 
$6,000 and uses the cash proceeds to repurchase stock (the Interest rate 
remains at 5 percent). The value of the firm Increases to $13,000—as 
shown in Table 1, column B. The Implied overall capitalization rate is 
now 
In this example, the hypothetical firm is able to Increase the total 
value of its stock and decrease its overall capitalization rate by 
increasing its debt to equity ratio. The per share market price has now 
increased as a result. Because (initially assume there were 850 shares 
outstanding valued at $10 per share) the $3,000 in debt issued is used to 
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Table 1, Met income approach to capital structure* 
•Company— 
A B 
0 Net operating earnings $ 1,000 $ 1,000 
F Interest (at 5%) 150 300 
E Earnings available to common 
stockholders $ 850 $ 700 
Equity capitalization rate .10 «10 
S Market value of stock $ 8,500 $ 7,000 
B Market value of debt 3,000 6,000 
V Total value of the firm $11,500 $13,000 
*From Van Home (128, p. 264) 
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purchase 300 shares of stock, leaving the firm with 550 shares. The 
value of the remaining common stock Is $7,000— which, when divided by 
550 shares outstanding, is equal to $12.73 per share. 
Graphically, this phenomenon is shown in Figure 14 where the degree 
of leverage employed is measured on the horizontal axis and percentages 
on the vertical axis. Since debt funds are cheaper than equity funds, 
the optimum capital structure is to employ as much debt as is institu­
tionally possible (i.e., move as far to the right in Figure 14 as the 
firm can). The significance of the net income approach is that the firm 
can increase its value to its shareholders by increasing the use of debt 
funds. 
The critical assumptions upon which the net income approach has been 
challenged are that k^, and more importantly k^, remain unchanged as 
the degree of leverage changes. These assumptions imply that the firm 
does not become more risky in the minds of investors and creditors as the 
degree of leverage is increased. 
Net operating income approach to capital structure 
At the opposite extreme of the net Income approach is the net 
operating income approach. Under this theory, it is the overall capital­
ization rate, k^, which remains constant regardless of the degree to 
which debt funds are employed. Using the same hypothetical firm as an 
example with k^ - 10%, 0 - $1,000 and B « $3,000 at 5%, the implied 
equity capitalization rate is 
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Percentage 
10 
5 
B/S 
Figure 14, Net income approach to capital structure 
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k ,1. $850 
e S $7,000 " 12.1 percent 
where S Is calculated In Table 2, column A. Now suppose, as before, the 
hypothetical firm replaces $3,000 of equity with $3,000 of debt. The 
Implied equity capitalization rate Increases to 
where S Is calculated In Table 2, column B. The equity-capitalization 
rate rises with increases in debt, but the total value of the firm 
remains unçhanged. Graphically, the net operating income approach is 
shown in Figure 15. The graph reveals that the overall capitalization 
rate of the firm does not change with changes in leverage. What does 
change is the required rate of return on equity. Under this hypothesis, 
investors demand a higher return (lower price to earnings ratio) on their 
investment for an increase in leverage. Because the cost of capital is 
constant, any capital structure is as good as any other, and no unique 
optimum exists. To see this, assume again that there are initially 850 
shares outstanding. The market value per share is then 7,000/850 (from 
Table 2, column Â) or $8.23. The $3,000 of debt is used to purchase 364 
shares at $8.23 each. Therefore, the market share price after the change 
(from Table 2, column B) is $4,000/(850-364) = $8.23, the same as before. 
The investor is indifferent as to which capital structure is employed. 
The critical assumption in this approach is that the Increase in the 
e S 4,000 
E 700 
- 17.5 percent 
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Table 2. Net operating Income approach to capital structure^ 
A B 
0 Net operating Income $ 1,000 $ 1,000 
Overall capitalization rate .10 .10 
V Total value of firm $10,000 $10,000 
B Market value of debt 3,000 6,000 
S Market value of stock $ 7,000 $ 4,000 
ke Equity capitalization rate 
(0-F)/S 12.1 17.5 . 
®From Van Home (128, p. 264). 
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Percentage 
10 
B/S 
Figure 15. Net operating Income approach to capital 
structure 
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required rate of return on equity Is just exactly sufficient to offset 
the Increased use of cheaper debt funds. 
Major support was given to the net operating Income approach by 
Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller In 1958 (95). They offered 
behavioral justification for a constant overall capitalization rate 
regardless of the degree of leverage employed. The assumptions upon 
which Modigliani and Miller based their argument are (128, pp. 270-271): 
1. Perfect capital markets; perfect and free information; no 
transaction costs; perfectly divisible securities; and all 
investors behave rationally. 
2. All investors view the expected probability distribution of 
operating earnings the same, and the distribution doesn't 
change over time. 
3. Corporate income taxes and bankruptcy costs are absent. 
Modigliani and Miller argue that arbitrage in the capital markets 
(and more Importantly the arbitragers ability to substitute personal 
leverage for corporate leverage) will insure that two firms identical in 
every respect except their capital structure will be valued the same. 
But for arbitrage to be effective, the two firms must be viewed as 
Identical substitutes by investors. In Modigliani and Miller's article, 
the two firms must be in the same risk class.^ 
^Modigliani and Miller propose to classify firms according to the 
degree of business risk to which they are exposed. Their arguments on 
arbitrage were then couched in terms of comparing two firms belonging to 
the same risk class. Subsequent authors have shown that this is an 
unnecessary restriction. For example, see Van Home (128, pp. 292-294) 
and Becker (9, pp. 65-69). 
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Consider two firms belonging to the same risk class and Identical In 
every respect except that A Is not leveraged while B has $3,000 of 5% 
bonds outstanding as In Table 3. The total value of Company B is greater 
than Company A. Modigliani and Miller maintain that this cannot happen 
because arbitragers will enter the market and sell shares of B to buy 
shares of A because they can obtain (with A's stock) the same dollar 
return with no increase in risk for a smaller investment outlay. This 
arbitrage would continue until the per share price of B*s stock declined 
and the per share price of A's rose to the point where the total values 
of the two firms were identical. 
Modigliani and Miller illustrate how this would occur (96). Suppose 
a rational investor owned 1 percent of Company B in Table 3. This 
ownership is worth $77.27. The Investor would practice arbitrage by: 1) 
selling the B stock for $77.27; 2) borrowing $30 (1% of B's corporate 
debt) at 5 percent; and 3) buying $100 (1 percent) of A's stock. Prior 
to this series of transactions, the investor's expected return on B's 
stock was $77.27 x .11 » $8.50, After the transaction, his return on A*s 
stock is $100 X .10 " $10.00 from which he must subtract personal debt 
servicing charges of $1.50 ($30 x .05 • $1.50). His net dollar return on 
A's stock Is therefore $8.50, the same as it was on B's stock. However, 
his investment in B's stock was $77.27 whereas his investment in A's 
stock is only $70 ($100 stock purchase minus $30 of debt). Conversely, 
the investor was earning 11 percent on his investment in B's stock. 
After arbitrage the Investor is able to earn 12.1 percent on A's stock 
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Table 3. Modigliani and Miller and the cost of capital^ 
Company— 
A B 
0 Net operating income $ 1,000 $ 1,000 
F Interest on debt 0 150 
E Earnings available to 
stockholders $ 1,000 $ 850 
Equity capiallzation rate .10 .11 
S Market value of stock $10,000 " $ 7,727 
B Market value of debt 0 3,000 
V Total value of the firm $10,000 $10,727 
k^ Implied overall capital rate .10 .093 
B/S Debt-to-equity ratio 0 .388 
*From Van Home (128, p. 272) 
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partially financed by personal debt. In essence, the Investor Is 
substituting personal leverage for corporate leverage by taking on 
personal debt. The concerted actions of all rational Investors will 
drive up the price of Company Â*s stock and lower Its kg and drive down 
the price of B's stock and Increase B's k^. This will continue until 
the total values of the two firms Is Identical. As a result, the overall 
capitalization rates, k^, must also be the same vrtilch Is consistent 
with the net operating Income approach. Conversely, If A's value exceeds 
B's value (A's equity capitalization rate is too low), arbitrage would 
occur in the opposite direction, raising A's k^ and lowering B's k^ 
until both firms are again valued the same. 
Modigliani and Miller conclude that ^ 
1. The total market value of the firm and its cost of capital 
are independent of its capital structure. The total 
market value of a firm is given by capitalizing the 
expected stream of operating earnings at a discount rate 
appropriate for its risk class. 
2. The expected yield of a share of stock, k^, is equal 
to the capitalization rate of a pure equity stream, plus 
a premium for financial risk equal to the difference 
between the pure equity capitalization rate and k^ times 
the ratio B/S. In other words, kg increases in a manner 
to exactly offset the use of cheaper debt funds. 
3. The cutoff rate for Investment purposes is completely 
independent of the way in which an investment is financed. 
This proposition, along with the first, implies a ccmplete 
separation of the investment and financing decisions of 
the firm. 
^Restated from Van Home (128, p. 271). 
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Obviously, pure adherents to the net operating Income approach would 
find fault with the development of the theory of the firm at the Intro­
duction to this chapter* In particular, they would argue there are no 
decision making linkages between Investment and finance nor between 
production and finance as pictured In Figure 11. However, the 
Modlgllanl-Mlller theory of capital structure. In Its simplest form, 
abstracts from the effects of market imperfections such as taxes, 
bankruptcy, and credit rationing. As will be seen In the next section, 
the inclusion of market Imperfections makes the Modlgllanl-Mlller theory 
consistent with the earlier presentation of the role of financing. 
Traditional theory of capital structure 
The traditional theory of capital structure Includes all the ground 
between the net income and the net operating Income approaches. But the 
traditional approach assumes that there is an optimum capital structure 
and that the firm can increase its total value through the Judicious use 
of leverage (128, p. 268). 
As an example of one variation of the traditional theory, consider 
the following. The hypothetical firm of the previous examples has $1,000 
in net operating income with no debt and an equity capitalization rate of 
10 percent. The total value of this firm is presented in column A of 
Table 4. In the absence of leverage, the total value of the firm is 
$10,000 with a per share price of $8.23 and an overall capitalization 
rate of 10 percent* Now assume that the firm issues $3,000 of debt at 5 
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Table 4. Traditional approach to capital structure 
—— —Company— 
A B Ç 
0 Net operating income $ 1,000 $ 1,000 $ 1,000 
F Interest on debt 0 150 360 
E Earnings available to 
common stockholders $ 1,000 $ 850 $ 640 
kp Equity capitalization rate .10 .11 .14 
S Market value of stock $10,000 $ 7,727 $ 4,571 
B Market value of debt 0 3,000 6,000 
V Total value of firm $10,000 $10,727 $10,571 
C Shares outstanding 1,214.3 850 520 
S/C Market value per share $ 8.23 $ 9.09 $ 8.79 
Overall capitalization rate .10 .093 .095 
0 
89 
percent and uses the proceeds to purchase 364.3 shares of stock -
o #23 
364.3). The Investors now view the firm as more risky with the presence 
of debt in the capital structure and raise their equity capitalization 
rate from 10 percent to 11 percent. The total value of the hypothetical 
firm is calculated in column B of Table 4. The total market value has 
increased to $10,727, the market price per share has risen to $9.09, and 
the overall capitalization rate has dropped to 9.3 percent. Although k , 
the required rate of return on equity, increased with the increase in 
leverage, the increase does not entirely offset the benefit of using 
cheaper debt funds. As a result the overall capitalization rate has 
dropped. 
Now suppose the firm increases its debt from $3,000 to $6,000, but 
the interest on debt also rises from 5 percent to 6 percent. Addition­
ally, investors view the firm as more risky than before and increase 
their required rate of return on equity from 11 percent to 14 percent. 
The valuation of the firm is calculated in column C of Table 4. The 
additional $3,000 of debt is used to purchase 330 shares at $9,09 per 
share, which leaves 520 shares outstanding. The market value per share 
is now $8.79 (lower than company B), and the overall capitalization rate 
is 9.5 percent (higher than company B). Thus, the total valuation of the 
firm is lower and the overall capitalization rate is higher when debt is 
increased from $3,000 to $6,000. 
Graphically, this version of the traditional approach is portrayed 
in Figure 16. The cost of debt, k^, remains constant to some point of 
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Figure 16. Traditional approach to capital structure 
Required 
Rate of 
Return 
on Equity 
A (with bankruptcy) 
(without bankruptcy) 
B/S 
Figure 17. Bankruptcy costs and the cost of capital 
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leverage and begins to Increase beyond that point because creditors view 
the firm as more risky and require a higher return on their loan funds. 
Investors also require compensation for additional risk taken on by the 
firm; therefore, k^ rises at an Increasing rate with leverage. With a 
small use of leverage, the Increase In k^ does not fully offset the use 
of cheaper debt funds, so initially the overall capitalization rate 
declines. But after some point (such as at X in Figure 16), the increase 
in kg more than offsets the cheaper cost of debt, and the overall 
capitalization rate begins to increase. The increase in k^ is . 
supported further once the cost of debt k^ also begins to rise. The 
optimal capital structure of the firm is the minimum point of k^ which 
occurs at point X. At point X the marginal real cost of debt is equal to 
the marginal real cost of equity. The traditional approach (either this 
variant or some other) implies that the cost of capital is not indepen­
dent of the capital structure; therefore, financing does influence 
investment and production. 
Market imperfections and capital structure 
The three theories of capital structure are extremely divergent in 
their conclusions* From a theoretical standpoint, it is difficult to 
choose among them. The choice must be made upon one's belief of the 
effect Increasing leverage has on the cost of debt and the required 
return demanded by Investors. In order to choose, the competing theories 
must be evaluated in light of economic behavior—that is, the theory 
which is most consistent with reality must be found. Theory is by 
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definition an abstraction of reality Where the abstract nature is 
achieved through specification of simplifying restrictions. Modigliani 
and Miller assume that perfect capital markets exist. Consequently, to 
prove that the net operating income approach is not an appropriate 
application of theory, one must show that perfect markets are not a 
reasonable assumption. Furthermore, even if market imperfections exist, 
they must be shown to be significant (128, p. 274). 
Transaction costs 
One imperfection in the market place is the cost of transactions. 
Transaction costs do restrict the arbitrage process for equilibrating the 
market, but as Hirschleifer (58, pp. 264-275) has shown, arbitrage will 
still take place up to the limits of the transaction costs. Transaction 
costs result in imperfect markets, but the effect is not systematic as to 
direction so that the net effect (if it exists at all) is not predict­
able. Therefore, although transactions costs are an imperfection, they 
are not sufficient grounds for refuting the net operating income 
approach. 
Bankruptcy costs 
Under the assumptions of perfect capital markets, bankruptcy 
proceedings result in zero costs. Presumably, assets are liquidated at 
their economic values and the proceeds distributed at no cost to 
creditors and Investors according to their claims. The creditors and 
investors are then able to reinvest the proceeds in equivalent endeavors. 
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Under perfect market restrictions, Investors and creditors are Indif­
ferent to the event of bankruptcy. Haugen and Senbet (52, pp. 383-394) 
argue that even If a market imperfection due to bankruptcy exist, it is 
still not an important factor because when bankruptcy approaches, the 
firm simply reorganizes by selling stock and repurchasing debt. The firm 
can do this at minimum cost because all parties involved act rationally 
and share an Incentive to avoid formal bankuptcy. 
Van Home states that although the evidence is fragmentary, the 
administrative costs of liquidation due to bankruptcy may approach twenty 
percent of the value of the assets (128, p. 226). This is in addition to 
any liquidation loss due to the sale of assets at less than their 
economic value. Security holders as a whole would receive less in the 
event of positive bankruptcy costs than in their absence. To the extent 
that a levered firm has a greater possibility of bankuptcy. Investors 
would prefer an unlevered firm, all other things the same. Kraus and 
Litzenberger (71, pp. 911-922) show that the possibility of bankruptcy is 
a nonlinear function of leverage (i.e., beyond some threshold it 
Increases at an Increasing rate). As a result, expanding leverage would 
be expected to have a negative effect on the value of the firm and its 
cost of capital (129). Since bankruptcy costs are a dead-weight loss. 
Investors are unable to diversify away this risk. Therefore, investors 
penalize the price of a stock (by requiring a higher k^) as leverage 
increases. The effect of bankruptcy costs is shown in Figure 17, page 
90. If the required return on equity is linear in the absence of 
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bankruptcy costs, as shown by the solid line in Figure 17, the arguments 
of Van Home, Krause and Utzenberger would make k^ bend upward at an 
increasing rate with the addition of bankruptcy costs, as shown by the 
broken line in Figure 17. The additional return required by investors at 
low levels of leverage is negligible but increases at an increasing rate. 
At high leverage, the effect is substantial. Therefore, the cost of 
capital and leverage are not independent, and financing is not 
independent of investment.^ 
Homemade leverage and the cost of borrowing 
Another assumption upon which Modigliani and Miller's argument is 
based is that personal and corporate leverage are perfect substitutes. 
A number of market imperfections, however, indicate this is not the case. 
An individual is unlikely to negotiate the same borrowing terms as a 
corporation. In addition, individuals face unlimited liability on 
personal loans whereas corporate leverage results in liability only to 
the value of the stock. Margin calls and the personal time Involved in 
facilitating personal loans may also make personal and corporate leverage 
less than perfect substitutes. 
^Joseph Stlglitz (119, pp. 851-866) suggests that bankruptcy 
affects the cost of capital even in the absence of bankruptcy costs. He 
makes this contention because of a divergence in expectations as to the 
chance of bankruptcy between lender and borrower. This results in an 
increasing Interest rate (due to Increasing leverage) and therefore scale 
becomes an Important factor and the firm's investment and financing 
decisions are no longer independent. 
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However, arbitrage need not be done by individuals. Other corpora­
tions and financial intermediaries entering the market may ensure effi­
cient functioning of the arbitrage process to equilibrate the market even 
if individuals can not (118, 119), Furthermore, Individuals can accom­
plish arbitrage without actually borrowing funds. They can accomplish 
the same thing by adjusting their portfolios of bond holdings (128, p. 
277). Therefore, these market imperfections appear to be of negligible 
importance. 
Income taxes 
Since interest payments on debt are tax deductible, leverage results 
in a tax shield benefit accruing to the residual owners of the firm, 
i.e., the stockholders. If the tax shield remains unchanged in all 
future years, the present value of the tax shield is 
t rB 
PV - - t^B, (4-24) 
where 
t^ is the corporate tax rate, 
r is the interest rate on debt, and 
B is the market value of debt outstanding. 
Therefore, the value of the firm with taxes Is now 
0(l-t ) 
V T-S- + t B, (4-25) 
^k 
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where 
is the overall capitalization rate (after tax) of a firm 
with no debt in a given risk class, and 
0 is the expected net operating earnings* 
The first expression on the right hand side of (4-25) is the value 
of an unlevered firm under taxes. The second term on the right is the 
additional value to the stockholders due to the deductibility of interest 
payments. In essence, the government is paying the levered firm a 
subsidy for using debt (128, p. 280). Additionally, the more debt 
employed, the greater the subsidy and the lower will be the cost of 
capital. Reworking the Modigliani and Miller approach to Incorporate 
taxes suggests that the optimum capital structure is to use as much debt 
as possible. 
However, the tax shield is only available if there is sufficient 
taxable income to offset it. Similarly, the future benefits of the tax 
shield will not be realized if bankruptcy should occur. Personal income 
taxes may also work to mitigate the tax advantage of debt to the corpora­
tion. Capital gains are subject to a lower personal Income tax rate 
than is ordinary income. With a 100 percent dividend payout and no 
growth in earnings, no appreciation (and therefore no capital gains) 
would accrue to the owners of stock. However, as the corporation 
increases its leverage to take advantage of the tax shield at the corpor­
ate level, the overall capitalization rate declines and the per share 
price of stock increases, producing a capital gain. However, the 
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creditors of the corporation must report the debt Income as ordinary 
income and pay a higher rate than on capital gains. Therefore, the 
overall affect of personal taxes is to reduce the tax benefit at the cor­
porate level (128, pp. 281-282 and 79, pp. 737-749). 
Restructuring the Modigliani and Miller argument to include taxes 
and bankruptcy costs is shown in Figure 18. With recognition given to 
the effects of corporate income taxes only, the cost of capital to the 
firm is linear and decreasing. Therefore, the firm would employ as much 
debt as it conceivably could and the optimum capital structure would lie 
as far to the right as possible. Incorporating the mitigating effect of 
personal income taxes, the cost of capital would still be linear and 
downward sloping, but with a larger slope (i.e., smaller negative slope). 
The optimum capital structure would still be at the very far right. With 
the addition of bankruptcy costs, the cost of capital curve in Figure 18 
would at first coincide with the other curves. As leverage becomes more 
pronounced, the effect of bankruptcy would partially offset the tax 
effect and at extreme leverage, bankruptcy considerations would more than 
offset the tax effect so that, even under the Modigllanl-Mlller approach, 
an optimal capital structure would exist. 
If one's beliefs dictate that other market Imperfections, such as 
imperfect information and differential borrowing rates, are significant 
factors, then the overall capitalization rate would turn up sooner, 
resulting in a smaller degree of leverage in the optimum capital 
structure. For additional discussion of determining the optimal capital 
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structure of a firm In the face of positive taxes and bankruptcy costs, 
see Kim (69), Scott (112), Lee and Baker (76), Baron (7) and Chen (25). 
If the importance of market imperfections in determining the optimal 
capital structure is accepted, then the net income approach, the net 
operating income approach and the traditional approach all produce an 
optimum combination of debt and equity. Fortunately, for the purpose 
here, it is not necessary to choose among them, for the only concern is 
to establish the linkage between financing and investment. With market 
imperfections, the linkage does exist and financing does indeed matter. 
To this point, debt has been treated as a homogeneous commodity. In 
fact, it has implicitly been assumed to be perpetual in nature. Since 
this is an unrealistic abstraction, it is now necessary to turn our 
attention to the types of financing available to the family farm. 
Conceptual Considerations for the Type of Financing 
In the previous section, the importance of financing was addressed. 
With the presence of market imperfections (most notably income taxes and 
bankruptcy costs), an optimum capital structure does exist. However, the 
discussion was limited to two types of financing - debt and equity. But 
debt is not a homogeneous commodity because of differing maturities and 
financial characteristics. In terms of maturity, liabilities can be 
classified as current. Intermediate, and long term. In terms of 
characteristics, liabilities can be loans, bonds, contracts, and leases. 
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just to name a few. Heterogenlty does not. In itself, lead to the con­
clusion that an optimum composition of financing exists. If capital 
markets were indeed perfect, equity owners would be indifferent to the 
type and maturity of the debt the firm employs because the firm could not 
affect its valuation by altering the composition of debt (128, p. 481). 
However, capital markets are not perfect and therefore, the composition 
and type of financing are important. In this section, the effects of 
market imperfections will briefly be reviewed and the salient character­
istics of selected types of financing will be identified. 
The most important imperfections affecting debt financing are flota­
tion costs, bankruptcy costs, costs of information, restrictions on 
lenders and absence of market determined transfers. Flotation costs 
which are fixed, in whole or in part, tend to bias the financing process 
towards less frequent financing, larger offerings at each issue and 
longer maturities. This is because a fixed financing charge leads to 
economies of scale with respect to debt offerings (128, p. 482). 
Bankruptcy cost considerations also bias structuring the repayment 
schedule toward lower levels of debt obligations coming due in the near 
future; that is, using debt with longer maturities. Costs of information 
limit the number of financing arrangements available to the firm. Most 
family farms are not of sufficient size to justify a debt offering on 
publicly traded markets. This is because the cost of Information to the 
ultimate investors is sufficiently high to make the public offering 
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unfeasible. Instead, the family farm will negotiate directly with a 
single paty such as a commercial bank. Farm Credit Bank, insurance 
company or family meaber. 
Restrictions on lenders may also limit the number of financing 
options available. These restrictions may be of a legal nature, a result 
of tax considerations, or self-imposed. For example, commercial banks 
face loan limits on the maximum amount they can loan to any one 
individual or entity. Commercial banks also favor short and intermediate 
term financing because of restrictions on their investment behavior. 
Federal Land Banks, on the other hand, specialize in making long term 
real estate loans. Dealings with family members are limited by the 
financial resources and consumption needs of each individual. As a 
result, the family farm may face limited sources of funds of a given 
maturity and type. This may force the farm to employ a maturity and type 
composition that is suboptimal. 
Due to the small size and limited number of participants in a family 
farm's financing market (that is, small in relation to publicly traded 
corporations), the terms of a debt obligation result from the direct 
negotiation of two parties. There is no efficient secondary market which 
determines effective Interest rates or maturities. Rather, the 
conditions of the debt obligation are negotiable and often occur at less 
than arm's length. As a result of these imperfections, the farm can 
alter its value to its stockholders by the way it packages Its financial 
instruments. 
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Maturity 
One approach to the question of optimum maturity composition is the 
hedging approach. Under this approach, each asset is offset by a 
liability of the same approximate maturity. Short term variations in the 
level of current assets (possibly due to cyclical or seasonal fluctua­
tions) would be financed with short term debt. Fixed assets and 
permanent current assets needed in the production process would be 
financed with long-term or permanent sources of funds. This relationship 
is shown in Figure 19. Over time, as the firm grows, so does the firm's 
use of long-term and permanent sources of funds. As a firm moves into a 
season of extra funds need, short-term financing would be used to acquire 
the additional inputs. As the firm progresses into a period when funds 
needs decline, short term borrowing would be paid off with surplus cash. 
In the short term borrowing troughs, the firm would have no short-term 
borrowing apart from current installments on long term debt obligations. 
In this manner, the firm would employ financing only when it is needed. 
Under conditions of certainty, an exact synchronization of needs with 
borrowings such as the hedging approach would be possible. Under 
uncertainty, this is no longer possible because seasonal funds needs. 
Interest rates, and net cash flows can all deviate from their expecta­
tions. Typically, a firm will not structure its repayment schedule in 
such a fashion as to require payment before the cash flow is generated. 
In short, the firm will lag the repayment schedule to the generation of 
funds. The longer the lag, the larger the margin of safety the firm has 
in meeting its obligations. 
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Figure 18. Net operating Income approach with taxes 
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Figure 19. Hedging approach to financing 
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The degree of safety the firm desires is determined by a trade-off of 
profitability for reduced risk. 
Long-term, fixed-rate financing provides the firm with a certain 
repayment schedule at a certain interest rate that is known at the time 
the loan is entered into. This provides the firm with more certainty 
(and therefore less risk) than does financing with an equivalent amount 
of short term debt. But this decrease in risk typically comes at a 
higher cost to the firm. Typically, the explicit interest cost of long-
term debt is higher than short-term.^ In addition, the firm will pay 
interest on funds when they are not needed. 
Alternatively, with short term financing, the firm faces more 
uncertainty as to the ability to refinance and the cost at which 
refinancing will occur. This is of particular concern when long term 
assets are acquired with short-term credit. The cash flows from the 
income generating asset are not sufficient to pay off the short term 
loan. If for some reason the firm is unable to "roll over" the short 
term credit, the firm may be unable to meet the debt obligations and 
suffer short-run cash insolvency. 
Even if refinancing is possible, there still remains the uncertainty 
as to interest costs. The obvious question that arises is —does a 
positive correlation between short term Interest costs and net operating 
^It is possible at any point in time to have a downward sloping 
or humped yield to maturity curve, however, over a long enough period of 
time the firm typically pays more for long term than short term 
financing, particularly if the borrowings are privately negotiated (2, 
pp. 1249-1254). 
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Income exist? From the end o£ World War 11 until 1970 there did exist a 
positive correlation between short term Interest rates and corporate net 
Income (128, p. 485). Over this period, both interest rates and profits 
tended to follow the business cycle. When corporate profits were 
depressed, so were interest rates; when profits were high, the rates were 
high also. Short-term interest rates acted to level out corporate Income 
and reduce overall variability in corporate profits. But in the 1970s, 
inflation seems to have broken the correlation, for in 1970-71, 1975-76, 
and 1979-80, short-term Interest rates remained high while profits were 
depressed. With the presence of high rates of inflation, it is unclear 
if any correlation exists between profits and interest rates. 
The firm is then faced with the trade-off of higher interest costs 
at more certainty for possibly lower Interest costs with more 
uncertainty. The decision on how much short-term and how much long-term 
debt to employ will be decided by the decision makers' preferences in 
terms of his risk-return tradeoff. 
Current liabilities Current liabilities are defined as short 
term liabilities whose liquidation is reasonably expected to require the 
use of existing resources properly classified as current assets or the 
creation of other current liabilities (1, p. 21). The period "short 
term" is defined as within the next year or operating cycle, consistent 
with the definition of current assets (131, p. 140). 
Current liabilities can be subdivided into two primary categories: 
those which arise due to temporary and seasonal financing needs, and 
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those which represent the current Installments on Intermediate and long 
term debt* 
Examples of current liabilities which are due to temporary and 
seasonal borrowing needs are trade credit; accounts payable; accrual 
accounts such as wages, salaries, rentals, and expenses payable; revenues 
which have been collected in advance; and short term notes payable. The 
demand for these items closely follows the production process. When 
production is occurring at a high rate and generates a high demand for 
inputs, the demand for short-term funds rises. When production is at a 
low level, the demand for funds also slackens and the need for current 
liabilities diminishes. Because these changes are spontaneous, current 
liabilities are determined more by the level at which production is 
occurring and the desired level of working capital (current assets minus 
current liabilities) or short-term liquidity, than by discretionary 
management decisions. Typically, if payment is made within the credit 
terms, no interest cost is involved and these items represent a source of 
float to the firm. 
Short-term notes payable do carry an explicit (or implicit. If sold 
at a discount) Interest charge. In addition to short-term bank loans, 
these items may also Include commercial paper, banker's acceptances, and 
other money market instruments. 
The third component of current liabilities Is the current install­
ments due on intermediate- and long-term liabilities. These installments 
result from the payment structure of the intermediate- and long-term 
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liabilities. As a result, the level of current liabilities needed in any . 
period can be described as the sua of the nondiscretionary funds require­
ments (that is, a fixed percentage, |0, of current assets) plus short 
term notes plus the current installments due on noncurrent liabilities 
or 
CLj. - + ST Notes^ + Z INSTALLMENTS^. (4-26) 
Intermediate and long term liabilities In accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles, an intermediate- or long-term 
liability is an obligation that will not require the use of current 
assets for payment during the upcoming operating cycle or during the next 
year, whichever is longer (131, p. 143). It is not necessary to 
distinguish between intermediate and long term. In practice the two are 
often presented under the heading of long term. The two classes will be 
separated here merely for convenience and defined consistent with inter­
mediate and long term assets where the time of demarcation is set at 5 to 
6 years 0 What is important is the distinction between current and 
noncurrent llablltles and the maturities of the noncurrent liabilities. 
Examples of financing instruments which fall within these two 
headings are conventional bank term loans where the bank may be a com­
mercial bank, a credit union, a savings and loan, a Production Credit 
Association, a Federal Land Bank Association, or an insurance company. 
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Revolving bank credit, equipment-financing loans, and chattel mortgages 
are all intermediate- or long-term liabilties. 
The common characteristic of intermediate- and long-term liabilities 
is that they are self-liquidating over a period in excess of one year. 
For repayment, the lender looks to the cash flow generating ability of 
the firm and the asset's collateral value (if the loan is secured). In 
addition to the monetary terms stipulated in the agreement, other 
conditions (protective covenants) may also be imposed by the lender. 
Some common protective covenants are requirements to maintain a 
stipulated level of working capital, restrictions on the payment of cash 
dividends, stock repurchase limitations, capital expenditure limitations, 
required insurance and restrictions on acquiring other Indebtedness. The 
number and severity of covenants result from direct negotiation between 
borrower and lender. 
Conventional term loans 
All of the financing instruments described below will be classified 
as conventional term loans or term loans where four parameters (amount, 
repayment schedule, interest rate and maturity) are points of 
negotiation. 
Upon agreement, the lender transfers cash proceeds to the borrower 
in return for a contractual obligation, as shown in Figure 20. The 
borrower uses the cash proceeds to acquire productive assets. The assets 
purchased, in conjunction with the existing stock of assets, are employed 
periodic interest and principal payments 
borrower 
(uses cash 
to acquire 
productive 
assets) 
net cash 
flow from 
sale of 
commodities 
cash proceeds lender 
production 
contractual 
obligation 
residual cash flow 
Figure 20. Conventional term loans 
109 
In the production process to produce commodities. The cash generated 
from the sale of commodities Is used to pay the periodic interest and 
principal Installments required by the obligation. Any residual cash 
flow is available to the borrower for consumption, dividends, or 
reinvestment in additional assets. If the net cash flow generated is 
insufficient to meet the debt-servicing needs of the obligation, then 
other sources of liquidity must be employed to meet the fixed financing 
costs. 
The effect on the borrower's balance sheet at the time the loan is 
entered Into is shown in figure 21. Initially, current asset's are 
Increased by the cash proceeds. At a later time (or possibly instanta­
neously) , the cash proceeds will be used to purchase assets. If the 
assets purchased are not current assets, then current assets will be 
decreased and the corresponding intermediate- or long-term asset accounts 
will be Increased by the price of the purchase. 
The present value of all future principal and interest payments 
discounted at the market rate of interest (assumed to be the same 
Interest rate stipulated In the loan) is Included as a long term 
liability. As each principal payment is made, the remaining obligation 
is revalued using the market rate of interest at the date of inception. 
Mathematically, the present value of the remaining obligation is computed 
as 
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Assets Liabilities 
+ cash proceeds + present value of 
future Interest 
and principal 
payments discounted 
at the the market 
rate of Interest 
Figure 21. Effect of taking out a loan on borrower's balance sheet 
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where 
FV^ Is the present value at the end of year t, 
n Is the original life of the loan in years, 
^\+t principal payment due in year i+t, 
is the Interest payment due in year i+t, and 
r Is the market rate of Interest at inception. 
Leases A lease is a means by which a firm acquires the economic 
use of an asset. The lessor transfers the property or the right to use 
the property, but not the title, to the lessee in return for a rental 
agreement as shown in Figure 22. The lessee employs the asset in his 
productive process to produce commodities which are then converted into 
cash. The net cash flow is used to make the periodic lease payments 
under the agreement. Any residual cash flow is retained by the lessee or 
any shortage of cash flow is made up from other sources. 
For accounting purposes, a lease is classified as either an 
operating lease or capital lease.^ A capital lease is broadly defined 
as a lease which transfers most of the risks and rewards of ownership 
from lessor to lessee or includes a "bargain purchase" option. An 
operating lease is any lease which does not qualify as a capital lease 
(131, p. 749). From the standpoint of the lessee, a lease must be 
^As defined in paragraph 6 of Financial Accounting Standards Board 
Statement Number 13, "Accounting for Leases" (38). 
periodic lease payments 
lessee 
(uses 
property 
in 
production 
property net cash 
flow 
from 
production 
lessor 
production 
Lease Agreement 
residual cash flow 
Figure 22. Capital and operating leases 
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classified as a capital lease if it meets one or more of the following 
conditions: 
1) The lease transfers title to the lessee at or before 
the end of the contract. 
2) The lease contains an option to purchase the asset 
at a bargain price. 
3) The lease period equals or exceeds 75% of the asset's 
economic life. 
4) The present value of the minimum lease payment stream 
equals or exceeds 90% of the net value realized by the lessor. 
The rate of discount is the lesser of the lessee's incremental 
borrowing rate or the lessor's internal rate of return (provided 
the latter can be calculated). The net value realized by the 
lessor is the asset's fair market value less any investment 
tax credit claimed by the lessor. 
If the lease fails all four of the above tests, then by default, it 
is considered an operating lease. 
The effect of a capital lease on the balance sheet of the lessee is 
shown in Figure 23. Both the asset and liability sides are Increased by 
an amount equal to the present value of the lease payments but not to 
exceed an amount in excess of the asset's fair market value. At 
Inception, the present value of a capital lease is calculated as 
n Sent. 
PV - r =r, (4-28) 
1=1 (1+r)^ 
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CAPITAL: 
Assets 
+ present value of 
minimum lease 
payments Including 
any bargain purchase 
option discounted at 
lessee's incremental 
rate of borrowing 
but not to exceed 
the property's fair 
market value 
Liabilities 
+ same as asset side 
OPERATING: 
Assets Liabilities 
+ prepayment (if any) + prepayment (if any) 
(terms of lease 
exceeding one year 
must be disclosed 
in a footnote or 
supporting 
schedule) 
Figure 23. Effect of a lease on lessee's balance sheet 
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where 
Rent^ is the lease rental due In year 1 of an n year lease, 
and 
r Is the lessee's Incremental rate of borrowing at the 
date of Inception or, if practicable to calculate, the 
lessor's internal rate of return on the asset if this 
rate is less (38, paragraphs 5, 7). 
The lease is amortized (both asset and liability) in a manner 
consistent with the firm's depreciation policy on similar assets, but the 
period of amortization must be the lease term rather than the life of the 
leased property (38, paragraph 11)For a firm using straight line 
depreciation on equivalent assets and a lease which requires equal 
periodic rentals over the term of the lease, the annual reduction to the 
asset and liability entries will be the per period lease payment minus 
interest on the outstanding lease obligation. Interest, in this case, is 
calculated as the discount rate used in the present value computations 
times the account balance at the beginning of the period. 
An operating lease does not affect either the lessee's or lessor's 
balance sheet in monetary terms. However, for all operating lease 
^However, if a lease transfers ownership or includes a bargain 
purchase option, the term should be the leased asset's useful life 
Instead of the lease term with appropriate consideration given to any 
residual value. 
With one exception. If there is a prepayment, the lessee must 
create a "Leasehold" and the lessor an "Unearned Revenue" account which 
is amortized in a reasonable and systematic fashion over the term of the 
lease. 
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agreements Which exceed one year, the relevant terms and conditions of 
the lease must be disclosed In a footnote or on a supporting document. 
In addition to the payment terms, the lease agreement may Include an 
option to purchase or renew the lease. The agreement will also stipulate 
who is responsible for maintenance and repairs. More importantly, the 
agreement will Identify which party is entitled to any investment tax 
credit. Typically, the lessor will retain the right to claim the 
Investment tax credit. However, a noncorporate lessor may not be able to 
meet the necessary qualifications and be willing to pass the credit on to 
the lessee. The party entitled to claim the credit is typically not of 
Importance because the terms of the lease will be adjusted accordingly. 
If the lessor retains the right to the tax credit, the lease will be 
negotiated at more favorable terms than if the lessor passes the credit 
to the lessee. Therefore, for the purposes here, it will be assumed the 
lessor retains the tax credit. The lessee is entitled to deduct the 
annual lease payments for tax purposes provided they are reasonable.^ 
To evaluate the financial consequences of the lease, it is necessary 
to determine whether the analysis should be lease-or-buy or lease-or-
borrow. Johnson and Lewellyn (67, pp. 815-824) argue the appropriate 
analysis is lease-or-buy whereas Van Home (128, pp. 544-545) and Bower 
(19, pp. 24-34) argue-that the question of profitability should be 
decided first (should the Investment be made) and the question of 
^The Internal Revenue Service's primary concern is that the lease 
does not represent an Installment sale. 
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financing (lease or debt) afterwards. Although this is a moot issue, the 
latter approach will be followed and profitability will be separated from 
financing, but the interrelationship will be kept in mind. The decision, 
in Isolation, can be viewed in terms of the opportunity cost of funds and 
the time pattern of cash flows. Although a variety of techniques have 
been employed in evaluating the lease-or-borrow issue, only the Internal 
rate of return method proposed by Beechy (10), Doenges (29), Flndlay 
(39), Mitchell (94), Roenfeldt and Osteryoung (106), Wyman (135), and 
Long (80) will be presented here. For alternative approaches see Bower, 
Herrington and Williamson (20), Bower (19, p. 31), and Gordon (47). The 
alternative approaches utilize a net present value approach, the results 
of which are very sensitive to the discount rate incorporated in the 
analysis. Some authors employ the after tax cost of debt while others 
use the weighted average cost of capital. Since very seldom can 100 
percent debt financing be employed, the first is Inappropriate because it 
doesn't give recognition to equity financing. The problem with the cost 
of capital as a measure of the discount rate is that the cost of capital 
Itself is determined by the decision to lease-or-borrow. Therefore, to 
avoid the problem of specifying a discount rate, the internal rate of 
return approach will be presented here. The Internal rate of return, by 
making the rate endogenous, avoids the problem of having to specify the 
appropriate discount rate ex-ante.^ 
^However, even with the internal rate of return method, a cut-off 
rate below which the firm is not willing to Invest must still be 
specified. 
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For a lease with no residual value and under the assumption that 
the lease payments equal the amortized payment plus Imputed interest, the 
after tax cost of leasing can be determined by solving the following for 
I: 
n-l L n T(L - P ) 
(A - ITC) - E + Z — - 0, (4-29) 
t-o (1+I)t t-1 (1+1%) 
where 
Ag - cost of the asset to be leased, 
ITC " investment tax credit foregone by the lessee, 
n " number of periods of the lease, 
- lease payment in year t, 
T = marginal tax rate, and 
Pj. • depreciation charge in year t foregone by leasing, 
instead of owning. 
The first term is the net after tax cost of the asset if it were 
purchased. The second term is the present value of the stream of lease 
payments discounted at the internal rate of return. The third term is 
the net tax savings (or tax dissavings) from deducting the lease payment 
Instead of depreciation. .The value of I which satisfies (4-29) is 
compared with the after tax cost of borrowing, or r(l - T). If I < r(l-
T) then it is cheaper to lease. If I > r(l-T), it is cheaper to borrow. 
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Bonds 
A bond can be defined as a contractual representation that a debt Is 
owed by one party, the issuer, to one or more other parties, the 
investors. The Indenture certificate indicates the principal amount, the 
stated interest rate based on the principal amount, and any other special 
agreements (131, p. 684). 
The investor exchanges cash for the bond certificate, as shown in 
Figure 24. The issuer of the bond uses the cash proceeds to purchase 
productive assets which are employed in the production process. The cash 
generated from the sale of commodities is used to make the periodic 
interest payments and the principal payment at maturity required by the 
indenture. Any residual cash flow is available to the issuer or any 
shortage of cash flow must be made up from other sources. 
The principal amount, the stated interest rate based on the 
principal amount, and the maturity date of the bond are all stated in the 
certificate. The effective rate of interest is determined by the price 
at which the certificate sells. If a bond sells for less than its face 
value, the bond is said to sell at a discount and the effective rate of 
interest on the bond is higher than its stated rate. Conversely, if the 
bond is sold for a premium (sales price exceeds face value), the 
effective rate is less than the stated rate. For large, publicly traded 
firms operating in a relatively efficient primary market, the firm 
selects the stated interest rate while the market determines the 
effective rate or the premium (discount) at which the bond will sell. 
periodic interest payments with principal paid at maturity 
issuer 
(uses cash 
proceeds 
to acquire 
assets) 
net cash 
flow from 
sale of 
commoditlei 
cash proceeds Investor 
production 
indenture 
certificate 
residual cash flow 
Figure 24. Bonds 
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The effect on the borrower's (Issuer's) balance sheet of a bond 
Issue Is shown in Figure 25. The asset side is increased by the net cash 
proceeds received. The liability side is increased by the present value 
of the stated Interest payments and principal payment at maturity 
discounted at the stated rate of interest. If the effective rate exceeds 
the stated rate, a negative discount entry must be made. If the 
effective rate is less than the stated rate, a positive premium account 
is entered. The cash proceeds will equal the par value minus any 
discount or plus any premium. 
At the end of each interest period, an interest expense is charged 
to the Income statement. Any discount or premium must be amortized over 
the life of the bond. The per period reduction in discount or premium is 
the difference between Interest expense at the effective rate and 
interest expense at the stated rate. At maturity, the par value entry 
will be offset by an equivalent decrease in current assets and the 
discount or premium will be fully amortized. The firm pays explicit 
Interest based on the principal amount but pays implicit Interest 
determined by the effective interest rate. 
In a family farm context, the parents and/or heirs may invest in 
bonds of the farm business at an Interest rate different from a market 
determined rate. For example, the parents may pay the face amount for a 
bond with a stated rate of Interest several percentage points below the 
market rate of equivalent securities. In this example, the parents have 
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Assets Liabilities 
+ cash proceeds + present value of 
interest and principal 
payments discounted 
at stated rate of 
Interest 
+ premium if effective 
rate is less than 
stated rate 
or 
- discount if effective 
rate exceeds stated 
rate 
Figure 25. Effect of Issuing a bond on Issuer's balance sheet 
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given the firm preferential financing terms. The parents forego personal 
Interest Income but since they are also equity owners of the firm, they 
will participate in the increase in value in their residual ownership of 
the firm due to the preferential financing. In addition, at the prefer­
ential interest rate, the firm is subject to a lower degree of financial 
risk so that a trade-off exists between return and risk. 
Installment contracts 
Over one-third of all farm real estate debt in the United States is 
provided by individuals (8, p. 80 and 75, p. 208), They become lenders 
when they sell their land on contract or title transfer secured by a real 
estate mortgage. Host of these transfers are financed with an 
Installment land contract. 
Since the contract results from the direct negotiation of two 
parties who are usually closely related, the terms of the contract can 
vary greatly. The seller of the land passes control to the buyer along 
with the right to use the land. Usually, the title transfers at a later 
date. In exchange for this, the seller typically receives a small 
downpayment plus a written contractual obligation to pay interest, 
principal, and a balloon payment at stated dates. As shown in Figure 26, 
the buyer incorporates the newly acquired land in his production process. 
Cash generated from the sale of commodities is used to meet the debt 
servicing and principal repayments required by the contract. Any 
residual cash flow accrues to the buyer or must be made up from other 
sources if there is a shortage. 
periodic interest and principal payments 
buyer 
(incor­
porates 
land in 
production 
net cash 
flow from 
production 
land and deed 
seller 
production 
written contractual 
"N. obligation 
downpayment 
residual cash flow 
Figure 26. Installment sale land contract 
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The discounted sales price of an Installment land contract is the 
present value of the downpayment, periodic principal and interest 
payments, and balloon payment (if any) discounted at the market rate of 
interest or 
n-1 PR + INT BAL + INT 
DSP - DOWN + S — + -, (4-30) 
t-0 (l+r)*^ (l+r)° 
where . 
DSP is the discounted sales price, 
DOWN is the downpayment, 
PRj. is the principal payment due in year t, 
INT^ is the interest payment due in year t, 
BAL is the balloon payment, 
n is life of the contract, and 
r is the market rate of interest at year of sale. 
The discounted sales price may not equal the fair market value of 
the land. Any discrepancy between the two is defined as the value of the 
contract, or 
VC « FMV - DSP, (4-31) 
where 
VC is the value of the contract, 
FM7 is the fair market value of the land, and 
DSP is the discounted sales price. 
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The buyer's balance sheet would appear as in Figure 27 after the 
acquisition of the land on contract. The asset side is increased by the 
fair market value of the land* If this value differs from the discounted 
sales price, a contra-account equal to the value of the contract would 
also appear as a liability in addition to the discounted sales price net 
of the downpayment,^ The value of the contract and the discounted 
sales price net of downpayment would be amortized annually as interest 
and principal payments are made. 
The advantages to the buyer in an installment land contract are that 
the buyer can acquire a relatively expensive input for a small downpay­
ment. The land can then be placed in production, and the net cash flows 
from the land's income generating ability can be used to meet the debt 
servicing needs of the contract. That is, the contract is self-
liquidating. Furthermore, the interest rate and payment schedule are 
negotiable and can be tailored to fit the needs of the buyer. The 
contract is also advantageous to the seller in that it provides a 
predictable future stream of income. If the contract qualifies for 
Installment reporting of gain, the seller can defer paying capital gains 
tax on appreciated land until the payments are received. That is, a 
portion of each payment is the recapture of basis (which is not taxable) 
^This is a departure from generally accepted accounting procedures 
which dictate the valuation of assets at the lower of cost or market. 
However, since land is typically the largest single entry on a land-
extensive farming operation, valuation at cost may result in a substan­
tial misrepresentation of asset values. 
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Assets Liabilities 
+ fair market value + present value of 
of land periodic principal 
- cash dounpayment and Interest payments 
discounted at the 
market rate of Interest 
+ value of contract 
Figure 27. Effect of Installment sales contract on buyer's balance 
sheet 
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and a portion which is capital gain and subject to tax. The interest 
payments received are taxed as ordinary income. Furthermore, in the 
event of forfeiture on the contract, it is relatively easy in Iowa for 
the seller to regain control of the land. 
The next chapter will incorporate the materials of the last three 
chapters in the development of the empirical model. 
129 
CHAPTER V. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
AND DATA REQUIREMENTS 
The purpose of model building Is to develop a laboratory analogy of 
the system or process under study. For the problem to remain manageable, 
the analogue must abstract from reality but still remain sufficiently 
detailed to be useful in confronting theory with data (14, p. 43). The 
Introduction discussed the reasons %Ay risk should be recognized in the 
decision making process. Chapter II developed the best criterion for 
Incorporating risk in the decision making process. This "best" criterion 
Is the maximization of expected utility measured in terms of net terminal 
wealth. Chapter III presented the use of first, second and third degree 
stochastic dominance as the method for measuring expected utility. 
Chapter IV discussed the theory of the firm from a whole farm perspective 
and discussed various methods of financing. This chapter presents the 
development of the empirical model and discusses the data requirements. 
The first section of this chapter presents the empirical model used 
In this study. The next section describes the Monte Carlo technique used 
and the mechanics of Implementing the results generated by the model into 
a stochastic dominance framework. Because taxes and the legal form of 
business organization play a very important role in the growth of the 
firm, the third section of this chapter develops the reasons for using 
the regularly taxed corporation as the legal entity for the family farm. 
The final section presents the data requirements and statistical 
parameters needed to run the empirical model. 
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The Empirical Ifodel 
Mathematical programming techniques such as linear and quadratic 
programming are widely employed to analyze decision problems. But the 
results generated by these or equivalent methods are only useful when the 
problem statement conforms with the rigorous parameter specifications 
required by the models. Alternatively, simulation provides much greater 
flexibility In modeling accounting, behavioral, and statistical relation­
ships. If the underlying structural relationships and parameters are 
accurately specified, an appropriate search procedure will produce 
optimal (or at least near-optimal) results. It is the flexibility with 
which a simulation model can be adapted to a particular problem which 
constitutes its greatest strength. This is the primary reason why 
simulation is used in this study Instead of a more rigid mathematical 
programming technique. 
The Iowa State University Business and Financial Planning Model is 
used in this study.^ The" simulation model is an integrated collection 
of accounting identities, behavioral relationships, and stochastic 
variables which describe the growth or decay in the net terminal wealth 
of the family farm. As was shown in Figure 12, each family member owns 
some business assets and some personal assets. The business assets are 
transferred to the farm corporation in exchange for shares of common 
stock, certificates of indebtedness (term loans or bonds), leases, 
^The model is described in detail in Appendix C. 
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contracts, or some combination of the above. At the end of the planning 
horizon, each family member's wealth includes his (her) personal assets 
plus his (her) investor and equity-owner interests in the farm 
corporation.^ 
The analysis provides a comparative static framework within which 
the effects of selected financing arrangements can be evaluated. Because 
the analysis is performed from a whole farm planning perspective, full 
recognition can be given to the effects of price and yield variability, 
inflation, and financing arrangements on cash flow streams' which evidence 
less than perfect correlation over time. The desirability of a 
particular financing instrument or combination of instruments can be 
evaluated in terms of its effect upon the probability distribution of 
terminal wealth. 
Throughout the presentation of the simulation model which follows, 
certain subscripts and superscripts carry a particular denotation. 
Unless otherwise indicated, these indices are: 
Subscript t refers to the year of the analysis where t=l, 2, . . . 
T (T is the last year of the planning period). 
^The farm corporation is assumed to be privately held and of such 
small size that its stock and bonds are not publicly traded on secondary 
markets. Stock values and financial Instrument values will be determined 
by the fair market value of the assets against which they are written. 
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Sub- or superscript j refers to the jth family member, or to the 
corporation, I.e., j = 0 refers to the corporation, j • 1 is the father, 
j " 2 Is the mother, j • 3 Is the first on-farm heir and so forth. 
Subscript k refers to the kth financial liability (k - 1, 2, 3, 
. . . K) where financial liabilities include conventional term loans, 
intrafamily loans, bonds, leases, and sales contracts. 
The equations are presented in relation to the accounting statement 
with which they are associated. The first set of equations calculates 
the after-tax income of the farm entity. The second set of equations 
describes the sources and applications of funds and the changes in 
financial position of the corporation. The third set of equations 
determines the balance sheet at the beginning of the subsequent period 
based upon the balance sheet of the previous period and the statement of 
changes in financial position. The last set of equations calculates each 
family member's cash flow and each family member's net worth at the end 
of the period. 
Farm Income 
Equations 5-1 through 5-9 calculate the stochastic net income after 
taxes of the farm corporation for each year. Net operating income is 
defined as the difference between total revenue and variable operating 
costs. Mathematically 
NOI^ « TR^ - VOC^, (5-1) 
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where 
NOl^ Is the net operating Income In year t, 
TRj. Is total revenue In year t, and 
VOC^ Is variable operating costs In year t,^ 
As an alternative to calculating directly the two values on the 
right hand side of Equation (5-)l, net operating Income Is empirically 
estimated in Equation (5-2) as a function of the amount of assets 
employed in the production process. The statistical coefficients in 
Equation (5-2) are empirically estimated from a pooled cross-sectional, 
time-series of Iowa Farm Business Annual Surveys for five sizes of 
representative farms (63)• The estimated coefficients and relevant 
statistical values for each regression are presented in Appendix B. The 
net operating income in year t for a farm of size 1 is estimated as 
^"it - -oi + "ll ' ^it + -21* ^lt+ "31* FAit+ 
"il ' T* + ^ it' (5-2) 
where 
"hi estimated regression coefficients for a 
farming operation falling within size 1 as defined in 
Appendix B, Table B-2, 
CA^^ is the dollar amount of current assets as of the 
beginning of the production period of year t. Current 
assets are defined to have useful lives of less than 1 
year, 
^Variable operating costs do not Include operator labor. For 
convenience, operator labor is subtracted later. 
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Is the dollar amount of Intermediate assets as of the 
beginning of year t. Intermediate assets are defined to 
have useful lives of more than 1 but less than 7 years. 
FÂ^|. is the dollar amount of fixed assets as of the 
beginning of year t. Fixed assets have useful lives in 
excess of 7 years* 
TR is the year of the analysis, and 
is the error term which is assumed to be zero (E(e^) = 0). 
Since total revenue is equal to prices of outputs times their 
respective quantities, and variable operating costs are equal to the 
input prices times the quantities used. Equations (5-1) and (5-2) 
implicitly measure, in dollar terms, the technological specification of 
the production processes employed. The inclusion of the year variable in 
Equation (5-2) captures the rate at which technological transformation 
takes place over time. 
The predicted value of net operating income in Equation (5-2) is the 
expected value, that is, the value most likely to occur during a "normal" 
year. In reality, the value of net operating income actually realized 
may vary from the expected value. As discussed in Chapter 4 on the 
theory of the firm, this deviation from expectation is attributable to 
variability in prices and quantities paid and received. For the most 
part, this variability in net operating income is uncontrollable by the 
firm. Therefore, in Equation (5-3), the net operating income of Equation 
(5-2) is scaled by a Monte Carlo varlate, x, which represents the 
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probability that the actual net operating income realized In year t may 
vary from Its predicted value.^ That is 
NOI^ - NOI^ • X, (5-3) 
where 
NOI^ is the actual net operating income realized in year t, 
NÔI^ is the predicted value from Equation (5-2), and 
X is the Monte Carlo variate.^ 
If X equals one then the expectations are realized. If x is less than 
one, then the actual income realized is less than the expected: if x 
exceeds one, the converse is true. 
Fixed operating costs are costs which are incurred regardless of the 
level of production. These costs are primarily due to the presence of 
assets which are not fully consumed within one production cycle. The 
major noncash fixed operating cost in agriculture is depreciation charges 
against machinery, equipment, and physical structures (i.e., assets which 
have intermediate and fixed lives). Cash fixed operating costs typically 
include such things as insurance, prepaid expenses, and maintenance and 
repair contracts which are amortized over the life of the asset. From 
the Iowa Farm Business Association Annual Surveys (63), cash and noncash 
^The development of the Monte Carlo variate, x, and the data used 
to generate it is deferred to a later section on Monte Carlo simulation. 
9 
The subscript 1 (denoting representative farm size) is dropped 
through the remainder of the exposition unless needed for clarity. 
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fixed operating costs are regressed against intermediate and fixed assets 
in Equations 5-4 and 5-5. That is, 
""u • Ki * «11 • «21 • Si - T* + «It 
""it • L + ^ 11 • "it-^ ^ 21* 7,1 ' T* + •it 
where 
CFOit is cash fixed operating costs in year t, 
NCFi^ is noncash fixed operating costs, 
are the regression coefficients for farms belonging to 
size i for estimating cash fixed operating costs, 
are the regression coefficients for farms belonging 
to size i for estimating noncash fixed operating costs, 
0^^, are the respective error terms, both with expected 
values of zero. 
It is interesting to note that intermediate and fixed assets appear 
in both the estimation of net operating Income and the estimation of 
fixed operating costs. Therefore, the net contribution of an intermedi­
ate or fixed asset to earnings before interest and taxes must be 
determined in light of Equation (5-3), (5-4) and (5-5) in concert and not 
just Equation (5-3).^ Since, by definition, fixed costs are assumed to 
^The regression coefficients by size of farm are presented in 
Appendix B, Tables B-3 and B-4. 
^The net cash contribution 
is determined from Equations 5-3 and 5-4 only. 
to earnings before Interest and taxes 
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be constant over any production cycle, the predicted values In Equations 
(5-4) and (5-5) are also assumed to be the actual values realized. 
That Is, CFO ~ CFO and NCF « NCF, 
Earnings before Interest and taxes (EBIT) are equal to the stochas­
tically determined net operating Income of Equation (5-3) minus the cash 
and noncash fixed operating costs of Equations (5-4) and (5-5). This 
relationship Is 
EBIT^ - NOI^ - CFO^ - NCF^. (5-6) 
Net Income before taxes In Equation (5-7) Is equal to earnings 
before Interest and taxes from Equation (5-6) minus total Interest 
charges on servicing all Interest bearing liabilities owed by the corpor­
ation minus all salaries and director's fees paid or, 
K J 
NIBT. - EBIT. - Z IP. . - E S & DF_, (5-7) 
^ ^ k-1 j-1 
where 
IP. Is the annual Interest payment on liability k due 
In year t, 
S & DF. Is the salary and/or director's fee paid to family 
J member j. 
^Salaries and directors' fees are tax deductible only if they meet 
the 1RS tests of reasonableness. The tests are based upon the amount of 
investment and personal labor contributed to running the corporation. 
The reason salaries and director's fees were not subtracted earlier, such 
as in Equation (5-3), is because these items are often used as Income 
sharing devices. That is, the family members first determine how much is 
available for distribution as salaries and director's fees and allocate 
In accordance with this value. 
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The annual Interest payment in Equation (5-7) is determined 
by the outstanding balance on loans, bonds, leases, and contracts owed by 
the corporation. Or 
- r^ « DEBT]^^, for k «1 to k, (5-8) 
where 
r^ is the annual Interest rate on liability k, 
DEBTj^j. Is the outstanding balance of liability k in year t. 
For leases, the entire lease payment is tax deductible if it meets 
the 1RS tests of reasonableness. Therefore, the right hand side of 
Equation (5-8) is imputed to equal the annual lease payment. 
Net income after taxes is equal to net income before taxes from 
Equation (5-7) minus corporate income taxes. Or 
NIç - NIBT^ - TAXC^, (5-9) 
where 
Nl^ is net income after tax, 
NIBT^ is net income before tax, and 
TAXC^ is corporate (subchapter C) federal income tax determined 
under the appropriate sections of the Internal Revenue 
Code. 
^The corporate tax rates have been reduced on the first $50,000 of 
taxable income since this study was completed. The rate on the first 
$25,000 of taxable income has been reduced from 17 percent to 15 percent 
and the rate on the second $25,000, from 20 percent to 18 percent (25A, 
p. 21). 
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In an accounting context, net income after taxes would be closed to 
a retained earnings account. The retained earnings account less the 
dividends paid in that year plus the adjustments for changes in the 
economic values for assets would show the increase or decrease (when 
compared to previous years) in residual owners' equity in the corpora­
tion, The retained earnings account would then be added to the paid-in 
capital (or contributed capital) account to determine the book value of 
net worth. If all assets and liabilities are correctly valued and 
adjusted to reflect their economic values, then the value of net worth 
can also be determined as the residual of total assets minus total 
liabilities. 
Sources and applications of funds and 
statement of changes in financial position 
Equations (5-10) through (5-15) describe the sources and applica­
tions of funds by the corporation and the changes which take place in the 
asset and liability accounts during any year. The total sources of funds 
for the corporation are the sum of net income after taxes from Equation 
(5-9) plus noncash fixed operating costs from Equation (5-5) plus new 
borrowings by the corporation plus new equity investment in the 
corporation. Mathematically 
TS^ - + NCF^ + + NE^, (5-10) 
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where 
TS^ is the total sources of funds in year t, 
NB^ is new borrowings by the corporation, and 
NE^ is new investment in the corporation. 
New borrowings by the corporation are the sum of the proceeds from 
the sale of new bonds and loans. That is, 
K' 
NB. - Z DEBT. . , (5-11) 
k-K+1 " 
where the index begins with K+1 to indicate these are new bonds and . 
loans. 
New equity in the corporation is the sum of the proceeds from the 
sale of additional shares of common stock to each of the family members, 
times the per share price as shown below. 
J 
NE. - Z (SH..-PS. ), (5-12) 
^ j-1 
where 
NE^ is new equity investment in year t, 
SH. is the number of shares acquired by member j in year t, 
^ and 
PS is the price per share paid in year t by member j and is 
calculated in Equation (5-27). 
The total applications of funds by the corporation are equal to the 
sum of the annual principal payments on all liabilities owed plus 
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dividends paid on common stock plus new assets purchased, or 
K J 
TU - S PP. + I D + P , (5-13) 
^ k-1 j-1 
where 
TU^ Is total applications of funds In year t, 
PP^^ is the principal payment in year t on liability k, 
is the dividend payment to individual j in year t, and 
P^ is the total purchases of new assets in year t. 
Total principal payments in Equation (5-13) include loans, contracts and 
bonds (in the year of maturity). Interest and lease payments have 
already been accounted for in Equations (5-7) and (5-8). 
If the total sources of funds from Equation (5-10) exceed the total 
applications of funds from Equation (5-13), the excess funds are presumed 
to be reinvested in the corporation by purchasing new assets. If total 
applications exceed total sources, new borrowings are increased to equate 
total sources with total applications. Therefore, 
if TS^ > TUj., then 
K J 
- TSt - "kt - jf, 
and purchases are determined both exogenously and endogenously. 
Similarly, 
if TS^ < TU^, then 
NBj. = TO^  - NI^  - NCF^  - NE^ , (5-15) 
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and new borrowings are determined by both Internal and external forces. 
If Equation (5-14) is executed, it is necessary to recompute Equation 
(5-13) based on the new value of purchases. Conversely, if Equation 
(5-15) is executed, then it is necessary to recompute Equation (5-10) 
with the new value for new borrowings. Either path will always result in 
the equalization of total sources with total applications. 
Statement of financial position 
The changes in financial position described by the sources and 
applications account are used to adjust the financial statement account 
balances from one period to the next. The asset accounts (Equations (5-
16) through (5-21)), liability accounts (Equations (5-22) through (5-
27)) and net worth accounts (Equations (5-28) and (5-29)) are discussed 
in this section. 
In Equation (5-16), total assets equals the sum of current assets 
plus intermediate assets less the accumulated depreciation taken against 
intermediate assets plus fixed assets minus the accumulated depreciation 
taken against fixed assets, or 
TA^ - CAt + (lAt - An_IA^) + (FA^ - AD-FA^), (5-16) 
where 
TA^ are total assets at the beginning of year t, 
CA^ are current assets, 
AD-IA^ is accumulated depreciation taken against intermediate 
assets, and 
AD-FA^ is accumulated depreciation taken against fixed assets. 
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Accumulated depreciation on intermediate assets (calculated in 
Equation (5-17)) and fixed assets (calculated in Equation (5-18)) are the 
sum of the total depreciation charges taken against intermediate and 
fixed assets for all years. The accumulated depreciation equations are 
t . lA. 
-Ç-
h"0 
AD-IA^ - . 2. «CFh . a»" (5-17) 
where 
NCP^ is calculated in Equation (5-5). 
The asset account balances at the beginning of the subsequent period 
(time t+1) are determined by adjusting the beginning balances of the 
previous period for the inflation, depreciation, and net investment that 
have occurred during the year. To maintain the same technical relation­
ship between inputs and outputs, the relative proportions of the asset 
composition are assumed to remain constant.^ This is the same as saying 
that production occurs with fixed factor proportions. No substitut-
ability of Inputs is permitted. Therefore, investment or disinvestment 
of assets occurs proportionately, vAiich ensures the same mix of assets is 
retained over time. 
Current assets at the beginning of the next period are equal to 
current assets at the beginning of the current period (at their inflated 
replacement value) plus the acquisition of new current assets or 
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(1+INF^) + (CA^/TA^) • P^, (5-19) 
where 
INF^ is the exogenously determined Inflation rate in year t, 
TAg is total assets in year t from Equation (5-16), and 
is purchases in year t from Equation (5-10). 
Intermediate assets (gross intermediate assets less the accumulated 
depreciation from Equation (5-17)) at their inflated value plus new 
intermediate assets purchased equals the value of intermediate assets at 
the beginning of the next period, or 
lA^^j = (lA^ - AD-IAÇ) (1+INF^) + AD_IA^ + 
(lA^/TA^) . P^, (5-20) 
where inflation is assumed to affect the replacement value of existing 
assets but not the depreciation taken against them. 
Fixed assets are primarily land and structures where land is 
typically the largest single dollar item on the asset side of the farm 
balance sheet. During the 1970s, land has appreciated in value at a rate 
higher than the rate of inflation on current and intermediate assets (13% 
versus 7.4%, 35). Therefore, fixed assets at the beginning of the next 
period are equal to fixed assets at the beginning of the previous period 
less the accumulated depreciation taken against structures times an 
adjustment for inflation and the excess or shortfall of land appreciation 
over the inflation rate, plus new purchases of fixed assets, or 
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(l+INF^Xl+APP^) + 
(FA^/TA^) . P^, (5-21) 
where 
INF^ Is the rate of Inflation in year t, and 
AFP^ Is the rate of appreciation in land values in excess 
of (or below) the rate of inflation. 
Total assets at the beginning of the subsequent period are calculated 
using Equation (5-16). 
The liability and equity side of the balance sheet is composed of 
current liabilities, long-term liabilities, and common stock. Current 
liabilities Include such items as trade credit, accounts payable, wages 
and taxes payable, and short-term borrowings which are directly tied to 
the level of production activity. When production activity reaches its 
seasonal high, so, typically, do the above items. Current liabilities 
also include the current portion of the long-term liabilities. As was 
discussed in Chapter 4 on the conceptual considerations in financing, 
current liabilities are typically subject to a limited degree of 
discretionary control by management. Current liabilities are determined 
by the level of production and, more Importantly, by the amount of assets 
needed to facilitate production. Furthermore, current liabilities are 
directly tied to current assets through the concept of working capital. 
Therefore, current liabilities at the beginning of the subsequent period 
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are defined to equal the current liabilities of the previous period plus 
the addition In current liabilities needed to compensate for the Increase 
In replacement cost of current assets. That Is, 
t^+1 " clt + . infg, (5-22) 
where 
CL^ Is current liabilities, and 
CÀ|. • INF^ is the increase in replacement value of current 
assets from Equation (5-19). 
The current portions of long-term liabilities and short-term borrowings 
are included in Equation (5-22). 
The remainder of the liabilities not included in Equation (5-22) are 
categorized as intermediate- and long-term liabilities which, for 
convenience, are grouped together into long term. Long-term liabilities 
include conventional operating loans and term loans, family loans, 
leases, bonds, and installment sales contracts owed by the corporation to 
family members and nonfamlly institutions. 
Loans 
In accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Procedures (99, 
Opinion No. 21), loans are assumed to be reported on the liability side 
of the balance sheet at the discounted value of future principal and 
Interest payments. The appropriate rate of discount to employ Is the 
market rate of interest on similar obligations of equivalent risk and 
maturity at the date of inception. When the loan is taken out at the 
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going market rate of Interest, this rate Is also the one used to discount 
the repayment stream. In this Instance, the present value of the loan 
obligation Is equal to Its face value. Only If the cash proceeds of the 
loan differ significantly from the face value will the present value of 
the future principal and interest payments differ from the face value. 
The value of each loan outstanding in year t is the present value of 
the remaining principal and interest payments discounted at the market 
rate of interest prevalent at its inception, as shown in Equation (5-23). 
That is, 
T PP +IP 
DEBT.. - S —52 H (5-23) 
h-t (l+r^^)^ 
where 
DEBT^^ Is the present value of loan k in year t, 
PP^^ is the principal payment on loan k due in year h, 
IPkh is the Interest payment on loan k due in year h, 
and 
^ko prevalent interest rate on similar loans in 
the year of inception. 
Leases 
"A lease is an agreement conveying the right to use property . . ., 
usually for a stated period of time" (131, pp. 748-780). For accounting 
purposes (in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Procedures), 
leases are defined as either capital or operating. A capital lease must 
be capitalized on both the asset and liability sides of the balance 
148 
sheet* An operating lease Is not capitalized, but merely disclosed as an 
item of information in a supporting schedule or footnote. 
However, if the present value of the minimum lease payment stream 
exceeds the fair market value of the property, then the property is 
Included in the balance sheet at its fair market value. The asset and 
liability entries for a capital lease are amortized annually over the 
term of the lease payments, not the depreciable or economic life of the 
asset. The method of amortization should be consistent with conventional 
depreciation methods employed by the firm for similar assets which are 
not leased. The present value of a capital lease is calculated using 
Equation (5-23) where the sum of principal and Interest payments due in 
year t is Interpreted as the lease payment and the discount rate is the 
lessee's Incremental borrowing rate or lessor's implicit rate of return, 
whichever Is lower. 
Bonds 
A bond is a contractual representation that a deb.t is owed by one 
party, the issuer, to one or more other parties, the investors. A bond 
certificate indicates the principal amount, stated interest rate based 
upon the principal amount, specified interest payment dates and any other 
special agreements between the parties. Thus, a bond is a written 
promise to pay a specified principal at a stated date and, in addition, 
periodic Interest on the principal at a specified rate per period (131, 
p. 684). The bond obligation appears as a liability which Is valued at 
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Its present value at the time of Issuance. If the market rate of 
interest at Issuance is above (below) the stated rate, then a discount 
(premium) associated with the sale of the bond will also be recognized as 
a liability as an offset to the face value of the bond. The amount of 
the discount or premium is the difference between the cash proceeds from 
the sale of the bond and the bond's face value. The discount or premium 
is amortized over the life of the bond. A bond sold at par in an arm's 
length transaction will have neither a discount nor a premium* The net 
liability (face value adjusted for discount or premium) of a bond is 
^ ^^kh ^^kT 
DEBT - Z , (5-24) 
kt h-t (14T^^) (l+rt,) 
where 
DEBTj^^ is the present value of bond k in year t, 
IPkh is the periodic interest payment, and 
PPkT is the principal payment (i.e., face value) in the 
year of maturity, T. 
Installment sales contracts 
Installment sales of land have become a very popular vehicle for 
transferring the ownership of farmland. Due to the rapid rate of 
appreciation of farmland in recent years, many land owners face 
substantial capital gains tax upon sale. Installment reporting of gain 
allows the seller to spread the recognition of capital gains over the 
life of the contract. At the same time, the contract allows the buyer to 
acquire the use and subsequent ownership of the land for a relatively low 
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downpayment. Furthermore, since most Installment sales contracts are 
negotiated directly between seller and buyer without the Involvement of a 
financial Intermediary, both the sales price and the Interest rate are 
negotiable. 
Each contract entered Into by the corporation will be valued as a 
liability calculated as the present value of the future principal and 
Interest payments due. The market rate of Interest at the date of 
inception is the appropriate rate of discount to use, or 
DEBT. . - Z —!= H + £1- , (5-25) 
h.t (14,^)^ (l+r^„)^ 
where 
DEBT^^ is the present value of installment sale contract k 
in year t, 
PPkh is principal payment due in year h, 
is interest due in year h, and 
PPkT is the balloon payment (if any) due at maturity. 
Total long-term liabilities are the sum of the present values of all 
loans, leases, bonds, and installment sales contracts not included in 
short-term liabilities, or 
LTL^ - L DEBT-^ (5-26) 
^ k-1 
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Owners* equity 
The residual ownership In the farm corporation Is denominated as the 
fair market value of the common stock. The per-share value of the 
common Is calculated as the fair market value of net assets (total assets 
minus total liabilities) divided by the number of shares outstanding, 
or, 
J t 
PS. - (TA. - CL. - LTL.)/ Z Z SH., , (5-27) 
j-1 h-O ^ 
where 
PS^ Is the per share value of common stock In year t and 
Is the same for all family members (this Is the value 
used In Equation 5-12), 
SH.^ Is the number of shares acquired by Individual j in 
year h, therefore 
t 
Z SH.. is the total number of shares owned by individual J 
h-0 and 
J t 
E E SH.. is the total number of shares outstanding. 
j-1 h-O jh 
The aggregate value of the common stock can also be determined from 
Equation (5-27) as the difference between total assets and total 
liabilities. 
Equations (5-1) through (5-27) completely describe the flow of funds 
through the farm corporation from an accounting standpoint. It is now 
necessary to describe the cash flows of the family members. 
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Cash flows of family members 
For the family members, of which there are assumed to be three, the 
father and mother are treated as a single decision making unit (j-1, 2). 
It Is assumed the parents share Income and expenses equally and file a 
joint Income tax return. It Is also assumed there Is one farm heir 
(j-3), who also qualifies for joint filing. 
Taxable Income Is equal to the sua of nonfarm Income plus salaries 
and director's fees from the corporation plus the taxable portion of 
dividends received plus interest payments on liabilities owed them by the 
corporation plus 40 percent of any recognizable gain from contract sales. 
For each family member, 
k . 
Tlj^ - S&DFjt + ^ ^jt + ^ IP^t " 200) + 
k . 
S and (5-28) 
k-1 
"jt + - Z"" > 
Ipor the tax year 1981, the first $200 ($400 If filing a joint 
return) of Interest and dividend income Is tax deductible. The deduc­
tion, however, can not exceed the Income received. For tax years 
beginning after 1981, there Is no exclusion for interest received. The 
exclusion on a joint return is $200 for qualifying dividends regardless 
of which spouse has legal title to the stock (25b, p. 246). 
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Where 
Tlj^ Is the taxable Income of Individual j In year t, 
S&DF.^ Is salary and directors' fee paid to Individual j 
from Equation 5-7, 
NFIj^ is nonfarm income received by Individual j in year t, 
D.^ is dividends received by individual j in year t, 
from Equation 5-13, 
K 4 
E IFjl^ is the total Interest payments in year t owed to 
k"l individual j, and 
K 
Z 
k< 
CG^ is the capital gain recognized for tax purposes on 
1 Installment sale contracts owed to individual J. 
The cash flow of the parents is their taxable incomes from (5-28) 
minus personal income taxes, minus personal consumption expenditures from 
Equation (5-31), plus principal payments received on loans, bonds, and 
contracts. New loans and bonds for which the individual is the lender or 
investor from Equation (5-11) must be subtracted from the above, as must 
the funds used to acquire new shares of common stock from Equation 
(5-12). For the parents and the heir, 
2 2 2 2 K 
Z CF.. - E TI.. - TAXP.. - Z + Z Z ppj. -
].i j' ].i J' j.i k-i " 
Beginning with Equation (5-28) it is necessary to add a 
superscript to designate the subset of all liabilities vAilch Involve the 
particular individual as the lender, lessor. Investor or seller. In the 
absence of the superscript, or if it is otherwise clear, all individuals 
are Included, 
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2 K' 2 
s Z DEBtJ - s SH_ • PS. and (5-29) 
j-1 k-K+1 j-1 J 
CF_ - TI, - TAXP, - C. + Z PPf. - S DEBT;^ -Jt it Jt Jt let let 
SHgj. • PSj. , (5-30) 
where 
CFj^ is the cash flow of individual j in year t, 
Tlj^ is taxable income from Equation (5-28), 
TAXP^ is personal income taxes from the 1RS Tax Tables,^ 
cj^  is consumption expenditures from Equation (5-31), 
PP^^ is the principal payment on liability k received by 
individual j in year t, 
Z DEBT^^ are new liabilities where individual j is the lender of 
k>R-fl a loan or investor of a bond, and 
SHj^ • PS^ are funds used to acquire new shares of common stock. 
Personal consumption expenditures appearing in Equations (5-29) and 
(5-30) are calculated using the consumption equation from the Iowa State 
University Computer Assisted Estate Analysis model as 
C - -37,419 + 619 (t-1900) + .04(TI.. - TAXP ), (5-31) jt jt 
The personal tax rate tables have changed since this study was 
completed. The tax rate tables effective for the 1982 tax year are 
presented in 25b, pp. 13-19. 
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where 
C.^ Is the personal consumption expenditures of Individual 
^ j, and 
t Is the year. 
The personal (nonbusiness) assets of the next period are the 
personal assets of the previous period plus any residual cash flows from 
Equations (5-29) and (5-30), or 
For simplicity, only one category of personal assets Is recognized. This 
category Includes both durable and nondurable assets. 
Therefore, each family member's personal wealth Is the sum of his 
personal assets. Investor (and/or lender, lessor and seller) Interests In 
the corporation, and owner's equity in the corporation. That is, 
jt* (5-32) 
where 
are the personal assets of individual j and 
CFj^ is the cash flow of individual j. 
(5-33) 
where 
PWj^ is the personal wealth of individual j in year t 
PAj^ is the personal assets from Equation 5-32, 
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Z DEBT^^ Is the total present value of all old and new liabilities 
k"l owed to individual j, and 
SH. • PS J. is the fair market value of individual j's equity 
^ interest in the farm corporation. 
Equations (5-1) through (5-33) are repetitively solved for each year 
of the planning horizon. At the end of the planning horizon, the 
personal wealth for each family member from Equation (5-33) becomes one 
discrete point on the probability distribution of terminal wealth. The 
simulation is rerun with the same parameters (the Monte Carlo variate, x, 
remains stochastic) to generate a second observation of terminal wealth. 
This process is continued until the probability distribution is described 
to the desired degree of statistical reliability. This probability 
distribution is converted into a cumulative density distribution which 
constitutes the uncertain outcome of one risky financing arrangement. 
The cumulative frequency distribution for each alternative financing 
strategy is developed in a similar fashion. The cumulative density 
functions can then be compared using stochastic dominance theorems of 
Chapter 111 to determine which financing arrangement maximizes expected 
utility. 
The Environment and Data Requirements 
The empirical model presented in the previous sections implicitly 
assumes that the representative firm operates under certain environmental 
conditions. These environmental conditions are correlated cash flows and 
the corporate form of legal organization. This section will discuss 
these two conditions. 
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Correlation of cash flows over time 
Net after-tax cash flow Is the key determinant of the rate at which 
a firm grows In real terms.^ In any year, the larger the ending 
cash-flow, the larger can be the Investment In new productive assets to 
expand the production base for the subsequent period. 
Most mathematical programming techniques and the majority of the 
researchers of firm growth assume the annual cash flows are either 
perfectly Independent or perfectly correlated over time. This 
simplifying assumption greatly reduces the computational burden placed on 
the researcher and may be a reasonable approximation of reality when 
addressing questions of incremental Investment analyses. However, when 
growth of the whole firm is modeled, either assumption may lead to 
unrealistic results. The reason for this has already been alluded to in 
terms of the linkage between the after-tax, after-dlvldends cash flow of 
any year and the resultant expansion or contraction of the production 
base for the subsequent period. An example will help clarify this 
concept. 
Assume that a firm at time zero faces three possible outcomes in 
after-tax cash flows, as portrayed in Figure 28. If the firm experiences 
a very good year, it will follow the high cash-flow branch and have an 
after-tax cash flow of $10,000. If the year is only average, then the 
^ Net after-tax cash flow is also after cash dividend payments 
have been made. 
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Figure 28. Decision tree for less than perfectly correlated cash flows 
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firm expects an after-tax cash flow of $4,000. If the year Is bad, the 
firm will follow the low branch and expect a negative cash flow of -
$2,000. But experiencing a bad first year does not entail a bad second 
year. That is, if the cash flow in year 1 is -$2,000 it does not imply 
the expected outcome of year 2 will be -$6,000. Nor does an above-
average year in year 1 lead to an above average year 2. But this is 
exactly lAat would happen under the assumption of perfectly correlated 
cash flows. Under the assumption of perfectly correlated cash flows, the 
decision tree in Figure 28 would have only three, instead of nine, nodes 
at the end of year two. If the high branch is followed, then the 
expected cash flow at the end of year one would be $10,000 and the 
expected cash flow at the end of year two would be $20,000. If the 
average branch is followed, the expected cash flows would be $4,000 and 
$10,000. Similarly, the low branch generates cash flows of -$2,000 in 
year one and -$6,000 in year two. 
Independent cash-flows imply that the outcome in year two is in no 
way determined by what happened in year one. In the example of Figure 
28, each year would have the three outcomes of $10,000, $4,000 and 
-$2,000. 
In reality, the fact that year one turns out to be an above average 
year does not imply that year two will be also. Year two may be average 
or below average. But if year one is above average, then the larger cash 
flow can be used to increase the productive base going into year two. 
With constant scale considerations, increasing the production base in 
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year one Increases the cash flow generating ability of the firm in year 
two. As a result, if the firm experiences another above-average year 
after an above-average year one, the firm's expected cash flow stream is 
$10,000 in year one and $20,000 in year two. If the firm experiences an 
above-average year after an average year, its expected cash flow stream 
is $4,000 in year one and only $12,000 in year two. Less than perfectly 
correlated cash flows imply that the outcome of one year determines the 
starting point (but not directly the ending point) of the next. 
With the assumption of less than perfectly correlated cash flows, 
there are three possible outcomes after year one, nine outcomes after 
year two, 27 outcomes after year three, and so forth. 
Mathematically, the relationship of these three assumptions can be 
described in terms of net present values and standard deviations of net 
present values. Under all three assumptions, the firm's expected net 
present value is 
n E(CF ) 
ECMPV) - I , (5-34) 
t-o (1+1) 
where 
E(NPV) is the expected net present value, 
E(CF^) is the expected cash flow (after taxes and 
dividends) in year t, and 
i is the risk free rate of interest which is assumed to 
remain constant over all n years. 
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Under the assumption of Independence, the standard deviation of 
Equation (5-34) Is 
/n V(CF ) 
SD - / E 1— , (5-35) 
v/ t-0 [(l+D^t] 
where 
V(CF^) Is the variance of cash flows In year t and Is 
calculated as 
V(CFj.) - Z^jcF^^ - E(CF^^ (5-36) 
where 
H Is the number of discrete outcomes possible, 
CFg^ Is the cash flow of outcome x In year t, 
E(CF^) Is the expected cash flow, and 
Pxt is the probability of outcome x occurring. 
Alternatively, If the cash flows are assumed to evidence perfect 
correlation over time, then the standard deviation is 
n SD 
SD - E =- , (5-37) 
t-0 (1+1) 
where 
SD^ is the standard deviation in year t and is calculated as the 
square root of (5-36). 
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The standard deviation of (5-37) will always be larger than the 
standard deviation of (5-35). Because, for any series of positive 
numbers, the square of the sum is always greater than the stm of the 
squares. Or, in this case, the square root of the square of the sum 
(i.e.; Equation (5-37)) will always be larger than the square root of the 
sum of the squares (i.e., Equation (5-36)). 
If the cash flows are correlated over time (but not perfectly), then 
the standard deviation is calculated as 
NPV^ is the net present value If joint outcome x occurs over 
the n years, 
E(NPV) is frffln Equation (5-34), and 
is the joint probability of- outcome x occurring. 
Computationally, Equation (5-38) can become very tedious. If the 
example in Figure 28 with only three possible outcomes is carried out to 
ten years, 59,049 joint probabilities would need to be calculated. If 
the number of possible outcomes from any node is Increased from three to 
five with a ten year planning horizon, then 9,765,625 joint probabilities 
would need to be calculated to generate one standard deviation. Although 
E(NPV)r P. 
x 
(5-38) 
where 
m is the total number of joint outcomes after n years, 
or h". 
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problems of this magnitude are computationally possible, it should be 
evident why most researchers prefer to assume either perfect or zero 
correlation. 
Alternatively, a Monte Carlo simulation can be used to approximate 
the final distribution of a correlated cash flow stream to any degree of 
accuracy desired. 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
In general, Monte Carlo methods are procedures which enable the 
researcher to set up a laboratory experiment of the real world within 
which the properties of the econometric estimators may be discerned (114, 
p. 1). 
The steps involved in a Monte Carlo study are: 
1. Specify a true structure of the problem being analyzed 
with exogeneous and structural variables and parameters, 
2. Generate a series of pseudo-random numbers from a 
preassigned distribution, 
3. Solve the structure described in Step 1, 
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 for a number of samples, changing 
only the error terms, and 
5. Evaluate the results. 
The structure of the problem has been developed in Equations (5-1) 
through (5-33)« The exogenous and structural variables and parameters 
will be presented later in this chapter and in Appendix B. The random 
number generation from a preassigned distribution is incorporated into 
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the simulation model in Equation (5-3) and the technique is presented in 
this section. The evaluation of the result will be done with stochastic 
dominance theory. 
As was Identified in the Chapter IV on the theory of the firm, there 
are three causes of risk to the firm. The first, production risk, is 
external and uncontrollable by the firm, and is manifested primarily 
through variability in prices and yields. The second cause, is 
Investment or operating risk,; due to the presence of fixed assets. The 
third cause, is financial risk, is attributable to fixed financing costs. 
The operating and financing components of total firm risk are handled 
endogenously within the structure of the simulation model once the 
initial set of parameters is established exogenously. It is the risk 
component caused by the variability in prices and quantities to which the 
Monte Carlo method is applied. 
Step two of the Monte Carlo procedure requires the selection of a 
preasslgned distribution from which the Monte Carlo variate can be 
randomly estimated. Many researchers have found the triangular probabil­
ity distribution particularly useful in this regard (3, 28, 89, 100, 
117). This is a popular and flexible distribution in elicltating 
personal preferences and in describing normal as well as nonnormal 
distributions. This is because the continuous triangular distribution 
can be completely described by three parameters—its lowest value. 
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highest value, and modal value. As pictured in the upper part of 
Figure 29, the horizontal axis measures the uncertain varlate x and the 
vertical axis measures Its probability of occurring. The point a Is the 
lowest value which can occur, b Is the largest value which can occur, and 
m Is the mode or most likely value of x expected to occur. As shown In 
Figure 29, the distribution about the uncertain varlate x Is positively 
skewed but this need not be the case. If the mode Is coincident with the 
mean and a and b fall three standard deviations below and above the mean, 
then the triangular distribution of Figure 29 approximates the normal 
distribution. All but one-half of one percent of the distribution of 
each tail is accounted for. Once a, m, and b are specified, the 
triangular probability distribution can be transformed into a cumulative 
density function, as shown in the lower half of Figure 29. It is from 
this cumulative density function that the pseudo-random numbers are 
generated In step two of the Monte Carlo procedure. 
The pseudo-random number series is generated as follows. A random 
number between 0 and 1 is generated. This random number is the value u 
shown in the lower half of Figure 29. This value is mapped into the 
cumulative density function of x and the corresponding probability value 
y of x is read from the horizontal axis. The value y is used in Equation 
(5-3) as the error term to determine the actual value of net operating 
Income realized in terms of Its predicted value. 
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Figure 29. Monte Carlo simulation with a triangular 
distribution 
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Solving the cumulative density function of a triangular probability 
distribution for y Is a simple exercise In algebra.^ The value for Y 
Is 
1/2  
y - A + u(B-A)(M-A) ' If u£ (M-A)/(B-A), or 
1 /2  
y - B - (l-u)(B-A)(B-M) If u > (M-A)/(B-A). (5-39) 
where 
A, M, B are the lower, modal and upper values of the triangular 
distribution, and 
u is a random number between 0 and 1, 
The uncertain variable x Is a scalar where the mean is set equal to 
one and A, H, and B are stated in relation to the mean. The particular 
value, Y of x, represents the error term to be used in (5-3). If Y is 
equal to one, then the actual net operating Income realized is the 
expected value by (5-3). If Y is less than one, then the actual is less 
then expected and conversely, if Y exceeds one, then the actual net 
operating Income exceeds the expected value. The varlate y represents 
the Inherent instability and variability in prices and yields. The 
particular values of the parameters A, M, and B are presented in Appendix 
B. 
^Such is not the case with many other distributions and in fact, 
no inverse exists for the normal and y must be approximated. 
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One run of the simulation model for one selected set of parameters 
produces one point on the final probability distribution of net terminal 
wealth. The simulation Is run again, allowing only the error terms in 
(5-3) to change, to generate a second point on the distribution. This 
process is continued until the probability distribution for net terminal 
wealth is approximated to the desired degree of accuracy. A cumulative 
density function can be created from the probability distribution 
function by assigning each discrete outcome the probability of 1/n for 
n runs. The solution values are ranked in ascending order and cumula­
tively summed to generate the cumulative density function of net terminal 
wealth for the chosen set of parameters. Choosing a different set of 
parameters will generate a new cumulative density function. The two sets 
of parameters can be evaluated in terms of the maximization of expected 
utility by comparing the two cumulative density functions with the 
stochastic dominance theorems of Chapter III. 
The weakness of Monte Carlo modeling is that the optimum solution 
may never appear as one of the calculated solutions. However, Brooks 
(23, pp. 244-251 and 24, pp. 430-457) has statistically estimated the 
number of runs needed to obtain an optimal or near-optimal solution with 
a specified probability where the number of feasible, random observations 
required is 
IT - log (l-P)/log(l-6), (5-40) 
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lAiere 
P Is the probability that at least one observation will be 
made from the 6 subset, and 
S is the proportion of the entire decision space which contains 
optimal or near optimal values of the decision variables. 
The number of runs required for selected conbinations of P and S are 
shown in Table 5. 
Referring to Table 5, if five percent of all possible solutions are 
assumed to be either optimal or near-optimal (6«.05) and the desired 
level of confidence is 90 percent (P>^.90) that at least one of these 
solutions will be observed. It is necessary to run the simulation model 
forty-five times. That is, forty-five discrete points of the probability 
distribution of terminal wealth are sufficient to insure ninety percent 
confidence of including at least one optimal or near-optimal solution 
among the forty-five. 
Corporate form of organization 
As identified in (5-9), the farm firm is assumed to be a regularly 
taxed, Subchapter C corporation. Although most farms in the past and at 
present are sole proprietorships or spin-offs into informal partnerships, 
there is an increasing trend toward incorporation. In large part, this 
trend toward incorporation is attributable to Income and estate tax 
considerations. The most Important of these inducements to incorporate 
are: 
170 
Table 5. Number of feasible, random observations, F, required for 
selected values of p and 8 
P 
.80 .90 .95 .99 
.05 
6 
.025 -J 
32 45 59 90 
64 91 119 182 
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1. Increased flexibility In estate planning and flexibility 
In the transfer of property prior to and after death. 
2. Flexibility In integrating young family members into the 
farming operations. 
3. Income-sharing plans which make use of both corporate and 
personal tax provisions to reduce federal income taxes. 
4. Continuity of existence after the death of the major 
shareholder. 
5. Liability of shareholders limited to the extent of their 
investment in the corporation. 
6. Tax deductible fringe benefits such as retirement plans, 
life Insurance premiums, and health Insurance. 
But the regularly taxed corporation also suffers a number of disad­
vantages over the sole proprietorship. These disadvantages include: 
1. At least as high and usually higher tax rates on capital 
gains. 
2. Higher costs of social security taxes. Worker's Compensation, 
and unemployment insurance. 
3. The business activities of the corporation are limited 
to those specified in the articles of Incorporation. 
4. Some states restrict corporate activity in agriculture. 
5. Corporations typically require more extensive recordkeeping. 
In general, it is not clear whether the advantages outweigh the 
disadvantages. Each situation must be evaluated in light of its 
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particular circumstances and the objectives of the decision maker. In 
addition, the sole proprietorship or Informal partnership can be 
structured In such a fashion as to function much the same as the corpora­
tion. Therefore, although the corporate form of organization Is used In 
the simulation model of (5-1) through (5-33), the model could also be 
structured In terms of a sole proprietorship or Informal partnership with 
much the same results. 
Data Requirements 
In an effort to keep the results of the simulation model of (5-1) 
through (5-33) as generally applicable as possible, balance sheets and 
Income statements were developed for five representative Iowa farms based 
on the Iowa Farm Business Association's Annual Surveys (63). USDÀ publi­
cations (61, 62, 125, 126, 127, and 26) were used to estimate nonfarm 
Income, nonfarm personal wealth. Inflation, and market rates of 
Interest. 
Balance sheet 
One of the classification schemes of the Iowa Farm Business 
Association Is by acreage where there are five class sizes, as shown in 
Table 6. For each class, 1980 current. Intermediate, and fixed asset 
categories were predicted using an autoregressive model with a one year 
lag of the form 
P + and (5-41) 
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Table 6. Iowa Farm Business Association's size classification by 
acreage* 
Class Acres 
1 100 - 179 
2 180 - 259 
3 260 - 359 
4 360 - 499 
5 500 and over 
*From Iowa Farm Business Associations (63). 
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\ - PVl + ®t' 
where 
t is for the years 1970 through 1979, and the standard 
statistical properties are assumed to apply, namely 
~ (0, 0%), 
®t» ®j - 0 for t f j, 
|P I <1. 
E(u^) » 0, 
2 
V(u ) - —2- , and 
1-P 
cov - -a-? . 
1-p 
The dependent variable in (5-41) is the asset type being projected. 
The independent vector of variables Xj. are an intercept term and the 
year. The coefficients and statistical results are presented in Appendix 
B. 
The 1980 projected assets for each size of farm of Table 2 are 
presented in Table 7. A class one farm has 155 total acres and 136 
rotated acres. It has $85,232 of current assets (such as feed, 
livestock, supplies, and stored grains); $72,257 of intermediate assets 
(primarily machinery, breeder livestock, and equipment); and $243,501 of 
fixed assets (land and structures) for a total of $440,990 in business 
assets. A class two farm has $117,028 of current, $107,170 of 
intermediate, and $341,892 of fixed assets for a total of $566,090. 
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Table 7. Asset composition by size—1980 projections 
Class size 1 2 3 4 5 
Assets 
Current $ 85,232 $117,028 $186,810 $218,647 $ 377 ,350 
Intermediate 72,257 107,170 139,573 147,930 247 ,142 
Fixed 243,501 341,892 455,125 597,621 1 ,014 
II 
Total assets $400,990 $566,090 $781,508 $964,198 $1 ,638 ,660 
Total acres 155 225 328 427 777 
Rotated acres 136 196 282 359 614 
Personal assets $ 8,020 $ 11,322 $ 15,630 $ 19,284 $ 32 ,773 
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Similarly, a class five farm with 777 total acres (614 are rotated 
cropland) has $377,350 of current assets, $247,142 of intermediate, and 
$1,014,168 of fixed assets for a total of $1,638,660 in 1980. 
The Iowa Farm Business Association does not survey nonfarm, personal 
assets. Based on a U.S. Department of Agriculture study (125, pp. 33-
36,) projected 1980 nonfarm personal assets are calculated as two percent 
of business assets. As shown in the lower part of Table 7, personal 
assets of class one farms are $8,020 in 1980. Personal assets of a 
class, three farm are $15,630 and a class five has $32,773 in personal 
assets. 
Although the reporting of asset values in the Iowa Farm Business 
Associations surveys is required of all members and verified by enumera­
tors, liabilities are an optional reporting item and are not verified. 
As a result of this nonreporting (and suspected under-reporting) of 
liabilities, thé Iowa Farm Business Association's surveys had to be 
adjusted to determine the liabilities of the representative farms.^ 
Liabilities of the representative farms were estimated as a 
composite of four sources of information. A personal interview Mr. Doug 
tteline, who is a Iowa Farm Business Association farm consultant and head 
enumerator (91), suggests the debt to asset ratios of the representative 
^Debt to asset ratios of the Iowa Farm Business Associations 
surveys varied from four percent for class one to seven percent for class 
five farms. Most researchers, including me, believe these values to be 
unrealistlcally low. 
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farms should range from twenty percent for class one to thirty percent 
for class five# The Balance Sheet of the Farming Sector (125, p. 39) 
Indicates that the overall debt to asset ratio of Iowa farms Is sixteen 
percent. 
A disaggregated capital projections study done by Boehlje and 
Selnders 62, pp. 61-92) indicates the debt-to-asset ratios for cash grain 
farms are twelve to fifteen percent and livestock farms are sixteen to 
thirty-one percent. The findings of this study, the cross classification 
from the economic sales class to IFBA acreage classes, and the debt-to-
asset ratios for cash grain and livestock are summarized In Table 8* 
The Agricultural Finance Outlook (126, p. 26) suggests that the 
debt-to-asset ratios for U.S. livestock, dairy, and grain farms 
classified by small, medium, and large should vary from 8.1 percent to 
30.4 percent, as summarized In Table 9. 
Based on these four sources of Information, the liabilities reported 
on the Iowa Farm Business Association's surveys were Increased to the 
range of fourteen to twenty-two percent, as shown In Table 10.^ For a 
class one farm, current liabilities are projected to be $36,962 and 
noncurrent to be $22,177, for a total of $59,139 In 1980. Class three 
^Although the asset values are critical In estimating net 
operating Income, the liability values serve only as a starting point of 
the analysis. The primary focus of this analysis Is upon the effects of 
selected financing arrangements (presented In a later section of this 
chapter). Therefore, the liability projections presented in Table 10 
merely provide a "reasonable" picture of the financial position of the 
representative farms as a base from which to begin the analysis. 
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Table 8. Projected 1980 debt-to-asset ratios for cash grain and 
livestock farms* 
Sales IPSA Debt-to-asset ratio 
Class^ Cash Grain Livestock 
III-V 1 12% 16% 
II 2 13% 18% 
IB 3, 4 14% 24% 
lA 5 15% 31% 
*From Balance Sheet of the Farming Sector 1979: Supplement (125). 
^From Table 6. 
179 
Table 9. Debt-to-asset ratios by type and size* 
Size Livestock Dairy Cash Grain 
— Percent 
Small 8.1% 14.7% 13.3% 
Medium 12.5% 25.7% 14.0% 
Large 20.9% 30.4% 16.2% 
*From Agricultural Finance Outlook (126). 
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Table 10. Debt-to-asset ratios and liabilities by farm size—1980 
projections 
1 2 
Acreage Slze^ 
3 4 5 
Debt-to-asset ratio .14 .16 .18 .20 .22 
Liabilities 
Current $22,177 $24,093 $ 55,425 $ 64,987 $124,735 
Noncurrent 36,962 66,482 85,246 127 ,853 235,770 
Total liabilities $59,139 $90,575 $140,671 $192,840 $360,505 
*See Table 6. 
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farms are projected to have $55,425 of current and $85,246 of noncurrent 
liabilities in 1980 for a total of $140,671. Class five farms are 
projected to have $360,505 of total Habilites in 1980 composed of 
$124,735 current and of $235,770 noncurrent liabilities. 
Farm income 
From the Iowa Farm Business Association's surveys, farm income and 
expenses of the representative farms were separated into three 
components—net operating income, cash fixed operating expenses, and 
noncash fixed operating expenses. Net operating income, as defined in • 
(5-1), is total revenues minus total variable operating expenses. 
Equation (5-2) was used to estimate net operating income as a function of 
the stock of existing assets, an intercept term, and the year for each 
representative farm. The model of (5-41) was used to estimate the 
starting asset values In (5-2). The coefficients, t-values, lag 
coefficient, and R? are summarized in Appendix B. 
Cash fixed operating expenses of (5-4) and noncash fixed operating 
expenses of (5-5) were estimated for each class as a function of non-
current assets, an intercept term, and time using the model in (5-41). 
The coefficients, t-values, and are presented in Appendix B. 
Earnings before interest and taxes from (5-6) are the residual of 
net operating income and operating expenses. The 1980 projected earnings 
before interest and taxes and the percentage return on total assets are 
summarized in Table 11 for each representative farm. 
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Table 11. Projected 1980 earnings before interest and taxes by class 
Class 
Net 
operating 
income 
Cash 
fixed 
expense 
Noncash 
fixed 
expense 
Earnings 
before interest 
and taxes 
Percent 
return on 
total assets 
1 $ 38,634 $ 4,374 $ 9,582 $ 24,678 6.2 
2 $ 66,550 $ 5,784 $11,897 $ 48,869 8.6 
3 $ 67,467 $ 5,931 $14,110 $ 47,426 6.1 
4 $ 86,253 $ 8,695 $13,175 $ 64,383 6.7 
5 $148,321 $13,675 $24,993 $109,653 6.7 
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From Table 11, a class two farm in 1980 is projected to generate a 
net operating income of $66,550 in 1980, cash fixed expenses of $5,784 
and noncash fixed expenses of $11,897 for a projected earnings before 
interest and taxes of $48,869. This is an 8.6 percent return on total 
assets before taxes and interest. Similarly, a class five farm in 1980 
is projected to earn $109,653 before taxes and interest based on a net 
operating Income of $148,321, cash fixed expenses of $13,675 and noncash 
fixed expense of $24,993. The projected return on total assets for a 
class five farm is 6.7 percent. 
Nonfarm income 
Data available on nonfarm income are sketchy. The Iowa Farm 
Business Association's surveys concentrate entirely on farm and farm 
related sources and collect no information on nonfarm income. 
John Crecink, in a U.S. Department of Agriculture study (26, pp. 32 
and 45), estimated nonfarm income as a percentage of total family Income 
for the United States, as shown in Table 12. For example, a farm family 
with a total income of $4,000 would have earned $1,600 from farming and 
$2,400 from nonfarm sources. A family with a total family income of 
$25,000 would have earned $15,000 of that amount from farm sources and 
$10,000 from nonfarm sources. Crecink found that the primary sources of 
the nonfarm income for com belt farmers are nonfarm wages and salaries 
(50%), nonfarm business investments (30%), pensions (14%), and other 
investments (5%) (26, p. 45). 
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Table 12. Farm and nonfarm Income as a percent of total family 
income in farming for given levels of income^ 
Level of total 
family income 
As a percent 
Farm 
of the total 
Nonfarm 
$ 2,000 20 80 
4,000 40 60 
10,000 35 65 
23,000 50 50 
25,000 60 40 
® Crecink, (26, p. 32). 
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Creclnk's findings are supported by Farm Income Statistics (127, p. 
59) which found that smaller farms rely more heavily on nonfarm sources 
of Income while the larger farms generate the majority of their Income 
from farm sources^. In light of these two studies, ahd since the 
earnings levels of the representative farms all exceed $20,000, It Is 
assumed that for all but the largest farm size, farm Income represents 
three-fourths of the total family Income while nonfarm sources represent 
the remaining one-fourth. For the largest farm size, it is assumed that 
farm Income represents four-fifths and nonfarm income represents one-
fifth of total family Income. 
Market rate of Interest and rate of inflation 
For outstanding real estate and nonreal estate debts, market rates 
of interest of nine and twelve percent are used (126, pp. 12-13). The 
projections of future market Interest rates and inflation rates used in 
this study are taken from the aggregate, baseline macro projections of 
the National Agricultural Credit Study (62, p. 64). These projections 
are summarized in Table 14. 
This completes the development of the empirical model and the data 
employed. It is now appropriate to discuss the financing arrangements 
selected for analysis and the empirical findings. 
^The Farm Income Statistics figures for 1978 are summarized by 
economic sales class in Table 13. 
Table 13. Net farm and off-farm Income levels by volume of sales in 1978* 
ALL IV-V III II IB lA 
Net farm income 
Before Inventory 
adjustment $10,037 •$ 3,281 $ 5,917 $11,745 $21,636 $52,337 
Off-farm Income 12,829 13,573 10,068 7,802 6,846 10,850 
Total income $22,866 $16,854 $15,985 $19,547 $28,482 $63,187 
®From Stlglltz (119, p. 59). 
Table 14. Projections of macroeconomlc variables, 1980-1990* 
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
U.S. GNP ($Bil.) 2,570 2,841 2,310 3,538. 3,914 
percent change 8.6 10.5 13.0 10.2 10.6 
Consumer price index 
(1967 - 100) 246.6 270.4 291.2 315.9 341.0 
percent change 13.4 9.7 7.7 8.5 8.0 
Prime interest rate 15.0 11.0 8.5 „ 10.7 10.3 
percent change 22.1 -26.6 -22.7 26.4 - 4.0 
^From 62. 
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1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
4,310 4,732 5,194 5,688 6,221 6,791 
10.1 9.8 9.8 9.5 9.4 9.2 
376.6 395.2 423.9 454.0 485.3 518.1 
7.8 7.5 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.7 
10.3 10.4 10.6 11.1 11.6 12.2 
- 0.2 1.0 2.3 4.2 4.6 5.3 
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CHAPTER VI. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Chapter I discussed the Importance o£ financing In facilitating the 
Intergeneratlonal transfer of the family farm In an uncertain environ­
ment. Cahpter II developed the maximization of expected utility measured 
as net terminal wealth as the best criterion for choosing between 
alternate financing methods. Chapter III developed stochastic dominance 
as the appropriate method of choosing the better of a pair of financing 
methods which results In the maximization of expected utility* Chapter 
IV discussed the role and conceptual considerations of financing as an 
Integral part (along with production and Investment) In the theory of the 
firm. Chapter V presented the empirical Monte Carlo simulation model and 
data needed to run the model. This chapter presents the financing 
methods selected for analysis and discusses the empirical findings. 
Financing Situations Selected for Analysis 
The family unit used In each financing situation Is composed of a 
father and husband, age 55, a mother and wife, age 48 and a married heir, 
age 21. All are in excellent health and actively participate in the 
management and operation of the farm. The father and mother are assumed 
to function as a single decision making unit. They share ipcome and 
expenses equally and file a joint federal Income tax return. The heir is 
assumed to have his (her) own family so that he (she) also is entitled to 
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file joint federal Income tax returns. The heir is an on-farm heir who 
will gradually take over management and ownership of the farm as the 
parents reduce their role in the farm. Ultimately, upon the parents' 
death, the heir will inherit full ownership of the farm. The financial 
situations selected for analysis address the issue of facilitating the 
Intergenerational transfer process while the parents are still living and 
actively participating in management. 
Table 15 summarizes the financial situations selected for 
analysis.1 For each of the representative farms summarized in part A 
of Table 15, each family member receives an annual salary starting at 
$2,200 for classes II, III and IV and $1,100 for class V.^ The 
Class I farmis were dropped from the analysis because these 
represent a large number of part-time and small farms incapable of 
sustaining a family as the primary form of income. 
^These salary levels were chosen to approximately balance each 
individual's initial consumption needs with his or her initial after-tax 
income. It is possible to fault these salary levels as being too low by 
economic standards as a return on an input and low by tax standards (50b, 
Chapter 57). See Bramlette Building Corp. 52 T.C. 200 (1969), aff'd, 424 
F.2d 751 (5th dr., 1970); Gary N. Cromer, T.C. Ifemo. 1980-263; Pat 
Krahenbuhl, T.C. Memo. 1968-34; and Martin Fundenberger, T.C. Memo. 
1980-113. If salaries are increased to a more reasonable level, 
corporate after-tax cash flow will decline by a factor of one minus the 
corporate marginal tax rate, times the Increase in salaries, or the 
corporate after-tax cash flow will decrease by 
(1 - TAXC) • S 
where TAXC is the marginal tax rate paid by the corporation, and S is the 
increase in salaries. 
The increased salaries will increase the after-tax cash flow of each 
individual by 
(1 - .04 - (1 - .04) TAX?) S 
where .04 is the slope coefficient on after-tax Income from the consump­
tion function on page 155 and TAXP is the individual marginal tax rate. 
The increased salaries reduce the amount of investment and new 
assets by the corporation through its retained earnings, but increase the 
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starting salary Is Increased annually by the projected rate of inflation 
(shown In Table 14, page 188). Nonfarm Income for each family member Is 
estimated as a percentage of net Income. For classes II, III and IV, 
each family member Is assumed to earn 8.33 percent of total Income from 
nonfarm sources. Collectively, the family earns 25 percent of total 
Income from nonfarm sources and 75 percent from farm sources. Restating 
nonfarm Income as a percentage of farm Income, nonfarm Income Is 1/3 for 
Footnote continued from previous page 
salaries would alter the quantitative results presented In the remainder 
of this chapter. The amount of alteration would depend on the values of 
TÂXC, TÂXP, S, and the ownership mix of common stock between the parents 
and the heir. For each of the situations analyzed, the marginal tax 
rates and the ownership mix of common stock change over the planning 
horizon. But using the averages as proxies for the marginal tax rates 
for the class IV farm, owned 80 percent by the parents as presented In 
Table 16, the effects of an Increase In salaries can be analyzed in the 
following fashion. From Table 16, let TÂXC = .18, TAX? = .15, and S = 
$30,000 (an Increase of $10,000 per Individual). The average decrease in 
the corporate after-tax cash flow would be 
(1 - .18) • $30,000 = $24,600. 
The average Increase in the after-tax cash flow of the parents will 
be 
(1 - .04 - (1 - .04) .15) • $20,000 = $16,320. 
The average Increase in the after-tax cash flow of the heir will be 
(1 - .04 - (1 - .04) .15) . $10,000 = $8,160. 
Because the parents own 80 percent of the stock, the value of their 
common stock would be 
-($24,600)(.80) + $16,320 = -$3,360. 
The net effect for the heir would be 
-($24,600)(.20) + $8,160 = $3,240. 
Over the ten year planning horizon, the midpoint of the parents' net 
equity would be $33,600, or about 2 percent smaller ($1,907,462 versus 
$1,941,062). The midpoint of the heir's net equity would Increase by 
$32,400, or by about 7 percent ($517,665 versus $485,265). When the heir 
converts half the common stock into a loan or a bond, the midpoint of the 
parents' net equity would decline by more than $33,600 while the heir's 
net equity would Increase by more than $32,400. However, the relative 
ranking of preferences is not likely to be altered except in those 
situations where the curves are already so close that there is little 
significant difference between them. 
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Table 15. Financial situations selected for analysis 
Farm Class II III IV V 
A. Equities and Incomes 
Total equity $310,400 $640,800 $771,200 $1,278,000 
Salaries (each) 2,200 2,200 2,200 1,100 
Nonfarm Income 
as a percent of farm 
Income (each) .11 .11 11 8.33 
B. Ownership Mix 
Parents 100% 80% 60% 
Son 0% 20% 40% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
C. Parents; and Heir's 
Ownership/Investor Mix 
Common stock: 100% 50% 50% 
Loan: 0% 50% 0% 
Bond: 0% 0% 50% 
Total: 100% 100% 100% 
D. Interest rates 12% and 9% 
E. Dividends salaries with no dividends on common stock 
no salaries with dividends of 10 percent 
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the family or 11.11 percent for each family member. For class V farms, 
the femlly Is assumed to earn 20 percent of total Incane from nonfarm 
sources and 80 percent from farm sources. Assuming nonfarm Income Is 
earned equally, then each family member earns 8.33 percent In nonfarm 
Income as a percentage of farm Income. 
Three ownership mixes are analyzed for each farm class, as 
summarized In Part B of Table 15. The first situation assumes that the 
parents own 100 percent of the farm and the heir owns nothing. The 
second situation Is divided 80 percent to the parents and 20 percent to 
the heir. The third situation Is divided 60 percent to the parents and 
40 percent to the heir. 
Part C of Table 15 summarizes the heir's and parents' options on 
their ownership mix. In the first situation of Part C, the heir owns his 
their entire Interest (If any) In common stock. In the second situation 
of Part C, the heir redeems half of their common stock for a ten year 
loan with ten equal principal repayments.^ 
Alternatively, In the third situation of Part C Table 15, the heir 
redeems half of their equity Interest for an Investor interest In a ten 
year loan (or a bond) of equal fair market value. The loan or bond pays 
^When the heir redeems half of their equity ownership for an 
Investor Interest In the corporation, the proportionate shares of equity 
ownership of the parents and heir increase due to the decrease in the 
number of shares outstanding. If initially there are 100 shares of 
common outstanding of which the parents own 80 and the heir then converts 
10 of his shares into debt, this leaves 90 shares outstanding. The 
parents' proportionate Interest has increased to 80/90 or 89 percent 
while the heir's equity interest has decreased from 20/100 to 10/90 or 11 
percent. 
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periodic interest on the principal over its term. Similarly, the parents 
can redeem half of their common stock for either an investor interest in 
a ten year loan or a ten year bond. 
The interest rates on the loan or bond are set at two levels, as 
described in Part D of Table 15.^ The rates selected are 12 percent, 
which is assumed to be the market rate of interest, and 9 percent, which 
is below the market rate. With either interest rate, the loan or the 
bond is convertible into the same number of common shares. That is, the 
market value of the loan or bond is not adjusted for a change in the 
interest rate. Finally, in Part E of Table 15, the base situations are 
run with two income distribution plans. In the one salaries are paid to 
each of the family members but no dividends paid on the common stock. In 
the other, all of the net income of the farm corporation is distributed 
with dividends. 
Results of the Iowa State University Business and Financial Model 
are illustrated in the following section. 
Illustrative Results 
The Iowa State University Business and Financial Planning Model 
generates-a statement of financial position, a statement of changes in 
financial position, and individual cash flow statements for each of the 
^There are proposed regulations pending that would impose specific 
limitations on interest payments on debt instruments issued by a farm 
corporation. For more detail, see "Changes in Tax Laws" in the foreward 
of this study. 
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ten years in the planning horizon. The model recursively calculates 
Equations (5-1) through (5-33) for the farm firm and the family members. 
In addition, the model performs these calculations for four legal forms 
of business organization—the sole proprietorship, the partnership, the 
subchapter S corporation, and the subchapter C corporation. 
Tables 16 and 17 present selected results fxom the detailed analysis 
generated by the model. The initial situation in each table is a class 
IV farm owned 80 percent by the parents and 20 percent by the heir. From 
Table 7, page 176, and from. Table 10, page 181, a class IV farm has 
$964,198 in assets and $192,840 in liabilities in 1980. The firm's net 
equity in 1980 of $771,358 is distributed $617,086 (80%) to the parents 
and $154,271 (20%) to the heir as shown in Table 16. Over the ten year 
planning horizon, the parents* equity grows to $1,941,062, and the heir's 
equity grows to $485,265 for a combined equity of $2,426,327. In 1989, 
the combined assets of the firm are $3,032,910 and combined liabilities 
are $606,583. Over the ten year period, equity has grown at an average 
annual rate of 12.1 percent. Accumulated corporate income taxes for the 
firm are $67,020 and represent, on average, 18.4 percent of corporate 
income. The parents paid accumulated personal income taxes of $29,316, 
or 14.7 percent of income, while the heir paid $14,658 in taxes. Total 
accumulated taxes for the firm and family are $110,994 for an average 
16.7 percent of combined income. On average, the parents' annual expen­
ditures for living expenses are $15,470, the heir's are $7,735 for a 
family total of $23,205. 
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Table 16. Illustrative results of the Iowa State University business and 
financial planning model: example one 
Equities 
Total Assets, 1980 
Total liabilities, 1980 
Net Equity, 1980 
Total Assets, 1989 
Total Liabilities, 1989 
Net Equity, 1989 
A class 
bj 
IV farm, 
the parei 
10% owned 
Its 
Parents Heir Combined 
$ 771,358 
154,272 
617,086 
2,426,328 
485,266 
1,941,062 
$192,839 
38,568 
154,271 
606,582 
121,316 
485,265 
$ 964,198 
192,840 
771,358 
3,032,910 
606,583 
2,426,327 
Average Annual Growth Rate iS 12.1% 12.3% 12.1% 
Income Taxes 
Accumulated 
Average Percent 
of Income 
Corporate 
$ 29,316 
14.7% 
$ 14,658 
14.7% 
$ 110,994 
16.7% 
$67,020 
18.4% 
Average Annual Living Expenses $ 15,470 $ 7,735 $ 23,205 
Comparative Statement of Changes 
in Financial Position, 1983 
Net Income 
Income Taxes (Corporate) 
Investment in Business Assets 
Inflationary Gain 
$ 26,392 
4,678 
41,220 
102,196 
$ 6,598 
1,170 
10,305 
25,549 
$ 32,990 
5,848 
51,525 
127,745 
Individual Cash Hows, 1985 
Salary, Dividends, Directors' Fees 
Off-Farm Income 
Personal Income Taxes 
Living Expenses 
Net Cash Flow 
Investment in Farm 
Investment in Personal Assets 
$ 6,384 
12,842 
2,614 
15,580 
1,030 
1,015 
15 
$ 3,192 
6,421 
1,307 
7,790 
515 
500 
15 
$ 9,576 
19,263 
3,921 
23,370 
1,545 
1,515 
30 
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Table 17• Illustrative results of the Iowa State Uaiversity business and 
financial planning model: example two 
Equities 
Total Assets, 1980 
Total Liabilities, 1980 
Net Equity, 1980 
Investor Interest, 1980 
Total Assets, 1989 
Total Liabilities, 1989 
Net Equity, 1989 
Investor Interest, 1989 
A class IV 
the parents 
half his cc 
farm, 80% 
1—the hell 
mmon for £ 
owned by 
redeems 
I 12% bond 
Parents Heir Combined 
$ 858,136 
240,278 
617,088 
0 
2,495,862 
499,172 
1,996,690 
0 
$106,062 
29,697 
77,135 
77,135 
480,598 
96,120 
384,478 
0 
$ 964,198 
269,975 
694,223 
2,976,460 
595,292 
2,381,168 
Average Annual Growth Bate iS 12.5% 17.4% 13.1% 
Income Taxes 
Accumulated 
Average Percent 
of Income 
Corporate 
$ 40,196 
20.3% 
$ 38,026 
19.9% 
$ 125,506 
19.1% 
$47,284 
17.7% 
Average Annual Living Expenses $ 15,468 $ 7,919 $ 23,385 
Comparative Statement of Changes 
in Financial Position, 1985 
Net Income 
Income Taxes (Corporate) 
Purchases of Business Assets 
Inflationary Gain 
$ 19,546 
3,322 
41,520 
106,755 
$ 3,764 
640 
7,995 
20,557 
$ 23,310 
3,962 
49,515 
127,312 
Individual Cash Flows, 1985 
Salary, Dividends, Directors' Fees 
Off-Farm Income 
Interest Income 
Personal Income Taxes 
Living Expenses 
Net Cash Flow 
Investment in Farm 
Investment in Personal Assets 
$ 6,384 
12,748 
0 
3,428 
15,578 
124 
122 
2 
$ 3,192 
6,374 
9,252 
3,372 
7,974 
7,471 
7,108 
363 
$ 9,576 
19,122 
9,252 
6,800 
23,552 
7,595 
7,230 
365 
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In the lower half of Table 16, key results from the comparative 
statement of changes in financial position are presented for 1985.^ 
Net income from operations is $32,990 with corporate income taxes of 
$5,848. Purchases of new business assets are $51,525. Revaluation of 
the firm's assets to fair market value results in a $127,745 inflationary 
2 gain. Since the parents ere assumed to own 80 percent of the firm, 80 
percent of the changes in financial position are attributable to them. 
The individual cash flows for 1985 are shown in the bottom section of 
Table 16. The parents receive $6,384 in salaries, dividends, and 
director's fees from the firm while the heir receives $3,192. Off-farm 
income for the parents is $12,842 and for the heir, $6,421.^ The 
parents paid personal income taxes of $2,614 and living expenses of 
$15,580. The heir paid personal Income taxes of $1,307 and living 
expenses of $7,790. Of the parents' net cash flow of $1,030, $1,015 is 
reinvested in the firm. The heir reinvests $500 of his (her) net cash 
flow of $515. 
^Since the model does not calculate average annual figures for the 
statement of changes in financial position or the cash flow statements, 
the middle year of the planning horizon (1985) is used as a proxy for the 
average annual values. 
Other line items from the statement of changes in financial 
position not presented here are depreciation, proceeds on sale of assets, 
loss or gain on sale of assets, new borrowings, additions to contributed 
capital, debt retirements, and withdrawals. 
q 
Off-farm income includes all Income not directly attributable to 
the farm entity. In addition to off-farm wages and salaries, this 
category Includes interest and dividends received on savings and also 
off-farm investments and net proceeds from performing custom hire work. 
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Table 17 initially begins with the same situation as did Table 16 
except now the heir redeems half his (her) common stock for a $77,135 
ten-year bond paying 12 percent interest. The firm's liabilities 
increase from $192,840 to $269,975 and equity decreases from $771,358 to 
$694,223. The heir's equity is cut in half, thereby reducing the total 
number of shares outstanding and altering the proportionate ownership of 
the parents. Before the heir redeemed his (her) stock, the parents' 
equity was worth $617,086 or 80 percent of $771,358. After the 
redemption, the parents' 80 percent becomes 89 percent of $694,223. In 
addition, the heir now has a $77,135 investor interest in the firm. Ten 
years later, the parents' equity is larger than before ($1 ,-996,690 versus 
$1,941,062), while the heir's is smaller than before ($384,478 versus 
$485,265).^ Because of the tax deductibility of interest payments on 
the bond, corporate accumulated taxes are nearly $20,000 lower in Table 
17 than they were in Table 16, Correspondingly, the heir's accumulated 
personal income taxes are higher in Table 17 because the interest is 
taxed as personal income. The combined accumulated taxes for the fir# 
and family members increase from $110,994 to $125,506 with the conversion 
to a ten year bond. In 1985, net income from operations is reduced to 
$23,310 by the interest payment on the bond. Corporate taxes in 1985 are 
$3,962. The major difference in the cash flow statements from Table 16 
to Table 17 is the $9,252 in bond interest received by the heir. The 
1 
The heir's average annual growth rate is larger than before 
(17.4% in Table 17 versus 12.3% in Table 16) but this is because the heir 
starts with a smaller equity in Table 17. 
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change In cash flow Increases the heir's personal Income taxes from 
$1,307 to $3,372 for 1985. 
By comparing Table 16 with Table 17, it is obvious that the change 
in the parents' net equity increases when the heir converts half his 
(her) stock to a bond. This increase in wealth for the parents comes at 
the exrpense of the heir. An heir wishing to maximize his (her) utility 
would be better served by not redeeming common stock for a bond paying 
the market rate of interest because the interest earned on the bond is 
taxed currently whereas the appreciation on common stock is accrued as 
capital gain and not taxed until the stock is sold. 
The results presented in Table 16 and 17 presume that expectations 
are realized—that is, there is no uncertainty. It is now appropriate to 
expand the analysis by letting the actual outcomes realized vary from the 
outcomes expected to occur. 
Recall that the objective function of the parents (and the heir is 
to maximize their net wealth at the end of the planning horizon. Because 
of the difficulty in constructing a family objective function, interper­
sonal comparisons can not be accomplished. Rather, outcomes that produce 
conflict between the parents and the heir can be identified but not 
resolved. Outcomes which don't produce conflict (but Increase both the 
parents' and the heir's net terminal wealth) facilitate the intergenera-
tional transfer process. 
Risk is incorporated into the analysis by measuring the change in 
net wealth that results from a selected financing arrangement as a cumu­
lative density function. Each cumulative density function is generated 
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by recursively performing the detailed analysis equivalent to that 
presented in Tables 16 and 17 with a Monte Carlo simulation driven by a 
random number generator. Each point on a graph represents one simulation 
for one time pattern of stochastic error terms! Each graph measures the 
change in wealth over the ten-year planning horizon for the parents or 
the heir for a selected financing arrangement under many randomly 
determined time patterns of stochastic error terms. After a sufficient 
number of analyses are performed, the results are ranked in ascending 
order and cumulatively summed to derive the cumulative density functions 
discussed in the remainder of this chapter. 
Ownership Mix 
Figures 30 through 37 present the cumulative density functions for 
both the parents and the heir for each of the representative farms for 
each of the three ownership mixes. The three initial ownership mixes for 
a class II farm are graphed in Figure 30 for the parents and Figure 31 
for the heir. Curve 100/0 on Figures 30 and 31 represent the parents' 
ownership of 100 percent of the common stock and 0 percent for the heir. 
Curve 80/20 on Figures 30 and 31 represent 80 percent ownership by the 
parents and 20 percent ownership by the heir, and curve 60/40 represents 
the 60/40 initial mix. Similarly, a class III farm is depicted in 
Figures 32 and 33, a class IV farm in Figures 34 and 35, and a class V 
farm in Figures 36 and 37. 
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Figure 30. A comparison of Initial ownership mixes for the parents of a Class II farm with common 
stock only 
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Figure 31. A comparison of initial ownership mixes for the heir of a Class II farm with common 
stock only 
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Figure 32. A comparison of initial ownership mixes for the parents of a Class III farm with common 
stock only 
80/20 60/40 
80/20 100/0 
600 ($ thousands) 
^ Mean values. 
Figure 33. Â comparison of initial ownership mixes for the heir of a Class III farm with common 
stock only 
FSD 
1.0 
60/40 80/20 100/0 
4 J: 
100/0 60/40 80/20 0 . 0  
thousands) 1200 1000 1400 1600 1800 
^ Mean values. 
Figure 34. A comparison of Initial ownership mixes for the parents of a Class IV farm with common 
stock only 
FSD 
1.0 
80/20 100/0 60/40 
60/40 80/20 100/0 
0 60 180 420 300 540 ($ thousands) 660 
® Mean values. 
Figure 35. A comparison of initial ownership mixes for the heir of a Class IV farm with common 
stock only 
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Figure 36. A comparison of initial ownership mixes for the parents of a Class V farm with common 
stock only 
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Figure 37. A comparison 
stock only 
of Initial ownership mixes for the heir of a Class V farm with common 
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As can be seen from Figures 30, 32, 34 and 36, the parents unambigu­
ously prefer the 100 percent ownership to 80 percent to 60 percent 
ownership under first degree stochastic dominance. This Is because first 
degree stochastic dominance (FSD) requires the preference of more wealth 
to less as an axiom of rational behavior. Similarly the heir. In Figure 
31, 33, 35 and 37, unambiguously prefers the 60/40 to the 80/20 to the 
100/0 distribution of ownership under FSD or just the opposite ordering 
of the parents. 
There are two reasons for presenting these figures. First, the 
curves in Figures 30 through 37 serve as a basis for.comparison for later 
situations and are presented here for completeness. Second, Figures 30 
through 37 present the conflict of Interests between parents and heir 
concerning intergeneratlonal transfer. If the parents are not concerned 
with facilitating the Intergeneratlonal transfer, that is, the parents' 
objective of maximizing expected utility is not constrained by a desire 
to transfer the farm to the heir, then the parents will always prefer 
owning the entire farm and will not gift any of their interest in the 
farm. Conversely, the heir wishes to own as much of the farm as possible 
since this maximizes his (her) utility. Therefore, potential conflict 
exists between the parents and the heir. 
Salaries Versus Dividends 
Common methods of sharing income between the parents and the heir are 
through the use of salaries, directors' fees, dividends on common stock, 
and interest payments on debt. Salaries and directors' fees are 
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compensation for the contribution of personal labor and managerial 
expertise, while dividends are compensation for the contribution of 
physical and money capital to the firm. Interest payments are 
compensation for nonequity investments in the firm. 
Salaries which meet the Internal Revenue Service criterion for 
reasonableness are tax deductible to the corporation as a valid business 
expense. The salary received by an individual must be reported as 
taxable Income on the individual's federal income tax return. Dividends 
are distributed from the after-tax earnings of the corporation. However, 
the first $400 (on a joint return) of taxable dividends and Interest 
received is tax deductible to the individual. Interest payments are 
deductible by the corporation but the excess over $400 received is 
taxable to the individual.^ Therefore, income of the corporation is 
taxed only once if it is distributed as either salaries or Interest 
(except for the first $400 of interest, ^ Ich is not taxed at all), but 
it is taxed twice (except for the first $400) if distributed as 
dividends. 
When salaries or dividends can accomplish the family's desired 
Income sharing plan equally well, salaries would be preferred since they 
produce a smaller combined tax liability. As shown in Figures 38 through 
41, this is exactly what happens. In Figure 38, the parents in a Class 
^For tax years beginning after 1981, there is no exclusion for 
interest received. The exclusion on a joint return Is $200 for 
qualifying dividends regardless of which spouse has legal title to the 
stock (25b, p. 246). 
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Figure 38. A comparison of salaries and dividends for the parents of a Class IV farm with 100 
percent Initial ownership 
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Figure 39. A comparison of salaries with dividends for the heir of a Class IV farm who Initially 
owns 0 percent. 
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Figure 40. A. comparison of salaries with dividends for the parents of a Class IV farm who 
initially own 60 percent of it 
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Figure 41. A comparison of 
owns 40 percent 
salaries with dividends for the heir of a Class IV farm who initially 
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IV farm with 100 percent ownership prefer salaries to dividends by FSD. 
In Figure 39, the heir also prefers salaries to dividends under FSD in a 
Class IV farm When the parents own all of the farm. In Figure 38, 
changing the income sharing plan from stock dividends to salaries 
increases the mean change in the parents' terminal equity from $1,518,100 
to $1,807,600, or by 19 percent.^ This increase in equity is attribut­
able to the double taxation of dividends. Figure 40 represents the 
change in the parents' terminal wealth distribution under FSD for a Class 
IV farm with 60 percent ownership; in all cases the parents prefer 
salaries to dividends under FSD. Figure 41 summarizes the wealth 
distribution of the heir under FSD; as with the parents, the heir prefers 
salaries to dividends in every case.^ 
In the comparison of salaries with dividends, there is no conflict 
of interest between the parents and the heir. Both unambiguously prefer 
salaries to dividends under FSD. But this is not to say dividends are 
never important. To avoid double taxation, salaries must meet the test 
However, the variability of the distribution also increases with 
the switch from dividends to salaries—from a standard deviation of 
$62,300 to $131,100. This increase in variability occurs because 
salaries are a fixed expense—the same salary is paid regardless of the 
level of after-tax income. Dividends, on the other hand, vary propor­
tionately with the level of after-tax income. If, in a particular year, 
there is no (or negative) after-tax income, no dividends are paid whereas 
salaries would still be paid. However, as can be seen in Figures 38 to 
41, the increase in wealth from using salaries instead of dividends more 
than compensates the parents and the heir for the increase in 
variability. 
If in fact salaries fail the test of reasonableness, the 
distributions are treated as dividends for tax purposes. 
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of reasonableness. If the salary is not reasonable, the dividends would 
be preferable since at least the first $400 of dividends is tax 
deductible at the personal level. Furthermore, dividends can be used to 
distribute income in relation to ownership instead of management or 
contributed labor. This feature becomes of increasing importance as the 
parents enter retirement, since they are inclined to reduce their 
participation in the management of the firm. In this situation, it 
becomes difficult to justify the reasonableness of salaries while 
dividends can provide the parents with retirement income based upon their 
investment in the firm. When annual dividends or the annual salaries are 
below $400, the family members will prefer dividends if their personal 
marginal income tax rate is greater than the marginal tax rate of the 
corporation. Conversely, if the corporation's marginal tax rate is 
higher, then salaries (or director's fees) are preferred. 
Common Stock Versus a Constant Principal 
Loan at Market Rate of Interest 
In this and the next three sections, either the parents or the heir 
redeem half their common stock for either a loan or a bond. Since the 
terms of the loan or bond result through direct negotiation without the 
Involvement of a financial intermediary, the interest rate need not be 
determined by prevalent market conditions. Therefore, the stated rates 
of interest on the loan or bond are evaluated at 12 percent (assumed to 
represent the market rate) and 9 percent. 
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In each situation, the conversion of equity Into debt has four rami­
fications on the growth In net terminal wealth of the parents and the 
heir: 
1. A conversion of equity to debt by one party changes the propor­
tionate equity ownerships of all parties (see footnote 1, page 
193). 
2. With the Issuance of a new debt Instrument, Interest payments 
reduce after-tax corporate cash flow. As a result, the firm has 
less after-tax earnings available for distribution. 
3. A conversion to a loan requires periodic principal payments to 
amortize the loan value to zero over the planning horizon. A 
conversion to a bond requires a single balloon payment of 
principal at maturity. As a result, the timing for reinvesting 
in the firm Is altered. 
4. The Individual who holds the Investor Interest In the bond or 
loan enjoys a larger cash flow than he would had he kept his 
Interest entirely In equity. This Is due to the Interest and 
principal payments he periodically receives. 
Figures 42 through 31 summarize the changes In the net terminal 
wealth of the parents and the heir when the parents' Initial ownership, 
or the heir's Initial ownership, or both. Is converted from an equity 
Interest of common stock to a combined owner-Investor Interest. This Is 
accomplished by redeeming half the Initial common stock for a ten year, 
constant principal loan at the market rate of Interest (assumed to be 12 
percent). 
Figure 42 summarizes the results for the parents who initially own 
80 percent of a class V farm. The All Common curve in Figure 42 
represents the situation vrtiere the heir's 20 percent Interest is held 
entirely in common stock while the Half Common-Half Loan curve in Figure 
42 represents the same circumstances except the heir redeems half his 
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Figure 42. A comparison of a loan with a bond, both at 12 percent, for the parents of a Class V 
farm who initially own 80 percent (all in common stock) and an heir who initially owns 
20 percent (half in common stock and half in either a bond or a loan) 
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Figure 43. Second degree stochastic dominance of the situation shown Figure 42 
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Figure 44. A comparison of common stock with a loan with a bond, both at 12 percent, for the heir 
of a Class V farm who initially owns 20 percent, half in common stock and half in 
either common, a loan or a bond 
SSD 
270 
210): 
150 
All Common 
Half Loan-Half Common 90): 
700 800 900 1000 1100 ($ thousands) 1200 
Figure 45. Second degree stochastic dominance of the situation In Figure 44 
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Figure 46. A comparison of common stock with a 12 percent loan with a 12 percent bond for the 
parents of a Class V farm who initially own 60 percent (all in common stock) and an 
heir who initially owns 40 percent (half in common and the other half In either common, 
a loan or a bond) 
SSD 
700;: 
All 
Common 550 >: 
Half _ Half 
Loan Common 
400;: 
2505: 
100-
1900 2300 2700 3100 ($ thousands) 3500 
Figure 47. Second degree stochastic dominance of the situation shown in Figure 46 
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Figure 48. Third degree stochastic dominance of the situation shown In Figure 46 
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Figure 49. A comparison of common stock with a 12 percent loan with a 12 percent bond for the 
heir of a Class V farm who Initially owns 40 percent divided half in common and the 
other half in common, a bond or in a loan. 
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Figure 50. A comparison of a loan with a bond, both at 12 percent, for the parents of a Class IV 
farm who initially oim 80 percent (half in common and half in a bond or a loan) and an 
heir who initially owns 20 percent all in common 
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Figure 51. A comparison of a loan with a bond, both at 12 percent, for the heir of a Class IV farm 
who initially owns 20 percent (all in common stock ) and the parents who own 80 percent 
(half in common stock and half in common, a bond or a loan) 
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(her) common stock for a ten-year constant principal loan. The two 
curves cross In Figure 42 so that under first degree stochastic 
dominance, the parents are Indifferent as to whether the heir holds his 
(her) Interest entirely in common stock or half in common stock and half 
in a loan. Figure 43 measures the second degree stochastic dominance of 
these two cumulative density functions of Figure 42. Since the Half 
Loan-Half Common curve lies entirely to the right and below the All 
Common curve in Figure 43, all parents whose utility function specifica­
tion possesses a negative second derivative (i.e., parents who are risk 
averse) will prefer that the heir hold half his (her) interest in a 
market-rate loan because this results in the greater expected utility for 
risk averse parents. 
There are two reasons why the utility is greater. First, the 
proportionate ownership of the residual equity of the corporation changes 
with the conversion. Before redemption the parents own 80 percent of the 
common stock and the heir owns 20 percent. After redemption, the 
parents' equity interest has Increased from 80 to 89 percent while the 
heir's equity interest has decreased from 20 to 11 percent. Earnings 
retained by the corporation combined with appreciated asset values are 
distributed equally among the outstanding shares. Therefore, after 
conversion, the parents participate in 89 percent of the increase in 
corporate value while the heir participates only in 11 percent. 
Second, with the issuance of a loan. Interest payments on the loan 
reduce after-tax corporate cash flow. The accumulated Income taxes paid 
by the corporation (for the mean solutions) decrease from $1,102,033 for 
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the all common case to $1,055,291 when the heir converts half his (her) 
Income stock to a loan. However, the after-tax net income of the firm 
decreases from $170,165 to $164,858 with conversion to a loan (mean 
values for 1985)« As a result, the corporation has less after-tax 
earnings available to distribute. Although the parents have a greater 
participation rate after conversion, they participate in a smaller cash 
flow stream. The parents' average annual growth rate in equity Increases 
from 16.14 percent before conversion to 16.23 percent after conversion. 
In an argument analogous to the earlier discussion of Table 16 and 17, 
the parents benefit from the reduction in corporate taxes to a slightly 
greater degree than the reduction in corporate cash flows. However, the 
Half Loan-Half Common and All Common curves in Figures 42 and 43 are so 
close together as to suggest that even though stochastic dominance can 
differentiate between them, no substantial difference exists. From Table 
D-1 of Appendix D, the mean and variance of the All Common curve in 
Figure 42 are $3,781,500 and $252,506,300,000 whereas the mean and the 
variance of the Half Loan-Half Common curve are $3,883,500 and 
$285,262,800,000 .1 
Figure 44 shows the results of the same financing situation, but for 
the heir. Under FSD, the child is also Indifferent between holding his 
(her) entire initial interest in common stock and a market-rate loan. 
^If the Half Loan-Half Common and All Common curves of Figures 42 
and 43 are assumed to be independent and normally distributed, the null 
hypothesis that the means are equal can be tested as is done in Appendix 
D. From Table D-1 of Appendix D there is a better than 80 percent change 
the means are approximately equal. 
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However, If the heir is risk averse ([SSD] in Figure 45), then the son 
will unambiguously prefer the Half Loan-Half Common to All Common 
situation.^ 
The reason why this occurs is the timing at which the heir acquires 
new shares of common stock. Conversion to an loan requires the heir 
initially to give up common stock. As the loan is amortized over the 
planning horizon, the heir is assumed to reinvest the principal (along 
with interest and any other excess cash flows) in new shares of common 
stock on an annual basis. For the heir, the mean of the Half Loan-Half 
Common curve in Figure 44 is larger than the mean of the All Common curve 
($1,085,900 versus $1,048,200) while the variance is smaller 
($14,280,300,000 versus $18,796,400,000). 
A comparison of the detailed solutions (such as those shown in 
Tables 16 and 17) at the mean values provides little insight as to why 
the heir must be risk averse to prefer the Half Loan-Half Common to All 
Common situation. However, the following simplified example in Table 18 
will clarify what is happening. Suppose at time t the heir owns 100 
shares of common stock valued at $100 per share for a total equity 
interest in the firm of $10,000. On the first day of the year, the heir 
converts 50 shares of common stock into a $5,000, one year, 12 percent 
loan. After conversion, the heir owns 50 shares of stock valued at 
$5,000 and a $5,000 loan. Further suppose that during the next year 
^The test of the null hypothesis of equal means can be rejected at 
the 80 percent confidence level (Appendix D, Table D-1). 
232 
there are three possible outcomes for the firm. If the firm has a bad 
year, Its after-tax rate of growth In equity Is 8 percent. If the year 
is mediocre, then the average rate of growth in equity is 9.6 percent. 
And If the firm enjoys an exceptional year, the rate of growth will be 12 
percent. The heir receives the loan principal of $5,000 and Interest of 
$480 after taxes (assuming the heir's marginal tax rate is 20 percent) 
regardless of whether the firm has an exceptional year or a bad year. 
However, the value of the heir's common stock varies with the outcome. 
As a result, if the firm's after-tax rate of growth in equity is 8 
percent, the heir is $80 better off by converting half the common to a 
loan. If the rate of growth is 12 percent, the heir is $120 worse off 
from the conversion. 
There is some after tax rate of growth in equity (in this simple 
example 9.6 percent).below which the heir is better served by converting 
to a loan and above which the heir is better served by holding all common 
stock. 
Now to relate this simple example to the curves in Figure 44. Each 
point on the Half Loan-Half Common curve in Figure 44 measures a change 
in the net terminal wealth of the heir over the ten-year planning 
horizon. Points lying to the lower left on the curve represent smaller 
Increases in net worth than do the points lying toward the upper right. 
Equivalently, points to the lower left correspond to relatively smaller 
rates of growth in equity while points lying to the upper right 
correspond to relatively larger rates of. growth. Below the rate of 
growth corresponding to $1,250,000 in Figure 44, the heir prefers to hold 
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the loan because the after-tax return on the loan exceeds the afte-tax 
rate of growth in common stock. In Figure 44, this occurs at such a high 
rate that the probability of realizing a higher rate Is relatively small. 
Therefore, as shown In Figure 45, a risk averter is not willing to gamble 
on the firm's rate of growth exceeding the fixed return on the loan and 
the heir prefers the loan under second degree stochastic dominance. 
Figures 46, 47, and 48 show the same situation for the parents when 
the parents initially own 60 percent of the firm and the heir owns 40 
percent. When the heir's Initial 40 percent common stock position Is 
split equally between common stock and a market-rate loan, the parents 
are Indifferent under FSD (Figure 46) and SSD (Figure 47). Only under 
third degree stochastic dominance (TSD) do the parents prefer that the 
heir hold half his (her) interest in a loan (Figure 48). That is, all 
parents who are nonsatlated in wealth, who are risk averse, and who 
evidence decreasing absolute risk aversion will unambiguously prefer that 
the heir hold a market-rate loan in lieu of common stock. However, as 
shown in Table D-1, there Is little substantial difference between the 
means of the two curves. 
The heir also prefers the Half Loan-Half Common arrangement because 
he (she) is receiving the annual Interest and principal payments and can 
reinvest the proceeds in new common stock (Figure 49). 
Figures 50 and 51 compare common stock with a 12 percent constant 
principal loan when the parents' share is split equally between common 
stock and a loan. There are several reasons why the parents might 
consider such a financing strategy as this. For example, if dividends 
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are not being paid and the parents can not satisfy the reasonableness 
test for salaries or directors' fees, interest payments can be used to 
support their standard of living. Another possible reason is the sense 
of assurance that interest payments provide as a known source of income. 
Finally, common stock with voting rights carries with it responsibility 
to direct and manage the firm. When parents reach a certain stage in 
their lives, they may no longer wish to bear that responsibility. In 
Figure 50, the parents in a Class IV farm who intially own 80 percent and 
convert half their common stock to a 12 percent loan, prefer, under first 
degree stochastic dominance, the All Common outcome to the Half Common-
Half Loan. The heir prefers that the parents own half their interest in 
common and half in a loan under first degree stochstic dominance (Figure 
51). 
The reason that the parents prefer to keep all their interest in 
common instead of half in a loan is that their proportionate interest in 
the equity decreases from 80 percent to (80-40)/( 100.-40) or 67 percent. 
Although the parents receive periodic interest payments which can be 
reinvested in the firm, this is more than offset by the decrease in their 
equity participation. The heir prefers that the parents hold a loan 
because his proportionate equity interest increases from twenty percent 
to one-third. This more than offsets the decrease in the cash flow 
stream from the periodic interest payments. Although only the results 
for a class IV farm are presented here, the same preference ordering is 
true for the other representative farm sizes. 
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Common Stock Versus a Constant Principal Loan 
at Below Market Rate of Interest 
Figures 52 to 54 show the tradeoffs for the parents and the heir for 
a Class V farm initially divided 80/20 when the heir redeems half his 
(her) common stock for a below market-rate, ten-year constant principal 
loan (assumed to be 9 percent). In Figure 52, the parents in this situa­
tion prefer the heir to hold half his (her) Interest in a loan under 
first degree stochastic dominance. However, the means for the Half Loan-
Half Common curve and the All Common curve in Figure 52 are not signifi­
cantly different at the 80 percent level of confidence ($3,924,400 as 
opposed to $3,781,500 with variances of $287,296,000,000 for the Half 
Loan-Half Common and $252,506,300,000 for the All Common financing 
arrangement). The heir, however, does not care whether he (she) has an 
all common interest or a half common-half below^arket loan under first 
degree stochastic dominance, as shown in Figure 53. The mean of the Half 
Loan-Half Common curve in Figure 53 is slightly larger ($1,059,000 versus 
$1,048,200) and the variance is slightly smaller ($13,689,000,000 versus 
$18,796,000,000) but the mean difference is not significant. Therefore, 
there is little substantial difference for the heir between the two 
financing arrangements. If the heir is risk averse, he (she) will 
unambiguously prefer the Half Loan-Half Common to the All Common 
situation under second degree stochastic dominance (Figure 54). 
The use of a constant principal loan by the heir instead of common 
stock affects the cash flows of the firm and the rate of appreciation per 
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Figure 52. A comparison of common stock with a 9 percent loan with a 9 percent bond for the 
parents of a Class V farm who initially own 80 percent (all in common stock) and an 
heir who initially ovnis 20 percent (half in.common and the other half in either common, 
a loan or a bond) 
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Figure 53. A comparison of common stock with a 9 percent loan with a 9 percent bond for the heir 
of a Class V farm who initially owns 20 percent divided half in common and the other 
half in either common, a loan or a bond 
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Figure 54. Second degree stochastic dominance of the situation shown in Figure 53 
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share of common stock. Before conversion, the organization paid 
accumulated income taxes of $1,102,033 while after conversion, it paid 
$1,067,611 (for the mean solutions). However, the $5,752 interest 
payment for 1985 to the heir reduced the firm's 1985 after-tax net income 
from $170,165 before conversion to $166,281 after conversion. The 
average annual growth rate in equity increased with the conversion from 
16.14 percent to 16.33 percent for the parents and from 17.03 percent to 
24.01 percent for the heir. The attractiveness of the loan to the 
parents or the heir is a function of the after-tax cost of debt servicing 
to the firm, the after-tax rate of return on the loan, and the rate at 
which the per-share value of the common stock is increasing. The 
interactions of these three will determine whether the loan or the common 
stock is more desirable. 
Common Stock Versus a Market Rate Bond 
If the loan discussed in the previous two sections did not require 
periodic principal payments but merely a balloon payment at maturity, it 
would be, in effect, a ten-year bond between the heir and the corpora­
tion. The Half Bond-Half Common curves in Figures 42 through 49 
represent the distribution of terminal wealth of the parents and the heir 
when the heir holds half his (her) interest in common stock and half in a 
ten year bond paying the market rate of interest. 
In all cases, the parents prefer the redemption of half the heir's 
common stock for the bond under FSD. Conversely, the heir prefers not to 
hold the bond in all cases under FSD. The parents prefer that the heir 
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redeem his (her) common stock for a bond because this Increases the 
parent's participation In the growth of net worth by more than the 
decrease In the after-tax corporate cash flow. Accumulated corporate 
Income taxes decline from $1,102,128 to $949,959 because of the tax 
deductible interest payments on the bond. However, the after-tax net 
income of the firm declines from $170,175 to $151,905 because of the 
interest payment to the heir (mean values for 1985 for the parents and 
heir of a class V farm divided 60/40, as shown in Figure 46 and Figure 
49), After conversion to a bond, the parents' average annual equity 
growth rate increases from 16.43 percent to 17.63 percent while the 
heir's annual growth rate declines from 16.16 to 15.94 precent. As can 
be seen in Table D-1, all comparisons between common stock and a market 
rate bond are significantly different at the 95 percent confidence level. 
Intrafamlly conflict occurs with the proposed use of bonds bearing the 
market rate of Interest. 
However, if the parents' objective function of maximizing their 
expected utility of terminal wealth Is constrained by a desire to facili­
tate the transfer of the farm to the heir, then bonds will never be 
employed as a transfer device because the heir's expected utility of 
wealth is always higher when all of the heir's Interest is in common 
stock than when that Interest is split between common stock and a bond. 
Common Stock Versus a Below-Market Kate Bond 
The Half Bond-Half Common curves in Figures 52 through 54 represent 
the situations where the heir's Interest is divided into half common 
241 
stock and half in a 9 percent bond, where 9 percent Is three percent 
below market. In all cases, the results are the same as for the 12 
percent bond. That is, the heir is worse off in terms of terminal wealth 
with the use of the bond, and mean differences are significantly dif­
ferent at the 95 percent confidence level. This supports the argument of 
the previous section in that the bond with either a market or below 
market rate of interest is not effective in facilitating intergenera-
tional transfers. 
However, if the effects of the interest rte are symmetrical, these 
results lead to the hypothesis that a bond with aii above market rate of 
interest would Improve the heir's economic position relative to the full 
ownership of common stock. Therefore, parents who are genuinely 
concerned about transfer of the farm to the heir should consider bonds 
only if the bond carries an above-market interest rate.^ 
Constant Principal Loans Versus Bonds 
Figures 42 through 54 can be used to compare situations where the 
heir's interest in the corporation is composed half of stock and half in 
either a constant principal loan or half in a bond. Figures 42 through 
49 compare the situation when both the bond and loan carry a market-rate 
of interest. Figures 52 through 54 compare the two at 9 percent. 
^This is not as attractive an option with nonfarm heirs. The on-
farm heir is assumed to revinvest any excess personal cash flow in the 
corporation whereas the nonfarm heirs would not be expected to do so. 
Therefore, with an on-farm heir, the corporation does not experience the 
cash flow problems it would with nonfarm heirs. 
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In all cases, the constant principal loan Is preferred to the bond 
by the heir, while the parents always prefer the bond over the constant 
principal loan.^ Referring to Appendix D, all mean differences between 
Half Loan-Half Common and Half Bond-Half Common for the parents and the 
heir are significant at the 80 percent level of confidence and some are 
significant at the 95 percent level. The reason for this preference 
scheme Is the role that periodic principal payments play. The heir 
receives Interest on the loan balance in each case but with the loan, the 
heir also receives periodic principal payments which can be used to 
purchase new shares of common stock. As a result, with a loan, the heir 
receives annual income and enjoys the right to increase his (her) propor­
tionate ownership of the firm. Conversely, the parents' proportionate 
equity in the firm is continually being diluted due to the Issuance of 
new shares to the heir. When the bond arrangement is used, the principal 
of the bond is not used to acquire new common stock, and the rate of 
dilution of the parents' Interest in the corporation is not as rapid. 
However, since Interest is paid on the outstanding balance, the 
decrease in the after-tax cash flow stream of the corporation is greater 
with the bond than with the loan. The two effects partially offset each 
other, but the loss in participation through dilution is greater than the 
^As discussed in the earlier sections, the parents prefer the 
exclusive use of common stock, but the heir prefers either a bond (held 
by the parents) or a loan (held by the heir). The parents ranking of 
preferences when they have the option of converting half their common 
stock into a loan or bond would be common stock over either a bond or a 
last. Whereas, the heir prefers the bond over the loan over all common 
stock. 
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cash flow difference from the interest payments, so the parents prefer 
the bond to the loan. 
If the parents' objective function includes the desire to transfer 
the farm to the heir, it is preferable to use the constant principal loan 
over the interest-only bond. 
Market Versus Below Market Interest Rates 
Figures 55 through 58 compare a below-market constant principal loan 
against a market-rate constant principal loan. Figures 59 through 60 
make the same comparison for bonds. In all situations the parents prefer 
the lower interest rate while the heir prefers the higher rate under FSD. 
For a class V farm initially owned 80 percent by the parents, and with 
the heir's conversion of half his (her) common stock to a loan, the 
parents' average annual equity growth rate is slightly larger when 9 
percent interest is paid on the loan than when 12 percent is paid. 
Conversely, the heir's average annual growth rate in equity increases 
slightly when the interest rate on the loan is increased from 9 to 12 
percent. Similarly, when the parents' interest is divided half in common 
stock and half in either a bond or a loan, the parents prefer 12 percent 
to 9 percent under first degree stochastic dominance. At the same time, 
the heir prefers, by first degree stochastic dominance, that the parents 
receive the below-market interest rate. However, as can be seen in Table 
D-1, the means are not significantly different at the 80 percent level of 
confidence (with the exception of Figure 60). 
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Figure 55. A comparison of a 12 percent and a 9 percent loan for the parents of a Class V farm who 
initially own 80 percent (all in common stock) 
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Figure 56. Â comparison of a 9 percent and a 12 percent loan for the heir of a Class V farm who 
initially owns 20 percent (half in common stock and half in a loan) 
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Figure 57. A comparison of a 9 percent and a 12 percent loan for the parents of a Class V farm who 
initially own 60 percent (all in common stock) 
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Figure 58. A comparison of a 9 percent and a 12 percent loan for the heir of a Class V farm who 
initially owns 40 percent (half in common and half in a loan) 
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Figure 59. A comparison of a 9 percent and a 12 percent bond for the parents of a Class V farm who 
initially own 60 percent (all in common stock) 
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Figure 60. A comparison of a 9 percent and a 12 percent bond for the heir of a Class V farm who 
initially owns 40 percent (half in common stock and half in a loan) 
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In terms of the maximization of expected utility, the two parties 
will be In conflict over the relevant Interest rate to use. If the 
Intergeneratlonal transfer Is desired, the process will be facilitated by 
placing an above market rate of Interest on debt Issued to the heir and a 
below market rate of Interest on debt Issued to the parents. 
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CHAPTER VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical findings of selected financing arrangements were 
discussed and presented In Chapter VI. The financing arrangements 
studied were the mix of ownership between the parents and the heir, the 
use of salaries and directors' fees as opposed to dividends, and the 
redemption of common stock for either a market or below-market rate loan 
of bond by the parents or the heir. Those findings are summarized below. 
Mix of ownership between parents and heir 
Three ownership mixes were analyzed as starting points for later 
comparisons. These were 100 percent owned by the parents (100/0), 80 
percent owned by the parents and 20 percent owned by the heir (80/20), 
and 60 percent owned by the parents and 40 percent owned by the heir 
(60/40). 
The analysis shows that for all representative farms, the orders of 
preference for the parents and the heir Is: 
for the parents: 100/0 80/20 >2 60/40; 
for the heir: 60/40 80/20 100/0. ^ 
These orderlngs highlight the Intrafamlly conflict which arises 
whenever parents attempting to maximize their expected utility of wealth 
^The notation A > Is Interpreted A Is unanimously preferred to 
B by 1th degree stochastic dominance. The notation A% B^ Is 
Interpreted A Is not preferred to B nor B to A by 1th degree stochastic 
dominance. 
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wish to initiate the intergenerational transfer during life. For parents 
to initiate an intergenerational transfer process during their lifetimes, 
their objective of maximizing their expected utility of wealth will have 
to be constrained by the desire to continue the farming operation across 
generations. If it is not, the parents will never give away any of the 
firm and will retain as much control over the farm as they can for as 
long as they can. 
Income sharing plans 
Common methods of sharing income between the parents and the heir 
are through the use of salaries, directors' fees, and dividends on common 
stock. For all situations analyzed, it was true that the ordering 
preference for the parents and the heir is: 
salaries and directors' fees >, dividends. 
This is because salaries and directors' fees are distributed from before-
tax earnings of the firm whereas dividends are distributed from after-tax 
earnings. 
Redemption by the heir of half his (her) 
common stock for either a loan or a bond 
When the loan or the bond is at the market or below market rate of 
interest, the ordering preferences of the parents and the heir for 
selected initial ownership mixes are those shown in Table 18. 
In all situations, the parents prefer that the heir convert half his 
(her) commonstock into a bond because the parents' increased 
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Table 18. Ordering preferences for the parents and the heir when the 
heir converts half his (her) equity Interest Into a bond or 
loan* 
For the 
When the 
parents 
Initially 
own: 
And the 
heir 
Initially 
owns: 
And the 
interest 
rate Is: The ordering preference is: 
80% 20% 12% Bond >1 Loan >2 All Common 
PARENTS 
9% Bond >2 Loan >| All Common 
60% 40% 12% Bond >2 Loan >| All Common 
9% Bond >2 Loan >2 All Common 
80% 20% 12% Loan >2 All Common >2 Bond 
HEIR 
9% Loan > All Common > Bond 
2 1 
60% 40% 12% Loan >2 All Common >2 Bond 
9% Loan >2 All Common Bond 
*Numerical values (means, variance, skewness, and kultosls) that 
accompany this table can be found In Table D-1, Appendix D. 
^>2^Means unamlnously preferred by first degree stochastic 
dominance. 
^>2Heans unanimously preferred by second degree stochastic 
dominance. 
^>2Means unanimously preferred by third degree stochastic 
dominance * 
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participation in the after-tax cash flows of the firm more than offsets 
the decrease in the size of the cash flow stream caused by the interest 
payments. For diametrically opposed reasons, the heir least prefers the 
bond. 
The parents also prefer that the heir convert half his (her) common 
stock into a loan. The preference is not as strong as with the bond. 
(In fact, the parents prefer that the heir hold a bond rather than a loan 
in all situations.) This is because the periodic principal payments made 
to the heir are reinvested in new common stock lAlch continually erodes 
the parents' rate of equity participation in after tax cash flows. • 
The heir prefers to convert half his (her) common stock to a loan 
because their after-tax return on the loan exceeds the rate of return 
foregone in participating in the growth in the equity of the firm. 
If the parents and the heir are risk averters, they both can benefit 
from the heir's holding of a loan. Since there is no interpersonal 
conflict in this situation, creation of an Intrafamily loan to the heir 
Increases the expected utility of both the parents and the heir. 
The same is not true when considering a bond. The parents benefit 
while the heir losses. In this situation, intrafamily conflict exists, 
and the outcomes can't be predicted. However, if the parents wish to 
facilitate the intergeneratlonal transfer of the farm to the heir, the 
issuance of a bond to the heir has the exact opposite effect. That Is, 
it transfers wealth to the parents from the heir. 
Altering the interest rate from 12 percent to 9 percent does not 
significantly alter the ordering preferences. However, an Increase In 
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the interest rate decreases the after-tax cash flow stream of the firm. 
As the interest rate is increased, the heir's income stream increases at 
the expense of the parents. Intrafamily conflict occurs and it is not 
possible to ascertain the interest rate which will maximize the combined 
utilities of the parents and the heir. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
The study discussed one part of the intergenerational transfer 
process—namely, the inter vivos effects of a financing arrangement on 
net terminal wealth. The estate tax consequences were implicitly assumed 
to be unaffected by the financing arrangement selected. Such is not the 
case. Special use valuation and the unlimited marital deduction are just 
two of the estate tax provisions affected by inter vivos financing 
arrangements. Further research needs to be done in expanding this study 
to incorporate estate planning and the estate tax consequences. 
This study left unaddressed intergenerational transfers complicated 
by the presence of one or more off-farm heirs. The on-farm heir was 
explicitly assumed to reinvest in the farm at every available opportu­
nity. To impose this same assumption upon the behavior of off-farm 
heirs, is undoubtedly unrealistic. As a result, the off-farm heirs would 
create equity and liquidity drains on the firm that the on-farm heir does 
not. Financing arrangments that work for the on-farm heir will probably 
not work at all well for the off-farm heir. Farm families with both on-
farm and off-farm heirs will encounter difficulties in transferring the 
farm to the on-farm heir while simultaneously providing equitable 
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treatment of the off-farm heirs. Furthermore, many off-farm heirs have 
little or no desire to own corporate farm stock that doesn't pay 
dividends nor has a secondary market for resale. These off-farm heirs 
will want their potential Inheritances In liquid form. Much additional 
thought needs to be devoted to facilitating the Intergeneratlonal 
transfer of the farm while accommodating the needs of the off-farm 
heirs• 
Further research needs to be done In developing multi-member family 
objective function. This study could Identify conflicts between the 
parents and the heir, but it could not weigh the trade-off of one party's 
gain -against another's loss. 
In this study, conversion from equity to debt was permitted only 
once at the beginning of the planning horizon. In reality, the passage 
of time alters the parents' and heir's needs and circumstances. Further 
research should accommodate organizational conversions at times other 
than the beginning of the planning horizon. 
This study.relied on the corporate organizational form throughout. 
The majority of farms are organized as sole proprietorships or Informal 
partnerships. Further research needs to be done on facilitating 
intergeneratlonal transfers under organizational forms other than the 
corporation. 
Other topics for further research Include: more than one class of 
common stock, debt Instruments convertible into equity, variable interest 
rates, and interest rates Indexed to inflation. 
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Implications 
Farm families Interested in transferring the farm to the on-farm 
heir can enhance such transfers through the use of intrafamily loans to 
the heir bearing the market rate of interest. During inflationary 
periods of economic activity, the expected utility of the heir Is greater 
with a combination of common stock and constant principal loan than with 
all common stock. At the same time, the parent's expected utility also 
is increased when the heir converts half the common stock to an Investor 
interest in a loan. Over the planning horizon, both the heir's and 
parent's terminal wealth is Increased with the loan to the heir. 
The same can not be said for the use of a bond. In all situations 
analyzed, the heir was worse off at the end of the planning horizon in 
terms of expected utility of wealth when the heir converted half his 
(her) common stock into a bond. The parent's expected utility increased 
when the heir held a bond. The conversion of the heir's common stock to 
a bond Increased the wealth of the parents at the expense of the heir. 
This is counterproductive to facilitating an intergeneratlonal transfer. 
As a result, the use of intrafamily bonds to the heir should be 
discouraged when one of the family's objectives Is to facilitate the 
transfer of the farm to the heir. 
This study evaluated the effectiveness of selected financing 
arrangements in facilitating Intergeneratlonal transfers. Certain 
financing arrangements were consistent with intergeneratlonal transfers 
(such as Issuance of a loan to the heir) since both the parents and the 
heir benefitted and no Interpersonal conflicts arose. Other financing 
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arrangements, however, resulted in Interpersonal conflicts with one party 
benefitting at the expense of the other. Although it was possible to 
identify that such conflicts arose, this study was not able to resolve 
such conflicts. What is needed is a family multi-member objective 
function which can weight one member's loss in utility against another's 
gain to determine if the family gains or losses. 
This study focused on the during-life effects selected financing 
arrangements have on intergenerational transfers. The study did not 
integrate the during-life financial consequence of a particular arrange­
ment with its estate tax consequences. To truly facilitate the intergen­
erational transfer process, both during-life and death consequences 
should be evaluated as interdependent parts of a single transfer plan. 
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APPENDIX A: 
PROOFS OF STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE THEOREMS 
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The theorems of first, second and third degree stochastic dominance 
presented in Chapter 3 are reproduced below. 
First degree: F G if and only if G(x) F(x) (A-1) 
for all X e I. 
Second degree; F >2 G if and only if G^(x) 2 F^(x) (A-2) 
for all X e 1. 
Third degree: F >2 G if an only if (A-3) 
a) Pp > UQ and 
b) G^(x) 2 F^(x) for all x e I. 
where denotes "at least as preferred as" for stochastic dominance of 
degree i and F and G are two unequal distributions corresponding to two 
risky propsects* Each degree of stochastic dominance provides a basis 
for unanimous preference of one risky prospect over another for all 
decision makers whose utility functions satisfy the subclass of utility 
functions defined below. 
= {u: u, u' is continuous and bounded on I, 
u > 0 on I*} (A-4) 
U2 = {u: U^, u" is continuous and bounded on I, 
u" < 0 on 1°} (A-5) 
Ug = {u: Ug, u"' is continuous and bounded on I, 
u"' > 0 on 1%^ (A-6) 
For all utility functions of class i, one and only one of the following 
will be true when comparing two risky prospects with unequal 
^The interval, I, is of the form (a, b) or (a, <*>) while the 
interval, 1°, represents the interior of I or (a, b) or (a, "). 
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distributions F and G; 1) F G, 2) G F, or 3) neither F 
G nor G F. 
The theorems Â-1 through Â-3 give conditions that are both necessary 
and sufficient for stochastic dominance. The proof (134, p. 72-77) 
begins by providing the sufficiency part. First, consider the case where 
F is discrete with a finite number of jumps at x^, x^, • . . x , 
where 0 = x^ < x^ < x^ . . . x^ < 1 and f(0) - 0 and f(l) = 1, then the 
expected value of utility is: 
n 
Ep[u(x)] = F(Xq)u(Xq) + Z iF(x^) - F(Xj—)]u(x^^) + [1 - F(l—)Ju(l) 
where 
F(x—) = lim FCx-h) as h —^ 0 from positive values, (Â-8) 
and 
F(l—) • lim (Fl-h) as h —^ 0 from positive values. (A-9) 
Since F is a right continuous step function, (Â-7) can be rewritten as 
n 
Eplu(x)] = F(XQ)u(XQ) + E iF(x^) - F(x^_J^)]u(x^) + [1-F(x^)]u(l) 
n 
= - E F(x. ,) [u(x.) - u(x. ,)] + u(l) (A-10) 
1=1 1 '• 
Since 
*1 
u(x.) - u(x. ,) = / u'(x)dx (A-11) 
1-1 Xi_i 
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Equation (A-10) can be rewritten as 
n X 
E_[u(x)] = u(l) - S F(x. ,) / u'(x)-dx 
" i-1 1 1 *i-l 
1 
= u(l) - F(x) ù'(x)dx (A-12) 
Now form a similar expression for distribution G and subtract from 
(A-12) which gives 
1 
EP[u(x)] - EG[u(x)] » /Q [G(X) - F(x)] u'(x)dx (A-13) 
^ 1 
• /q D (x)u'(x)dx 
where D^(x) = G(x) - F(x). Thus if D^(x) 2 0 for all x e I and the 
strict inequality holds for at least one value of x then E[u(x)P] > 
E[U(X)Q] for all u e and proves the sufficiency part of Theorem 
(A-1) for the case I = [0,1]. 
To examine the case Ug, Integrate (A-13) by parts: 
E[u(x)p] - Elu(x)g] « /Q u^(x)dD^(x) » D^(l)u'(l) 
1 2 
- /q D (x)u"(x)dx (A-14) 
For. u G Ug* u'(l) >. 0 and u" < 0 on I = (0, 1) which proves 
sufficiency in Thereom (A-2). 
To examine Ug, rewrite (A-14) for a linear utility function u(x) = 
X. In this case, D^(l) =• Wp - WQ = /^lG(x) - F(x)]dx. Thus, 
(A-14) can be rewritten as 
1 2 
E[u(x)p] - E[u(x)g] = (Pp-Ug)u'(l) - /g D (x)u"(x)dx (A-15) 
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Integrating (A-15) by parts: 
Etu(x)p] - E[u(x)g] « u*(l) - D^(l)u"(l) + 
1 3 
+ /q D^(x)u"'(x)dx (A-16) 
For u e Ug we have u'(l) 2 0, u"(l) £ 0 and u"'> 0 on 1° which 
proves sufficlentcy In Theorem (A-3). 
Next consider the unbounded case I = (0, *). Defining 
u(<») = lim u(x) (A-17) 
« 
which Is finite by assumption, we have 
E[u(x)pl » u(") - /Q F(x)u'(x)dx. (A-18) 
To prove this, let x^ > 0 be a continuity point of F, and assume 
without loss of generality that u(0) = 0, so that u(x) > 0 on 1°, Then 
*0 
E[u(x)p] = /q u(x)dF(x) + u(x)dF(x) (A-19) 
*0 CO 
» u(Xq)F(xq) - /q F(x)u'(x)dx + u(x)dF(x). 
Now 
0 < f u(x)dF(x) < u(«) dF(x) = u(*) [1-F(x.)], (A-20) 
0 0 
which approaches 0 as Xg », Similarly, 
0 < f(.  F(x)u'(x)dx F(x)u'(x)dx = / "F(x)u'(x)dx 
" « " *0 
< f u'(x)dx = u(») - u(x ), (A-21) 
*0 
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which approaches 0 as Xg . Thus, as approaches infinity, we 
get (A-18). Therefore, 
boundedness of U on I implies that u', u", and u"' all approach zero at « 
so that integration of (Â-22) by parts, as in the finite case, is valid. 
Theorems (A-1) through (Â-3) then follow in a fashion similar to the 
bounded case for the unbounded case and the sufficiency conditions for 
Theorems (A-1) through (A-3) are met. 
The necessary parts of Theorems (A-1) through (A-3) can be proved by 
example. Consider first the subclass of utility functions belonging to 
Uj and suppose that D^(x) < 0 for some x e I. Then F and G must 
cross, that is, there must be a point of continuity, Xq, of both F and 
G in the interval I. We know then that 
E[u(x)p] - E[u(x)g] » /q D^(x)u'(x)dx (A-22) 
which is the same as for the bounded case. We need only note that the 
(A-23) 
where f is defined as the step function 
*0 
0 
(A-24) 
^Slnce Xq is a point of continuity of F and G, the value of 
F (x ) is immaterial. 
*0 
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Note that f Is a nondecreaslng function but is not a member of U.. 
"o ' 
However, it is possible to approximate F arbitrarily closely by a 
*0 
function which is a member of Up so there exists a function belonging 
to U, such that E [u(x)] < E [u(x)]. For example, take U (x) » 1/2 + i r u n 
2  2  — 1 / 2  
1/2 (x-XQ)[(x-XQ) + 1/n ] . For n > 0 u^ e and as n —^ u^(x) 
i 0 for X < Xq, u^(x) f 1 for x > Xq, and u^(Xg) • 1/2 for all n. 
Applying the Monotone or the Dominated Convergence Theorem (38 and 39) on 
the intervals In x:x £ Xq and In x:x Xq , we have; 
Ej,[u^(x)] Ep[f^ (x)l as n —^ » (A-25) 
A similar case can be constructed for distribution G. Thus D^(XQ) < 0 
implies E_[U (x)] < E_[u (x)] for some n, so that F >, G can not be true 
r n b n 1 
which proves the necessary part of the proof for first degree stochastic 
dominance. 
In the context of second degree stochastic dominance, suppose 
2 
D (XQ) < 0 for some XQ S I where XQ is a point of continuity between 
F and G. Integrating by parts gives: 
D^(Xq) = /q® [G(X) - F(x)]dx = /q® x[dF(x)-dG(x)] + 
XolG(Xo) - F(XQ)1 
» (x-xg)[dF(x) - dG(x)] « Eptg^ (x)l - E^tg^ (%)] (A-26) 
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where g (x) Is a plecewlse linear ramp function. 
*0 
g„ (x) 
*0 
x-XQ, X < XJJ 
.0, X > X (A-27) 
The function g (x) is nondecreaslng and concave but is not a member of 
*0 
U^. However, the functions v^(x) « 1/2(x-Xq) - 1/2[(x-Xq)^ + 1/n^]^^^ 
are In I , and v (x) -A g (x) as n —^ By Invoking the Dominated 
z n Xq / 
2 Convergence Theorem, D (x) < 0 implies E_[v (x)] < E_[v (x)l for large 
r n n 
n, so F >2 G is false which proves the necessary part of second degree 
stochastic dominance condition in (A-2). 
To prove the necessary part of (A-3), two conditions must be 
established; Wp 2 and D^(x) >_ 0. Again, suppose D^(x) < 0 
for some point of continuity Xq. Integrating by parts 
D^(Xq) = / q D^(x)dx = XqD^(Xq) - /q® D^(x)xdx 
= -Xq /Q®(x-XQ)dD^(x) - 1/2Xq^ dD^(x) + 1/2 x^dD^(x) 
= 1/2 /q® (x-x^^dD^(x) = 1/2 [-(x-Xq)^][dF(x)-dG(x)] 
= E [h (x)] - E [h (x)]. (A-28) 
E XQ B XQ 
where h^ is the plecewlse quadratic function 
h (x) » 
*0 
- 1/2 (X-Xq)^, X jC XQ 
_0, X > Xq (A-29) 
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Again, although h (x) does not belong to U , the functions w (x) = 
*0 3 n 
*0 2 2 1/9 
1/2 {[(y-Xg) + 1/n ] - (y-XQ)}dy do belong to for n > 0, and 
w^(x) —^ h^ (x) as n —^ », Thus, D^(*q) < 0 implies Ep[w^(x)] < 
E_[w (x)] for large n and F >_ G is false. \7 n j 
Finally, suppose < y^. Consider the function u(x) = e ^(k>0) , 
which is in U^. Define 0^(x) = k% - 1 + e ^  and note that 0 <_ 
0^(x)/k < x for all x 2 0. Also 0^(x)/k —) 0 as k —^ 0, for 
all, X 2 0« The dominated convergence Theorem thus implies 
lim [0 (x)/kl dF(x) = 0 (A-30) 
k-^ 0 ^ 
so 0^(x)dF(x) - 0(k) (A-31) 
Thus Ep[u(x)] = -1 + ky^ + 0(k) as k 4^ 0 and similarly for Eg[u(x)]. 
Then Eplu(x)] < Eg[u(x)] for sufficiently small k, and F >g G is false. 
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APPENDIX B: 
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS AND STATISTICAL RESULTS 
279 
This appendix presents the results of the statistical regressions 
needed to run the simulation model described in (5-1) through (5-33). 
m 
Estimated coefficients, t-values, R and other relevant statistics are 
presented for the projected 1980 balance sheets of the representative 
farms, net operating incomes, cash fixed operating expenses, noncash 
fixed operating expenses and the parameters of the Monte Carlo triangular 
distribution. 
Projected 1980 Balance Sheet 
The projected 1980 Balance Sheets for the representative farms Which 
are summarized in Table 6 were estimated from the cross-sectional, 
time-series of Iowa Farm Business Associations Annual Surveys for the 
years 1970 through 1979 (63). The model used was of the form 
+ 11^ and (B-1) 
"t • '"c-l + 't-
where 
is the category being estimated, 
t is for the years 1970 through 1979, 
is a vector Including an intercept term and the year, and 
e^ and are assumed to satisfy the standard assumptions of 
e^ ~ (0, (P-), 
G j  " 0  fo r  t  ^ j ,  
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are summarized in Table B-1 for 
estimated 1980 liabilities for 1980 
by the debt to asset ratios of Table 
appearing in Table 6. 
Income and Fixed Expense Projections 
Estimated net operating income of (5-2) was estimated using the 
model of (B-1) for each class of farm. The cofficients with 
2 t-values, lag coefficient and R are summarized in Table B-2* 
Cash fixed operating costs of (5-4) and noncash fixed operating 
costs of (5-5) were also estimated using the one period lag model of 
(B-1). The and coefficients, t-values, lag coefficient 
2 
and R are summarized in Tables B-3 and B-4 respectively. 
The coefficients in Tables B-2, B-3 and B-4 predict well as 
9 
evidenced by the high R , but most t-values are not significant. This 
phenomenon is due to the high degree of collinearity among the 
independent variables. In almost all cases, the correlation coefficients 
between the asset types exceeded .9. Fortunately, this problem is not as 
severe as it first appears. If the representative farm is assumed to 
| p  i<  1 ,  
E (Uj.) = 0  
2 
v(u ) sr. and 
1-p 
h 
GOV {u , V } = —a . 
l-pT 
The coefficients, t-values and 
the five representative farms. The 
from Table B-1 were adjusted upward 
6 to arrive at the liability values 
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already be on Its expansion path and that path is linear through the 
origin, then expansion or contraction of the firm size will occur only by 
increasing or decreasing the asset categories in equal proportions. That 
is, no substitution of one asset for another takes place nor is it 
possible to increase income by increasing one asset category without a 
proportionate increase in the others. Therefore, since all independent 
variables (except the year and the intercept) are changed 
proportionately, the effects of the colllnearity are mitigated. 
Parameters of the Monte Carlo Distribution 
As discussed in Chapter V on the Monte Carlo simulation, the 
triangular distribution requires the specification of a lower limit, a 
mode and an upper limit. From the Iowa Farm Business Association's 
annual surveys for the years 1970 through 1979, the mean, standard 
deviation, skewness, kurtosis and coefficient of variation were estimated 
for each representative farm. These statistics are summarized in Table 
B-5. Although the sample sizes are too small to perform statistical 
tests of significance, the values presented In Table B-5 indicate that 
classes 1, 2 and 4 are slightly negatively skewed while classes 3 and 5 
are positively skewed. Furthermore, class 1 farms evidence platykurtlc 
behavior (relative to a normal distribution) while classes 2 through 5 • 
evidence Increasingly leptokurtlc behavior (i.e., less peakedness and 
thicker tails than a normal distribution). It is interesting to note 
that for classes 1 through 4 the absolute dispersion increases with 
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Increasing levels of Income but, as measured by the coefficient of 
variation. It does so at a decreasing rate. 
The information of Table 5-5 can be used to construct points A, M 
and B of the triangular distribution for each class of farm. For a farm 
of class 1, the lower bound A Is 
XJAJ - X - P^'SD^, (B-2) 
where 
Xj, Is the mean of class 1 from Table D-5, 
Aj^ Is the lower bound, 
Is the two-tailed probability measured In standard deviations 
about the mean, and 
SD^ Is the standard deviation of class 1 frcm Table B-5. 
Similarly the upper limit of the triangular distribution for class 1 is 
X^BJ - X + PI'SD^, (B-3) 
where B^ is the upper bound for class 1 farms. Dividing (B-2) and 
(B-3) through by the mean produces 
SD 
Ai - 1 - P . - 1 - P • CV^, and (B-4) 
SD 
B i - l + P '  j - i - l  +  P *  C V ^ ,  
where is the coefficient of varltalon for class 1. 
The value of P is set In accordance with a normal distribution. If 
the underlying distribution is normal, then the triangular distribution 
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can be set to account for 95 percent of that distribution by setting P 
equal to 1.96 standard deviations about the mean. (With P=3.00, 99% of 
the normal distribution would be included In the triangular.) But as was 
pointed out above, none of the distributions appear normal. Therefore, 
by setting P equal to 1.96, something less than 95 percent of the 
distribution is accounted for in classes 2 through 5 because of their 
leptokurtlc behavior. Conversely, since class one appears platykurtic, 
more than 95 percent of the distribution is included in the triangular 
distribution. 
The values of A, H and B for each representative farm are summarized 
in Table B-6 with P set at 1.96 standard deviations about the mean. The 
parameters of Table B-6 are employed in (5-39) to estimate the randomly 
generated error term to adjust the predicted net operating income to an 
actual net operating Income in (5-3). 
o 
Table B-1. Estimated coefficients, t—values and R for 1980 projected balance sheets for the 
representative farms 
Intercept 
1 
Year Intercept 
—II 
Year R2 
Current Assets -347.704 
(-2.65) 
5,411.7 
(3.14) 
.66 -329,892 
(-2.16) 
5,586.5 
(2.78) 
.61 
Intermediate Assets -441,191 
(-14.724) 
6,418.1 
(16.284) 
.98 -693,342 
(-9.75) 
9,931.4 
(10.62) 
.96 
Long-Term Assets -1,053,742 
(-7.36) 
15,455 
(8.21) 
.93 -1,683,405 
(-9.88) 
24,247.8 
(10.82) 
.96 
Current Liabilities -17,658 
(-1.29) 
293.4 
(1.64) 
.35 5,948.9 
(.176) 
28.0 
(.063) 
.0008 
Intermediate Liabilities -11,695.2 
(-1.81) 
176.0 
(2.07) 
.46 -89,809 
(-6.32) 
1,241.8 
(6.64) 
.90 
Long-Term Liabilities -35,831.0 
(-1.18) 
538.8 
(1.35) 
.27 -85,391 
(-5.58) 
1,230.8 
(6.11) 
.88 
Table B-1. continued 
Intercept 
—Ill 
Year R2 Intercept Year R2 
Current Assets -755,247 11,775.7 .97 -726,433 11,813.5 .92 
(-11.08) (13.13) (-6.06) (7.50) 
Intermediate Assets -958,691 13,728.3 .99 -908.502 13,205.4 .997 
(-20.73) (22.56) (-38.15) (42.16) 
Long-Term Assets -2,152,056 31,167.5 .96 -2,912,000 42,002.7 .97 
(9.47) (10.43) (-11.53) (12.65) 
Current Liabilities -94,782 1,414.6 .69 -25,680 543.7 .21 
(-2.94) (3.33) (-0.72) (1.17) 
Intermediate Liabilities -71,654 1,011.9 .92 -70,198 1,010.1 .67 
(-7.24) (7.77) (-2.90) (3.17) 
Long-Term Liabilities -79,050 1,224.6 .75 -114,720 1,739.9 .82 
(-3.28) (3.86) (-4.14) (4.78) 
Table B-1. continued 
•V-
Intercept Year R2 
Current Assets -1,351,370 
(-5.12) 
21,609 
(6.23) 
.89 
Intermediate Assets -1,520.730 
(-30.92) 
22,098.4 
(34.16) 
.996 
Long-Term Assets -4,961,422 
(-13.16) . 
71,525.6 
(14.43) 
.98 
Current Liabilities -197,131 
(-3.61) 
2,939.0 
(4.10) 
.77 
Intermediate Liabilities -137,527 
(-7.10) 
1,931.4 
(7.55) 
.92 
Long-Term Liabilities -390,753 
(-3.56) 
5,569.8 
(3.86) 
.75 
Table B^2. Net operating income (NOI) by class. Coefficients, t-values in parentheses, lag 
coefficients and R are estimated with a one period lag autoregressive model 
Class 
<-01> 
1 
<\i> 
CÀ 
<-31> 
lA 
(-4i> 
FA Year P R2 
Rotated 
Acres 
1 -741,120.7 -2.685 8.218 -2.381 12,432.9 .4806 .93 136 
. 
(-.29) (-.74) (1.52) (-.93) (.321) (1.45) 
2 875,141.6 .080 2.469 - .351 -12,028.7 .4275 .87 196 
(.36) (.043) (.67) (-.98) (-.36) (1.25) 
3 -276,301.8 - .178 1.618 - .554 5,038.8 .6099 .92 282 
(-.32) (-.14) (1.14) (-2.38) (.387) (2.04) 
4 -340,475.3 -4.271 10.194 -1.631 10,337.4 .6535 .99 359 
(-.12) (-2.36) (7 .00) (-2.77) (.23) (2.28) 
5 25,043,417.8 1.478 11.149 1.025 -370,217.7 .4247 .99 614 
(2.26) (1.03) (4.83) (1.12) (-2.24) (1.24) 
Table B-3. Cash fixed operating costs (CFOC) by class. Coefficients, t-values in parentheses, 
one period lag coefficient and R are estimated with an autoregresslve model 
Class 1 CA 
(*li) 
lA 
(êzi) 
FA 
(*3i) 
Year P R2 
1 -5,070.4 
(-1.06) 
.071 
(7.00) 
-.0143 
(-8.88) 
97.45 
(1.40) 
.5297 
(1.65) 
.99 
2 31,658.7 
(3.22) 
.045 
(2.73) 
.0098 
(1.79) 
-425.56 
(-3.01) 
.6728 
(2.41) 
.99 
3 -216,595.3 
(-.99) 
.089 
(.38) 
-.0968 
(-2.62) 
3,177.14 
(1.01) 
.6506 
(2.27) 
.76 
4 -67,018.6 
(-1.00) 
-.016 
(-.27) 
-.0053 
(-1.25) 
1,015.61 
(1.05) 
.4880 
(1.48) 
.99 
5 365,010.7 
(-1.36) 
-.079 
(-.63) 
-.0285 
(-2.35) 
5,273.47 
(1.38) 
.4835 
(1.46) 
.98 
Table B-4. Depreciation (noncash fixed operating costs, NCFC) by class. Coefficients, 
t-values in parentheses, one period lag coefficient and R are estimated 
with an autoregresslve model 
Class 
(ioi) 
1 CA 
(Til) 
lA 
(^21^ 
FA 
(fsi) 
Year P R2 
1 14,517.62 
(.70) 
.105 
(2.26) 
-.0015 
(-.23) 
-168.91 
(-.56) 
.3440 
(.97) 
.98 
2 38,223.1 
(1.83) 
.082 
(2.38) 
-.0188 
(1.72) 
-519.27 
(-1.73) 
.4945 
(1.51) 
.99 
3 -61,005.3 
(-2.55) 
-.007 
(.28) 
-.0053 
(1.20) 
921.01 
(2.69) 
.5216 
(1.62) 
.99 
4 -161,959.5 
(-3.20) 
-.038 
(-.85) 
-.0113 
(-3.49) 
2,390.70 
(3.26) 
.2893 
(.80) 
.99 
5 -503,461.3 
(-4.15) 
-.163 
(-2.89) 
-.020 
(-3.74) 
7,275.32 
(4.20) 
.6107 
(2.04) 
.99 
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Table 5-5. Statistical measures of net operating income from the Iowa 
Farm Business Association annual surveys by Class for the 
years 1970 through 1979 
Standard Coefficient 
Mean Deviation Skewness Kurtosis of variation 
Class (X) (S.D.) (Yj)* (?%)** (CV)*** 
1 $ 33,284 $14,659 - .354 -2.507 .44043 
2 45,900 15,645 - .267 .976 .34084 
3 59,463 18,318 1.203 1.575 .30805 
4 73,335 21,530 - .368 2.038 .29358 
5 123,033 58,633 1.955 4.528 .47656 
**^2 ' [z(x-5)^/nJ^ " ^ 
***CV =^Z(x-x)^/n ^ jQQ 
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Table B-6. Parameters of the triangular distribution with a probability 
of ninety-five percent (P=.95) 
Lower Limit Upper Limit Mode Mean 
Class A B M X 
1 0.1368 1.8632 0.85 1 
2 0.3320 1.6680 0.90 1 
3 0.3962 1.6038 1.10 1 
4 0.4246 1.5754 0.80 1 
5 0.0659 1.9341 1.30 1 
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APPENDIX C: 
THE IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY BUSINESS AND 
FINANCIAL PLANNING MODEL 
293 
The Iowa State University Business and Financial Planning Model Is 
composed of 30 subroutines. The program Is written in PL/1 programming 
language and encompasses over 9,000 programming statements. The primary 
objective of the model is to serve as a computer aid in the planning 
stage of the decision making process. As such, the model identifies the 
financial consequences for a given set of production, investment and 
financial decisions. Also, the model compares the financial consequences 
of the sole proprietorship, partnership and regularly taxed corporation 
forms of legal organization. 
The necessary input for the model is in three parts. The first part 
details the personal characteristics of each family and nonfamlly member 
Involved with the business. The second part describes the current 
balance sheet of the farm and the personal assets and liabilities of each 
individual. The third part of the input details the ownership character­
istics and Income sharing arrangements of the family firm if it is 
organized as a sole proprietorship, a partnership or a corporation. 
Exogenous parameters supplied to the model include the annual 
anticipated rates of inflation, interest rates and rates of return on 
business and personal property over the specified planning horizon. 
For each legal form of organization, the model generates a set of 
expected comparative financial statements. These comparative statements 
include a comparative statement of financial position, a comparative 
statement of changes in financial position (incorporating a statement of 
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Income) and a comparative statement of cash flows for each family 
member• 
The following discussion Identifies each subroutine In the model and 
briefly describes the subroutines functions. 
MAIN 
The main subroutine identifies all the variables, working matrices 
and output vectors to be used In the model. It controls the flow of 
execution through the model and calls the supporting subroutines In the 
correct sequence. The calculations are performed Iteratlvely for each 
year of the planning horizon. After all computations are completed, the 
report generating subroutines are called. 
The subroutines called by MAIN and the order in which they are 
called are: 
1. DATE 
2. INPUT 
3. OUTAA 
4. CARLO 
5. CLEAN 
6. FRM_ASS 
7. ALLOCTE 
8. PLANS 
9. INFLTN 
10. SOLE 
11. PRTNERS 
12. CORP C 
13. CORP~S 
14. FLOWS 
15. FRM INV 
16. SUMARY 
17. OUTCC 
18. OUTBB 
19. OUTEE 
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ALLOCTE 
At the beginning of each planning period, this subroutine determines 
the value of each owner's equity Interest In the firm. Assets and 
liabilities are valued at fair market values. 
The only subroutine called by ALLOCTE Is PER_ASS. 
BUY 
This* subroutine reinvests any positive cash flows after consumption 
and living expenses In new business or personal assets. For the sole 
proprietorship It actually acquires the assets. For the partnership or 
corporation, It merely Identifies the amount available for Investment. 
Subroutines called by BUY are: 
1. PER_ASS 
2. UPDATE 
CAP_ASS 
This procedure calculates the taxable, deductible and nontaxable 
portions of all capital transactions and any other transactions which 
qualify for capital gain treatment under Section 1231 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. This subroutine also calculates ordinary Income and loss 
on capital transactions along with short and long term carrybacks and 
carryforwards. 
CARLO 
This subroutine generates a stochastic varlate In the range (0, 1) 
using a power residual random number generator. The varlate Is mapped 
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into the cumulative density function of a triangular distribution with 
preassigned parameters to determine the Monte Carlo error term to be 
applied to predicted net operating income. 
CLEAN 
This subroutine initializes to zero all working matrices, vectors 
and variables at the start of the planning horizon for each legal form of 
organization. * 
CONSUMP 
This subroutine estimates the living expenses for each family and 
nonfamily member. 
CORP_C 
This subroutine calculates the financial and tax consequences for 
the regularly taxed corporation. Calculations performed include the 
determination of gross income, net taxable income, fixed operating costs, 
depreciation, debt servicing, salaries and director's fees, capital gain 
or loss (including carryover), charitable deductions and any net 
operating loss. The regular corporate tax is calculated and if net long 
term capital gains exceed net short term capital losses, the tax under 
the alternate method is also calculated. Next, the lesser of the regular 
tax or the alternate tax is compared to the minimum tax on tax preference 
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Items to find which is larger. This value becomes the corporate federal 
income tax. 
To the extent possible, dividends on common and preferred stock are 
paid from earnings and profits in accordance with the specified income 
sharing plan. 
Finally, any accumulated earnings tax liability is calculated. 
Subroutines called by CORP_jC and the order in which they are called 
are: 
1. DEFREC 
2. RTREJ)T 
3. CAP_ASS 
DATE 
This is a generic, built in subroutine which returns the current 
day, month and year. 
DEPREC 
This subroutine computes the per period and accumulated depreciation 
expenses for the asset base described in the financial statement. 
FLOWS 
This subroutine calculates the per period cash flow for each 
individual. Salaries, director's fees, nonfarm Income, social security, 
interest income and dividends are all Included in personal Income. 
Pesonal income taxes, charitable and noncharltable gifts and personal 
consumption expenditures are calculated. 
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Any excess positive cash flow is available for reinvestment In 
business and personal assets. Any deficit cash flow Is made up with 
short term personal borrowings. 
Subroutines called by FLOWS are: 
1. RTREJ)T 
2. CONSUMP 
3. CAP__ASS 
4. INCJTAX 
5. PER_ASS 
6. UPDATE 
FRM_ASS 
This subroutine totals the assets and liabilities by maturities. 
FRM__INV 
This subroutine invests (or dislnvests) in new (existing) assets in 
the same proportion as the existing ownership pattern. 
The only subroutine called by FRM_INV is UPDAT2. 
INC_TAX 
This subroutine determines the personal federal income tax liability 
for each member. It calculates gross income, adjusted gross income, 
deductions for dependents. Itemized deductions and the tax liability from 
the appropriate table. 
The only subroutine called by INC TAX is CAP ASS. 
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INFLTN 
This subroutine determines the appreciation in asset nominal values 
due to the effects of inflation. The inflation rates by asset type are 
exogenously specified. 
INPT 
This subroutine reads and stores the input for the family 
characteristics, financial statement, ownership pattern and anticipated 
financial and transaction plans for the particular situation to be 
analyzed. 
INT__ROR 
The subroutine interactively solves for the internal rate of return 
on the net change in nominal equity ownership of an individual over the 
planning horizon. 
OUTAA 
This subroutine outputs the family characteristics, property 
inventory and initial financial statements for each legal form of 
organization. 
OUTBB 
This subroutine outputs the summary comparison figures for the sole 
proprietorship, partnership and regularly taxed corporation. 
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OUTCC 
This subroutine outputs the comparative financial statements of 
position, changes in position and individual cash flows for each legal 
form of organization. 
OUTEE 
This subroutine outputs the first, second and third degree 
stochastic dominance discrete cumulative density values for total net 
assts owned by the parents and each heir. 
PER_ASS 
This subroutine calculates the net fair market value of the personal 
assets owned by an individual. 
PLANS 
This subroutine handles all the anticipated transactions such as 
gifts, land sales, asset purchases, setting up trusts, long term debt 
borrowing and long term debt prepayment. The subroutine Incorporates 
the anticipated (planned) transaction at the correct time into the flow 
of events. 
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Subroutines called by FLANS listed in the order in Which they are 
called are: 
1. PER_ASS 
2. UPDATE 
PRTNERS 
This subroutine determines distributable income for the partnership 
and makes the distribution in accordance with the prior agreement. If 
there Is no prior agreement specified, distribution Is made in accordance 
with ownership interests. 
Subroutines called by PRTNERS are: 
1. DEPREC 
2. RTRE_DT 
RTRE_DT 
This subroutine calculates the current interest expense and 
principal payments due on outstanding liabilities for both the firm and 
each individual. 
SOLE 
This subroutine calculates for the sole proprietorship the income 
and expenses from operations and distributes the earnings in relation to 
asset ownership. 
Subroutines called by SOLE are: 
1, DEPREC 
2. RTRE DT 
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CORP_S 
This subroutine details the financial consequences of the specially 
taxed subchapter S corporation. 
SUMARY 
This subroutine calculates and saves the summary comparison 
statistics among the legal forms of orgranlzatlon. 
Subroutines called by SUMARY are: 
1. INCJTAX 
2. INT_ROR 
UPDATE 
This subroutine updates the property Inventory and ownership 
information for purchases, sales and transfers of individuals and the 
sole proprietorship, 
UPDAT2 
This subroutine updates the property Inventory and the ownership 
information for the partnership, regularly taxed corporation and 
subchapter S corporation. 
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APPENDIX D: 
TESTS FOR SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEANS 
304 
Stochastic dominance theorems are very effective In distinguishing 
between two distributions. Although the theorems can Identify the 
preferred distributions, they provide no information on how much more 
preferred one distribution is over another. In several of the figures of 
Chapter VI, the curves are so close together as to intuitively suggest 
that, as a practical matter, little significant difference exists between 
the financing arrangements. This intuitive reasoning is supported by two 
arguments. First, each cumulative density function is based on a 
probability distribution generated from a random sample of a population 
for which the statistical moments are unknown. This Implies that 
sampling error could explain the difference between the cumulative 
density functions. Second, even if two cumulative density functions are 
significantly different, the monetary difference may not be large enough 
to justify altering the present financing arrangements. 
The latter argument can not be addressed without more knowledge 
about a decision maker's utility specification and the costs of altering 
the present organizational and financing structure to the preferred 
structure. However, the first argument can be addressed. 
Any two cumulative density functions created from two independent 
samples have means , which are estimates of their respective 
population means Testing for a significant difference between 
^See Snedecor (114A, pp. 100-116). 
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the population means, , Is based on the t-dlstrlbutlon where t has 
the value 
t = (%! - Xg] - (Uj - Wg) 
. (D-1) 
-1 ®2 
The denominator is the variance of the difference of two populations 
which equals the sum of the variances. However, the population variances 
2 2 2 
are unknown. The two samples furnish unbiased estimates of and 
2 
of Og. Consequently, the ordinary t of (D-1) can be replaced by the 
quantity. 
t* = (Xj - X2) - (Wj - *2) 
(D-2) 
"1 *2 
When the number of observations are the same for each sample (n^ 
n^ • n), Equation (D-2) simplifies to 
t' = (X^ - Xj,) - (u^ - ® 
. (D-3) 
To test the null hypothesis that = y^, the standard normal 
deviate, Z, can be constructed from (D-3), or 
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Z - n (Xj - Xg) 
. (D-4) 
4 + 4 
From a cumulative normal frequency distribution, the probability of 
a larger value of Z occurring, ignoring sign, can be determined. Table 
D-1 presents the mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis for selected 
cumulative density functions in Chapter VI. In addition, the calculated 
Zs, the probability of a larger value occurring and mean differences 
significant at the 80 and 95 percent levels are presented. 
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Table D-1. Tests of significant differences between means of the 
probability distribution functions of the cumulative density 
functions of Chapter VI 
Mean Variance 
Figure from (x (x Skew- Null 
Chapter VI $1,000) $1,000,000) ness Kurtosis Hypothesis Z 
38 
A. Salaries 1,807.6 17,187.2 -.604 
B. Dividends 1,518.1 3,881.3 -.985 
.240 Hg: 12.61** 
.915 
39 
A. Salaries 19.6 
B. Dividends 8.38 
4.2 -.955 .966 Hg: 31.74** 
.799 1.20 -.164 
40 
A. Salaries 1,102.5 6,416.0 -.621 
B. Dividends 893.5 1,211.0 -.867 
.274 Hq: 15.14** 
1.82 
41 
A. Salaries 726.5 
B. Dividends 613.1 
2,756.3 -.615 .261 Hq! 12.20** 
702.3 -.960 2.12 
42 
A. All Common 3,781.5 252,506.3 -2.79 
B. Half Loan 3,883.5 285,262.8 .383 
C. Half Bond 4,084.0 306,583.7 .384 
.448 Hq; li^=UB .88 
,079 
.085 
' "b""C 
: 2.56** 
44 
A. Half Bond 877.6 10,363.2 .424 
B. All Common 1,048.2 18,796.4 -.292 
C. Half Loan 1,085.9 14,280.3 .448 
.175 Hq: ii^=U3 6.32** 
.462 : 1.31* 
.242 : 8.39** 
46 
A. All Common 2,936.7 150,621.6 -.284 
B. Half Loan 2,990.0 181,220.5 -.393 
C. Half Bond 3,323.6 212,890.0 -.411 
.453 Hq; .59 
.607 
.670 
; Ug=Ug 3.39** 
: 4.06** 
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Table D-1. continued 
Mean Variance 
Figure from (x (x Skew- Null 
Chapter VI $1,000) $1,000,000) ness Kurtosis Hypothesis 
49 
A. Half Bond 1,609.5 37,908.1 
B. All Common 1,893.1 63,302.6 
C. Half Loan 1,964.8 50,580.0 
.354 .630 Hq: 5.64** 
.280 .449 ; 1.34* 
-.299 .538 : 7.55** 
52 
A. All Common 3,781.5 252,506.3 
B. Half Loan 3,924.4 287,296.0 
C. Half Bond 4,147.4 308,913.6 
-.279 .448 Hq: 1.23 
.389 .085 
.393 .096 
: 1.83* 
: 3.09** 
53 
A. Half Bond 838.2 9,722.0 
B. All Common 1,048.2 18,796.4 
C. Half Loan 1,059.0 13,689.0 
.421 .160 Hq: UA'PB 7.86** 
.292 .462 : Wg=Wg .38 
.447 .234 : 9.13** 
55 
A. 12% 
B. 9% 
3,883.5 285,262.8 .383 .079 Hg: .34 
3,924.4 287,296.0 .389 .085 
56 
A. 9% 
B. 12% 
1,059.0 13,689.0 .447 .234 Hg: 1.02 
1,085.9 14,280.3 .448 .242 
57 
A. 12% 
B. 9% 
2,990.0 181,220.5 -.393 .607 Hg: .69 
3,056.0 183,440.9 -.369 .570 
58 
A. 9% 
B. 12% 
1,919.3 48,180.3 -.284 .508 Hg: .92 
1,964.8 50,580.0 -.299 .538 
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Table D-1. continued 
Figure from 
Chapter VI 
Mean 
(x 
$1,000) 
Variance 
(x 
$1,000,000) 
Skew-
ness Kurtosis 
Null 
Hypothesis Z 
59 
A. 12% 3,323.6 212,890.0 -.411 .670 Ho: Wa'WB 1.01 
B. 9% 3,428.1 215,110.4 -.374 .602 
60 
A. 9% 1,546.9 35,231.3 -.328 .564 Ho: 1.46* 
B. 12% 1,609.5 37,908.1 -.355 .630 
*Signifleant at the 80% confidence level. That Is, there Is 20 
percent or less chance of a larger difference occurring. 
**Significant at the 95% confidence level. There is five percent or 
less chance of a larger difference occurring. 
